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“To the m any genres in the art o f  lying developed in the past, we must 
now add two m ore recent varieties. There is, first, the apparently in­
nocuous one o f  the public-relations managers in governm ent (...). The 
second new variety o f  the art o f  lying, [is] less frequently m et in everyday  
life (...). [It] appeals to (...) professional ‘problem  so lvers’, (...) som e o f  
them equipped with gam e theories and system  analyses (...).
Hence they were not ju s t intelligent, but prided them selves on being 
‘rational’. (T )hey were indeed to a rather frightening degree above ‘sen­
tim en ta lity ’ and in love with ‘th eory’, the world o f sheer m ental effort. 
They were eager to  find formulas, (...) that would unify the m ost dis­
parate phenomena with which reality presented them; that is th ey were 
eager to discover laws by which to explain and predict po litica l and his­
torical facts as though they were as necessary, and thus as reliable, as 
the physicists once believed natural phenomena to be. (...)
The problem -solvers d id  not judge; they calculated. (...) An u tterly  
irrational confidence in the calculability o f  reality [became] the le itm o tif  
o f  the decision-making processes (■■■)■”
Hannah A rendt (1969)
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Abstract
This thesis contributes to a re-examination and extension o f the equilibrium concept 
in normal and extensive form games. The equilibrium concept is a solution concept 
for gam es that is consistent with individual ra tionality and various assum ptions 
about players’ knowledge about the nature o f their strategic interaction. The thesis 
argues that further consistency conditions can be im posed on a rational solution  
concept.
B y  its  very nature, a rational solution concept im plicitly  defines which strategies 
are non-rational. A  rational p layer’s beliefs about p lay  by non-rational opponents 
should be consistent with this im plicit definition o f  non-rational play. The thesis 
shows that equilibrium concepts that satisfy additional consistency requirements 
can be form ulated in Choquet-expected u tility  theory, i.e. non-expected u tility  the­
ory with non-additive or set-valued beliefs, together with an em pirical assumption  
about p layers’ a ttitu de  toward uncertainty.
Chapter 1 introduces the background o f  this thesis. We present the conceptual 
problem s in the foundations o f gam e theory that m otiva te  our approach. We then 
survey the decision-theoretic foundations o f Choquet-expected u tility  theory and 
gam e-theoretic applications o f Choquet-expected u tility  theory that are related to  
the present approach. 1
Chapter 2 formulates this equilibrium concept for normal form games. This concept, 
called Choquet-Nash Equilibrium, is shown to be a generalization o f  Nash Equilib­
rium in normal form games. We establish an existence result for finite games, derive 
various properties o f equilibria and establish robustness results for Nash equilibria.
Chapter 3 extends the analysis to extensive games. We present the equivalent 
o f  subgame-perfect equilibrium, called perfect Choquet Equilibrium, for extensive 
games. Our main finding here is that perfect Choquet equilibrium does not gener­
alize, but is qualita tively different from subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Finally, in chapter 4 we examine the centipede game. It is shown that the plausible 
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Game theory is closely related to the question what constitutes rationality in strate­
gic interaction. The precise nature of this relationship, however, is subtle and con­
troversial. From the point of view of experimental game theory, bounded rationality 
seems a natural explanatory hypothesis o f actual behaviour. From the point of view  
of theories of evolution and learning in games, behaviour is the result o f a dynamic 
process and rationality need not play an explanatory role. Yet, the question what 
strategic rationality means has motivated many concepts in game theory from its 
very beginning (von Neumann 1928, von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944) to the 
present (Dekel & Gul 1997).
In decision theory, following Savage (1954), rationality is defined as a consistency 
property. Under uncertainty, the consequence of an act depends on the state of 
nature. When the ranking of these acts is consistent, i.e. satisfies Savage’s axioms, 
then it corresponds to the maximisation of the subjectively expected utility. Thus 
a decision-maker is rational if and only if he ranks acts as if he has both a utility  
function over consequences and a probability measure over states that expresses his 
beliefs, and an act is ranked higher than another if and only if his expected utility  
is higher
What distinguishes a game from a decision under uncertainty is that the players 
know that the uncertainty arises from strategic interaction, that is the decisions of 
other players. Consequently, in a game the decision-theoretic definition of rational­
ity is not sufficient: A player’s beliefs must be rational as well, i.e. consistent with 
what the player knows. Intuitively, then, a player will be rational if and only if he 
maximises his expected utility given rational beliefs.
If the rationality of the players is common knowledge, this requirement of rational 
beliefs leads to an infinite regress: A player’s beliefs must be consistent with the 
rationality of the opponent, the opponent’s beliefs must be consistent with the 
rationality of the player, and so the player’s beliefs must also be consistent with 
these beliefs of the opponent, ... ad infinitum.
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The central solution concepts in non-cooperative game theory are Nash’s equilib­
rium concept (Nash 1950) in normal form games, and its refinements and extensions 
in extensive form games (Selten 1965, Harsanyi 1967-68, Kreps & Wilson 19826). 
Their status as definitions or implications of game-theoretic rationality is under 
much debate. Alternative game-theoretic solution concepts have been motivated  
by rationality considerations, and, in turn, other justifications have been proposed 
for the equilibrium concept. Yet, the classical motivation for Nash equilibrium and 
subgame-perfect equilibrium —  the lack of an incentive to deviate and the exclusion 
of incredible threats —  refer explicitly to the rationality and the knowledge of the 
players. In particular, the equilibrium concept is consistent with the infinite regress 
that arises if rationality is common knowledge. Finally, the equilibrium concept is, 
so far, the unrivalled solution concept in applied game theory.
For these reasons, this thesis concentrates on the equilibrium concept as an expres­
sion of game-theoretic rationality. Our starting point is the hypothesis that Nash 
equilibrium can be understood as a definition of game-theoretic rationality in games 
in which rationality of the players is common knowledge. We argue, however, that 
further consistency conditions have to be imposed on a rationality concept in games 
without common knowledge of rationality. The objective of this thesis is to show 
that equilibrium concepts that satisfy these consistency requirements can be defined 
on the basis of non-expected utility theory.
The thesis does not claim that Nash equilibrium is indeed an adequate definition of 
rationality in normal form games, even if rationality is common knowledge, or that 
it is the only one. Rather, this view is adopted as a working hypothesis. Although 
a defence of this view can be given (e.g., Aumann & Brandenburger (1995)), the 
importance of the equilibrium concept alone justifies the study of the consequences 
of this view.
The acceptance of the equilibrium concept as a rationality definition for normal 
form games thus leads to two questions: How can this definition be extended to 
normal form games if rationality is not common knowledge? And how can this 
definition be extended to extensive form games? These questions are closely related, 
because a strategy in an extensive form game must specify an action after every 
possible history of the game, and not only after those that are consistent with 
rational play. Equilibrium refinements typically require that the players’ rationality
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is common knowledge even after histories in which players deviated from rational 
play. It is this aspect that is responsible for the controversy whether equilibrium  
refinements capture rationality in extensive games. The analysis of normal form 
games without mutual knowledge of rationality thus serves two purposes, first to 
relax a restrictive assumption about normal form games, and thus to extend the 
scope of the rationality concept, and secondly to provide a basis for the analysis of 
extensive form games.
The acceptance of any game-theoretic solution concept as a definition of rationality 
has the consequence that it also serves as an implicit definition of non-rational 
play: All strategies that do not satisfy the game-theoretic solution concept have to 
be considered non-rational. It follows that every deviation from rational play must 
be considered as evidence of non-rationality of the deviating player. On the other 
hand, compliance with the game-theoretic solution concept cannot be so clearly 
interpreted as evidence of rationality. A conforming player can have followed the 
game-theoretic solution “for the wrong reasons” , for instance by chance.
We are thus led to impose the following consistency conditions on an equilibrium  
concept if rationality is not common knowledge: First, players who do not play equi­
librium strategies must be considered non-rational. Secondly, any non-equilibrium  
strategy is a possible strategy that a non-rational player might choose. When de­
riving equilibrium strategies for rational players, it must be taken into account that 
the opponent need not be rational and therefore that he may play any non-rational 
strategy.
In this situation, the decision-theoretic rationality concept of Savage (1954), that 
provided the starting point of our considerations, is no longer adequate: It forces 
the rational player to form a specific probabilistic belief about the play of a non- 
rational opponent in a situation in which, by definition, the rational player must 
believe that an opponent, if non-rational, chooses any other strategy.
This thesis argues that non-additive decision theory, pioneered by Schmeidler (1989), 
allows the extension of the equilibrium concept that satisfies the additional con­
sistency conditions. Thus, by weakening the demands on individual rationality it 
becomes possible to fulfill stronger consistency requirements in strategic interaction.
In the rest of this introduction we aim to present the background of this thesis 
in more detail. In chapter 2 formulate the equilibrium concept for normal-form
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games in which rationality is not common knowledge. In chapter 3 we formulate an 
analogue o f subgame-perfect equilibrium for extensive games. Finally, in chapter 4 
we analyse the centipede game, which plays an important role in the discussion of 
rationality in game theory.
The rest o f this chapter is organized as follows. In the first section we describe 
how classical game theory captures strategic rationality. Section 2 describes the 
subjective expected utility model in decision theory. Section 3 explains how sub­
jective expected utility theory led to Bayesian game theory, and describes some of 
the difficulties that remain in defining strategic rationality. Section 4 describes the 
Ellsberg paradox, and how this empirical evidence led to the development of de­
cision theory with non-additive beliefs. Section 5 further investigates the meaning 
of non-additive beliefs. Section 6 presents the decision-theoretic aspects o f non­
additive beliefs in more detail and section 7 discusses the problem how to update 
such beliefs. Section 8 describes various equilibrium concepts for games that allow  
non-additive beliefs. Section 9 lists some economic applications, and section 10 
reviews the experimental evidence on uncertainty aversion. Section 11 concludes. 
Finally, section 12 outlines the limitations of our analysis and section 13 specifies 
the terminological conventions.
Before I start, I would like to make some personal remarks. The main purpose 
of this introduction is to try to convince the reader that Choquet expected utility  
theory is not just a technique looking for an application, but a solution to a problem  
in game theory. Thus I owe it to the reader to identify the the relevant underlying 
currents of game theory, and to a degree to evaluate them. When writing about 
such topics as foundations of rationality and probability, I felt the difficulty of 
avoiding formulations that sound grand, or even pretentious. Insofar as I failed in 
this, nothing could be further from my intention.
Also, to keep this introduction to a reasonable length while including the relevant 
aspects, some aspects are so densely argued that I hope that the reader will not be 
put off. In spite of this, I had to leave out many minor aspects and would like to 
refer the reader to other accounts of rationality in game theory, e.g. Dekel & Gul 
(1997) or Rubinstein (1998).
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Finally, each chapter has been written as a self-contained paper. As a consequence, 
the introductions and the description of Choquet expected utility theory in the 
later chapters introduce a degree of redundancy. However, this also allows the 
presentation of the material from the slightly different perspectives taken in the 
analysis of normal form games, extensive form games, and backward induction. 
In addition, I hope that the reader finds it convenient that the chapters are self- 
contained.
In the following I will use the pronoun ‘we’, meant to include the reader.
1.1 Rationality in Classical Game Theory
‘Classical game theory’ (the expression used by Harsanyi & Selten (1988)) can be 
characterized by two aspects: First, the theory attem pts to capture rationality in 
strategic interaction, and is not concerned with evolution or bounded rationality. 
Secondly, the rationality concept itself is implicit and informal. While the solution  
concept is explicitly motivated by rationality considerations, only the solution con­
cept is defined formally, and it is not explicitly derived from a formal definition of 
rationality. Since this thesis contributes to a clarification o f the rationality concept 
in games, we begin with a review of the relationship between rationality and game 
theory.
Rationality first enters game theory implicitly in the concepts of ‘correct play’ and 
‘value of a gam e’.1 These are the concepts that Zermelo (1913) used in his proof 
that chess is strictly determined. His motivation is to find out if every position in 
chess is similar to an endgame, i.e. has a well-defined value for the players, assuming 
that they play according to backward induction, which is ‘surely the only correct 
way’ (Zermelo 1913, my translation). Thus the concept of rationality is im plicitly  
already used, but it is not seen as problematic and not made explicit.
Von Neumann’s publication of the minimax theorem of 1928,2 usually regarded
*It is interesting to note that this is entirely analagous to the way both probability theory and
decision theory began (Hacking 1975).
2Zermelo’s argument contained a gap that was closed in the famous paper on graph theory of
Kbnig (1927). Kdnig (1927) also reports how Zermelo’s own solution, and that Zermelo’s paper
attracted von Neumann to gam e theory. This is noteworthy because Zermelo’s paper is not even
quoted in von Neumann &o Morgenstern (1944): Backward induction gives a com pletely different
13
as the beginning of game theory proper, embodies a different rationality concept.3 
Von Neumann (1928) for the first time argues explicitly —  but inform ally—  on the 
basis of rationality. Playing a minimax strategy is rational because it guarantees 
the security level, and in zero-sum games it is not possible to gain if the opponent is 
guaranteed to get his security level. In other words, a player whose payoff is lower 
than the amount that he can guarantee him self cannot be rational, but in a zero- 
sum game the players cannot both get more than their security level. In particular, 
minimax strategies are equilibria, but that was not von Neum ann’s concern; it 
is well-known that he objected to the equilibrium concept as a general solution  
concept.4
Von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944) attem pted to base the theory of all games on 
the minimax solution. In order to capture the cooperative element present in non- 
zero-sum games, the coalitional structure associated with an extensive game had to 
be analysed, and this association was based on the m inimax principle by adding a 
fictitious player (whose payoff transformed the game into a zero-sum gam e). While 
they thus laid the foundation for the analysis of cooperative games (although the 
distinction was only made explicit by Nash (1951)), the derivation of the coalitional 
structure from the extensive game was unfounded.
N ash’s equilibrium concept (1950, 1951) allowed a direct noncooperative analysis 
of finite nonzero-sum games with finitely many players. Like von Neumann, Nash 
argued explicitly (and informally) on the basis of rationality: Equilibrium strategies 
are rational because unilateral deviations are not profitable. Again, this marks a 
shift in the rationality concept. In fact, one of the objections against the equilib­
rium concept was based on the fact that equilibrium strategies are not m inimax 
strategies (Aumann & Maschler 1972, Harsanyi 1977): There are games in which
solution to non-zerosum games than that proposed in von Neumann Sc M orgenstern (1944).
3See also the first m inim ax argument attributed to Waldegrave in the 2nd edition of de Mont-
mort (1708, 1713), and the notes of Borel (1921,1924,1927)).
4 It seems that one can only speculate on the reasons. Binmore (1996a) suggests that von
Neumann objected to the possible m ultiplicity o f Nash equilibria, since equilibria do not possess 
the payoff-equivalence and exchangeability properties of minim ax strategies. Another reason might 
have been that the characteristic feature of non-zero-sum gam es according to von Neum ann Sc 
Morgenstern (1944) is the presence of both the com petitive and the cooperative elem ent, and the  
latter required for von Neumann a coalitional analysis (von Neumann Sc Morgenstern 1944, Section  
20 ).
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the unique equilibrium payoffs give the value, without guaranteeing it. However, 
this argument ignores that players would then have an incentive to play a best 
reply to the opponent’s minimax strategy instead of their own minimax strategy 
(Harsanyi 1982a).
The subsequent refinement of Nash’s equilibrium concept, initiated by Selten’s con­
cept of subgame perfection (Selten 1965) is again based on a shift in the rationality 
concept. W hile Nash’s reasoning is accepted for games in which all choices are 
simultaneous, it is regarded as too weak in extensive games: Nash’s requirement 
that players have no incentive to deviate is necessary, but not sufficient for ratio­
nality, because it allows ‘incredible threats’ to sustain the equilibrium path. Sub­
sequently, game theory attempted to capture rationality by more and more subtle 
refinement criteria for Nash equilibrium, for instance proper equilibrium (Myerson 
1978), strictly perfect equilibrium (Okada 1981) and strategic stability (Kohlberg 
& Mertens 1986).
Finally, Nash’s original justification of equilibria, i.e. the lack of an incentive to de­
viate, seems to require that players choose their equilibrium strategies because they 
believe that their opponents play their equilibrium strategies. Since the equilib­
rium need not be unique, this rationality concept cannot be considered as complete 
before a rational way to select among equilibria is found (Harsanyi & Selten 1988).
We have thus seen that classical game theory has attempted to capture rationality 
in strategic interaction, but the rationality concept itself has changed with the 
game-theoretic solution concept. Moreover, both the ideas of minimax play and 
equilibrium play have been important throughout. But while game theory has 
made significant progress in our understanding of rationality, classical game theory 
has not been able to provide a definitive characterization.
1.2 Subjective Expected U tility Theory
Building on the expected utility theory of von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944) 
and the probability theory of de Finetti (1931a, 1937), Savage (1954) characterizes 
rationality in decision-making.5 His theory was simplified by Anscombe & Aumann
5See also Ram sey (1926), whose construction takes objective probability (in the form of an 
objective randomization device) as given.
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(1963), and since the following developments take their system as a starting point 
we will present it in more detail.
Anscombe & Aumann (1963) consider a (finite) set of states S  and a (finite) set 
of consequences (‘prizes’) Z . They then assume the existence of an objective ran­
domization device that allows to specify all probability distributions A Z  over Z  
(‘roulette lotteries’, or ‘lotteries’ for short). An (Anscombe-Aumann) act / ,  or 
‘horse lottery’, is then a mapping that associates a probability distribution over Z  
with each state s £  S.
A decision maker (henceforth player) is characterised by a binary relation y  over 
acts. Anscombe and Aumann consider the following axioms:6
( A l )  y  is a complete pre-ordering, i.e. complete and transitive.
(A 2 )  The decision problem is non-trivial, i.e. there exist / ,  f  with f  y  f .
(A 3 ) The preference relation is continuous, i.e. \ i  f  y  g y  h then there exist 
a , P £  (0 ,1) such that7 a f  +  (1 — a)h  y  g y  (3f -f- (1 -  (3)h.
(A 4 )  Preferences are monotonic,8 i.e. if  f ( s )  y  f ' ( s ) for all s  €  S  then /  y  / ' .
(A 5 )  Preferences satisfy the independence axiom, i.e. ii  f  y  f  then for all
a  with 0 <  a  <  1 and all acts g also a f  -f (1 — a)g  y  a f  +  (1 — a)g .
They prove, that if, and only if, the binary relation y  over acts satisfies the above 
axioms then there exist
(1) -a utility function over consequences u : Z  — > 1R that is ‘cardinal’, i.e. unique 
up to affine transformations, and
(2) a unique probability measure ft over states,
(3) such that one act is preferred to another if and only if its expected utility is 
higher, i.e.
f h f '  *=>  ‘^ (s ) ^
ses »es
®This version of the Anscombe-Aumann model follows Schmeidler (1989) and Fishburn (1970).
7Here, the ‘com pound a ct’ [ a f  +  (1 — is defined as a f ( s )  +  (1 — a ) s ( s ) .  This is well-
defined, since A Z  is a m ixture space in the sense of Herstein & Milnor (1953), i.e. it is possible to  
take convex com binations o f probability distributions.
8Here, / ( s )  and f ' ( s )  are roulette lotteries, i.e. probability distributions p i,P2 over conse­
quences, and the preference relation over roulette lotteries (as usual, also denoted y )  is derived 
from the preference over constant acts, i.e. pi y  P2  pj ^  P2 1  where p*(s) =  p for all s £  S.
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In Savage’s (1954) framework, (Savage) acts map states directly into consequences. 
Since the set of consequences does not have a mixture space structure, the axioms 
cannot be expressed in terms of compound acts. Savage’s axioms allow the deriva­
tion of a qualitative likelihood relation over events that is shown to be representable 
by a ‘probability’ measure. Given this measure, in turn, it is possible to derive the 
existence of a utility function and the expected utility characterization.
However, the subtleties of Savage’s theorem (see, e.g., Wakker (1993)) will be impor­
tant for the application of game theory. The set of states must be infinite in Savage’s 
framework and the space of events must be a cr-algebra. The set of acts must be 
sufficiently rich, i.e. include all constant acts. Finally, the probability measure is 
only finitely additive, not countably additive,9 and it cannot have atoms.
1.3 Bayesian Game Theory
On the basis of subjective expected utility theory, classical game theory was criti­
cised by Kadane & Larkey (1982). They argued that for each player, the opponents’ 
strategies correspond to the states of uncertainty, so that decision-theoretic ratio­
nality alone does not go further than specifying that each player has beliefs about 
his opponents’ play. However, Harsanyi (19826) and Aumann (1987) argued that 
this argument overlooks that the players are assumed to know that their opponents 
are rational, and indeed that this is common knowledge.10 Consequently, these are 
restrictions on the beliefs of the rational players that have to be taken into account.
The argument that the game-theoretic solution concept should be formally derived 
from subjective expected utility theory and assumptions about the knowledge of the 
players was given by Spohn (1982) (see Osborne & Rubinstein (1994)). The first 
such derivation was first carried out by Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984). They 
showed that common knowledge of rationality alone only leads to ‘rationalizable’ 
strategy profiles, but not necessarily to equilibrium.
Their work marked the beginning of ‘Bayesian game theory’.11 Subsequent stud­
ies tried to identify the epistemological assumptions that underlie game-theoretic
9 Recently, Stinchcom be (1997) has extended the Savage model to the countably additive case.
10 A fact is common knowledge if everybody knows it, everybody knows that everybody knows 
it, everybody knows that, ad infinitum.
11 Of course, Harsanyi (1967-68) argued explicitly from a Bayesian point of view.
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solution concepts (see, e.g., Tan & Werlang (1988), Battigalli & Bonanno (1998)). 
Particularly influential has been the interactive belief model proposed by Aumann 
(1981, Appendix 4), which adopts Harsanyi’s (1967-68) methodology of games with 
incomplete information. This model was used, in particular, by Aumann (1987) to 
study the epistemic foundations of correlated equilibria, by Aumann & Branden- 
burger (1995) for Nash equilibria, and by Aumann (1995) for backward induction.12
In Aumann & Brandenburger (1995), each player can be one of several ‘types’. 
A type specifies the strategy that the player chooses, and his beliefs about the 
opponents’ types. Thus in this model, the set of states is the set of ‘type profiles’. 
To each state corresponds a strategy profile chosen by the players, and for each 
player a hierarchy of beliefs about the opponents. Aumann & Brandenburger (1995) 
show that in a state in which players are rational in the sense o f subjective expected 
utility theory, this is mutually known, and the players have a common prior about 
states, and conjectures about the strategy choices that are commonly known, then 
the strategy profile in this state is a Nash equilibrium.
On the basis of Aum ann’s and Brandenburger’s result, a Nash equilibrium can be 
interpreted as an equilibrium in beliefs.13 As a consequence, neither the multiplicity 
of equilibria in a specific game, nor the question whether an equilibrium is pure or 
mixed, leads to the difficulties that arise in justifying equilibria as actual strategy 
choices. It is also interesting that full common knowledge of rationality is not 
necessary to justify equilibria. On the other hand, the assumptions of common 
priors and that the players’ conjectures are commonly known is obviously very 
strong.14
In extensive games, Aumann (1995) distinguishes between material and substantive 
rationality and between ex-ante and ex-post rationality. In all cases, a player is 
rational if he does not know of another strategy that yields higher utility. Material 
rationality means that a player is rational at all decision nodes that are reached (in 
the play associated with the state of the world); substantive rationality means that 
he is rational at all decision nodes, whether play reaches them or not. If a player is 
ex-ante rational then he does not know at the beginning of the game that, at some
12For a survey see Dekel & Gul (1997). See also Binmore (19966), Aum ann (1996, 1998)
13This interpretation goes back to Harsanyi (1973).
14 Therefore the equilibrium selection problem also arises in Bayesian gam e theory.
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node, another strategy yields higher utility (conditional on the node being reached). 
If a player is ex-post rational, then he does not know at the time of his choice of 
action that another action yields higher utility. Since under perfect recall a player 
knows at the time of his choice what he knew at the beginning of the game, and 
since rationality is defined as the absence of knowledge (of a superior strategy), ex­
post rationality implies ex-ante rationality. Aumann (1995) shows that, in perfect 
information games, common knowledge of ex-ante substantive rationality implies 
the backward induction outcome.
It is exciting to see how the development described above constitutes progress in 
our understanding of rationality in games. In spite of this, even the study of the 
epistemic foundations of game theory has so far not been able to provide a conclusive 
characterization of strategic rationality:
First, the results for extensive form games leave open questions. Aumann’s (1995) 
result depends on his definition of rationality. Also, it does not apply to extensive 
form games in general, or the backward induction strategy profile. Also, stronger 
equilibrium refinements still lack an epistemological foundation.15
Secondly, so far Savage’s theorem is not formally applied to the interactive belief 
model, and such a formal application still faces difficulties.16 It is not clear whether 
the states in an interactive belief system  can be states of the world in Savage’s 
framework. They must ‘leave no relevant aspect undescribed’ (Savage 1954) and 
thus must themselves include a description of the players’ knowledge and beliefs. It 
is not clear whether strategies can be viewed as Savage acts, because the state of 
the world alone already determines the consequence in an interactive belief system. 
Even if this is assumed, strategy spaces are typically not rich enough to satisfy 
Savage’s theorem. Further, in games players choose a strategy, rather than rank 
their available ones. Also, the utility function is derived on the basis o f beliefs, 
whereas in games the utility functions are assumed to be (mutually) known. And, 
as mentioned above, the beliefs resulting from Savage’s theorem are non-atomic and 
only finitely additive measures.
A third objection to the view that game theory captures rationality is based on
l s However, such studies are under way, see e.g. Battigalli & Bonanno (1998). For related 
difficulties in extensive games see also Basu (1988, 1990) and Reny (1993).
16M ariotti (1998) formulates many of these difficulties for the case in which opponents’ strategies 
are taken as states, and they also apply essentially to  interactive belief system s.
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the principle of sequential rationality that underlies subgame perfection. Accord­
ing to this principle (see, e.g., van Damme (1992)), deviations from rationality are 
not taken as evidence of non-rationality. For other equilibrium refinements, e.g. 
sequential equilibrium (Kreps & Wilson 19826) and trembling-hand perfect equi­
librium (Selten 1975), this is justified by assuming that (otherwise fully rational) 
players ‘tremble’ when they choose their actions. Thus deviations are interpreted 
as mistakes, that allow no inference about the lack of rationality of the opponent,17 
and ‘complete rationality’ is regarded as a ‘limiting case of incomplete rationality’ 
(Selten 1975).
Quite apart from its empirical implausibility, no argument is given why rationality 
would have to be conceptualized in this way. In fact, von Neumann and Morgenstern 
argued that
... the rules o f  rational behavior m ust provide definitely for the possibil­
i ty  o f  irrational conduct on the part o f  others. In other words: Imagine 
that we have discovered a set o f  rules for all participants —  to be term ed  
as “optim al” or “rational” — each o f  which is indeed optim al provided  
that the other participants conform. Then the question remains as to  
what will happen i f  som e o f  the participants do not conform. I f  that 
should turn out to be advantageous for them  — and, quite particularly, 
disadvantageous to the conformists —  then the above “solution” would 
seem very questionable. We are in no position to give a positive  discus­
sion o f  these things as ye t —  but we want to m ake it  clear that under 
such conditions the “solution”, or a t least its  m otivation, m ust be con­
sidered as im perfect and incomplete. In whatever way we form ulate the 
guiding principles and the objective justification o f  “rational behavior,” 
provisos will have to be m ade for every possible conduct o f  “the others.”
Only in this way can a satisfactory and exhaustive theory be developed.
But i f  the superiority o f  “rational behavior” over any other kind is to  
be established, then its  description m ust include rules o f  conduct for all 
conceivable situations — including those where “the others” behaved 
irrationally, in the sense o f  the standards which the theory will set for 
them .”
von Neumann Morgenstern (1947, p .32)
Finally, even the assumption that rationality is mutual knowledge is empirically 
implausible, and theoretically raises the question what constitutes rationality if  it 
is not. Our preceding argument implies that lack of mutual knowledge of rationality 
arises endogeneously in extensive form games, after a deviation from rational play.
17This criticism of backward induction is well-known, see, e.g., Fudenberg & Tirole (1991).
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So the question arises, what strategic rationality means if already at the beginning 
of the game there is this lack of mutual knowledge of rationality.
This question was first addressed in a seminal series of papers by Kreps, Milgrom, 
Roberts and W ilson (1982, henceforth KMRW). Again on the basis of subjective 
expected utility theory, they considered the case in which the rational players have 
a specific belief about the ‘type’ of a non-rational opponent in an incomplete in­
formation game. For instance, in the finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma, they 
showed that if the non-rational types are believed to be tit-for-tat players and the 
game is repeated sufficiently often, then mimicking tit-for-tat is also an equilibrium  
strategy for the rational players. This approach sheds light on the experimental 
evidence (e.g. Selten & Stoecker (1986)). More generally, this approach has been 
extremely useful in Industrial Organization, where it made it possible to rationalize 
intuitively important strategic phenomena like lim it pricing and predatory pricing.
From a theoretical point of view, the KMRW approach allows to circumvent the 
difficulties of the principle of sequential rationality. Here, a deviation from the 
equilibrium strategy is indeed taken as evidence that players are not rational. In this 
case, the rational players conclude that they face the non-rational type. However, 
also this approach has its difficulties:
First, the theory does not explain why the rational players should hold a specific 
belief about the non-rational type. Subjective expected utility theory alone does 
not provide any restrictions, and in fact does not even provide a reason why differ­
ent players should agree on such beliefs. Expressing this ignorance simply through 
a uniform probability distribution is not satisfactory either, because game trees can 
be changed in ways that should be strategically irrelevant (Thompson 1952, Dalkey 
1953). For instance, postulating that the uniform distribution should describe be­
liefs about non-rational players would im ply that the rational strategies are not 
invariant with respect to additions of duplicate strategies.
A second difficulty with the KMRW approach is that it relies on Harsanyi’s (1967) 
analysis o f games with incomplete information. Thus the possibility that a player is 
non-rational is captured by the assumption that a corresponding ‘non-rational’ type 
exists. But in Harsanyi’s analysis, a type is a convenient way to capture the infinite 
hierarchy of beliefs that arises in incomplete information. Moreover, assuming that 
such types exist corresponds to assuming that these hierarchies satisfy consistency
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requirements (see, e.g., Brandenburger & Dekel (1993). These assumptions are not 
in the spirit o f interpreting players as not rational.
Finally, if the KMRW approach is interpreted as capturing rationality, then rational 
strategies result from applying the equilibrium concept, or its refinements, to the 
resulting incomplete information game. But then, any non-equilibrium strategy 
is characterized as non-rational. This, in turn, does not square with the starting 
assumption that the rational players have a specific belief about non-rational play.
To conclude, there are ample reasons to agree with Binmore’s assessment about 
game theory that “much o f what we say in defending what we do does not hang 
together properly.” (Binmore 1992). The aim of this thesis is to address some of 
the issues raised above. Of course, it will at best be possible to provide a first step 
towards a better characterization o f strategic rationality. We will argue that this 
requires a weakening of subjective expected utility theory. Such generalizations of 
SEU have been developed on the basis of empirical objections to its descriptive 
interpretation.
1.4 The Ellsberg Paradox and Choquet Expected U tility  The­
ory
When Savage proposed the subjective expected utility model, he allowed both a 
descriptive and a normative interpretation of the theory.18 Subsequently, its de­
scriptive validity, i.e. the claim that people act in accordance with the theory was 
criticised, first on the basis of thought experiments and casual empiricism, later
l s Later, Savage (1961, 1971, 1977) was very clear that its main significance was normative:
“A personal theory could be given a psychological and em pirical in­
terpretation as predicting the behavior o f  som e class o f  “persons.” A s 
empirical theories, they are not very interesting, nor have they very wide 
dom ains o f  validity. Their real im portance is as norm ative theories by  
which a person, like you, can police him self for coherence.”
Savage (1977, p . 10)
And about his book (1954):
“The author, though interested in personal probability, was not y e t a 
personalistic Bayesian ...”
Savage (1977, p . 18)
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on the basis o f experimental evidence. The criticism was first directed against 
expected utility theory under risk (e.g., Allais (1953)), and this has led to alterna­
tive, or more general decision theories under risk, e.g. generalized expected utility 
(Machina 1982), regret theory (Bell 1982, Loomes & Sugden 1982), prospect theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky 1979) and anticipated utility theory (Quiggin 1982).
The criticism o f Ellsberg (1961) was specifically directed at subjective expected 
utility theory under uncertainty. Ellsberg considered the following thought experi­
ments:
First, consider a decision-maker who is faced with the choice between bets on the 
colour of a ball drawn at random from an urn. Assume the decision maker knows 
that there are 90 balls in the urn, 30 of which are red. He also knows that the re­
maining 60 balls are blue or green, but he does not know the proportions. Ellsberg 
argued, that when faced with the alternative, whether to bet on a red ball or on a 
green ball, m ost people would prefer the first choice. On the other hand, when faced 
with the alternative of winning if the ball is either red or blue or winning if the ball is 
either green or blue, most people would prefer the second choice. However, taken to­
gether these decisions are inconsistent with the assumption that the decision-maker 
is ‘probabilistically sophisticated’, i.e. that his beliefs can be represented by a prob­
ability measure p: His first choice implies th at19 p(red ball) >  p(green ball). His 
second choice implies that p(green ball) -f p(blue ball) >  p(red ball) -f p(blue ball). 
So the probabilities cannot add up to 1.
Similarly, consider a decision-maker who is presented with the choice between bets 
on the colour of a ball drawn at random from two different urns. Assume the 
decision maker knows that there are 100 balls in each urn. He knows that in the 
first urn, 50 balls are red and 50 balls are blue. He also knows that the balls in the 
second urn are red or blue, but he does not know the proportions. Again, Ellsberg 
argued, that when faced with the alternative, whether to bet on a red ball drawn 
from the first urn or on a red ball drawn from the second urn, m ost people would 
prefer the first choice. But they would also prefer betting on a blue ball drawn from 
the first urn to betting on a blue ball drawn from the second urn. Again this violates 
probabilistic sophistication: His first choice implies that p(red ball from urn I) >
19The strict inequality m eans that we exclude the possibility that the decision-maker is indiffer­
ent. This is justified on the basis of the experim ental evidence, see below.
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p(red ball from urn II), his second choice implies that p(blue ball from urn I) >  
p(blue ball from urn II).
The intuitive explanation of this behavioral pattern is that the decision-maker is 
uncertainty-averse, or ‘ambiguity averse’.20 Here, the uncertainty, or ambiguity, 
that he faces consists in his ignorance about the true proportions of balls. The 
decision-makers choices have a parsimonious explanation in terms of aversion to 
these unknown proportions: He prefers bets on events whose chances he knows. 
From a mechanical point of view, all that it takes for subjective expected utility  
theory to account for this behaviour is to allow for non-additivity of beliefs. From 
a decision-theoretic point of view, however, this requires a characterization of this 
behaviour in terms of the underlying preference relation over acts.
This characterization was achieved by Schmeidler (1989). Schmeidler considered 
decision-making in the Anscombe-Aumann model, and introduced a weakening of 
the independence axiom, called ‘comonotonic independence’. This leads to ‘Choquet 
expected utility theory’ (CEU).
First, note that each (Anscombe-Aumann) act gives rise to a preference relation over 
states: If the decision-maker chooses act /  that leads to roulette lotteries f ( s )  and 
f ( s ' )  in states s  and s', then he prefers the occurrence of state s to the occurrence 
of state s' if / ( s )  >- / ( s ' ) ,  where, again, >- is the preference relation over lotteries 
induced by the preference relation over acts by identifying lotteries with constant 
acts. Two acts / ,  g are commonly monotonic (‘comonotonic’) if there are no two 
states s and s' such that the player would prefer s to s' under / ,  but s' to s under 
g.  Schmeidler’s result is that this limited independence requirement still allows the 
identification of beliefs and utility and the separation from beliefs and utility.
Formally, Schmeidler (1989) considers the following axioms:
( A l )  y  is a complete pre-ordering, i.e. complete and transitive.
(A 2 ) The decision problem is non-trivial, i.e. there exist / , / '  with f  y  f .
(A 3 ) The preference relation is continuous, i.e. if f  y  g y  h then there exist
a , /? 6 (0 ,1) such that a f  +  (1 — a) h  y  g y  (3f +  (1 — (3)h.
(A 4 ) Preferences are monotonic, i.e. if / ( s )  y  f ' ( s )  for all s £  S  then f  y  f  •
20We will use the terms interchangeable, w ithout claim ing that they are equivalent beyond the  
formal m odels of Schmeidler (1989), G ilboa Sc Schmeidler (1989), et al. .
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( A 5 ’) Preferences satisfy the comonotonic independence axiom, i.e. if  / ,  / '  and 
g are pairwise comonotonic and if /  >- f  then for all a  with 0 <  a  <  1 
and all acts g also a f  +  (1 — a)g  y  a f  +  (1 — a)g.
Schmeidler’s (1989) first main result is that preferences over acts satisfy the five 
axioms if, and only if, there exist
(1) a utility function over consequences u : Z  — > M that is ‘cardinal’, i.e. unique 
up to affine transformations, and
(2) a unique ‘capacity’ v over states,
(3) such that one act is preferred to another if and only if its ‘expected utility’ is 
higher, i.e.
/  y  f  •<=> J  u o  f  dv >  I  u o  f  dv.
Here, a capacity, or ‘non-additive probability’, is a generalisation of a probability 
measure.21 As in the case of probabilities, v(0) =  0, v(5) =  1 and for any event 
0 <  v(E )  <  1. In contrast to probabilities, capacities need not be finitely additive 
but only monotonic, i.e. if E  C E' then v(E ) <  v(E ').
Consequently, it is necessary to define the expectation of a random variable with 
respect to a non-additive measure. This definition was first given by Choquet (1953), 
in the context of mathematical physics.22 Choquet (1953, Section 48.1) defined the 
integral of a non-negative real-valued random variable X  as the extended Riemann 
integral f  X  dv := f£ °  v (X  >  a) da , where as usual v (X  >  a ) =  v ({s  E 5 |X (s )  >  
a } ) . In particular, the Choquet integral o f the indicator function 1e  for event 
E  gives the capacity v (E ). The mathematical theory of Choquet integration is 
developed, e.g., in the book of Denneberg (1994).23
21 Formally, capacities sire closely related to gam es in coalitional form. However, the charac­
teristic function of a cooperative game is usually assum ed to be superadditive, i.e. v (E  U E')  >
v(E)  +  v(E')  for coalitions E, E'.
22 Choquet makes additional assum ptions on the underlying set S  (a locally com pact topological
space), the set of events (the set o f all com pact subsets of S),  and the capacity v  (right-continuity). 
These assum ptions are not relevant for the definition of the integral, nor the interpretation of the  
capacity in a decision-theoretic context.
23 As an aside, we want to  m ention that Choquet him self has already contributed to game 
theory in various ways. First, he presented proofs of von Neum ann’s minim ax theorem  (Choquet 
1955, Choquet 1968). Secondly, he gave a gam e-theoretic characterization o f com plete metric 
spaces in topology (Choquet 1969). Also, he studied the continuity properties o f correspondences 
between general topological spaces (Choquet 1948).
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The Choquet integral generalizes the usual formula for the expectation (of a non­
negative random variable X  that is bounded above by b) in terms o f the decu- 
mulative distribution function if v is additive, i.e. f £ x  dF  =  Jq[1 — F {x)\dx  for 
a cumulative distribution function F(x)  =  Prob(X <  x).  Dellacherie (1970) and 
Schmeidler (1986) proved that the Choquet integral is additive on comonotonic 
functions, and Schmeidler (1986) also proved the converse: A m onotonic functional 
that extends the capacity and is additive on comonotonic functions is the Choquet 
integral.
Since the first four of Schmeidler’s axioms coincide with those of Anscombe & Au- 
mann (1963), this result is a proper generalization of subjective expected utility  
theory within the Anscombe-Aumann model. In particular, it is important to note 
that this result holds independently of the decision-maker’s attitude towards uncer­
tainty, e.g. whether he prefers or dislikes ambiguity. Formally, the result does not 
restrict the shape of the capacity v.
Schmeidler’s second main result is a characterization of uncertainty aversion. Ex­
ploiting the mixture space structure of the Anscombe-Aumann setup, preferences 
can be defined as uncertainty-averse if the players have a (possibly strict) preference 
for hedging, i.e. if /  y  g and f ' y g  then a / - f  (1 — a ) f  y  g.  Schmeidler shows that, 
given (A l) —  (A5’), preferences display uncertainty aversion if and only if the capac­
ity that represents beliefs is supermodular,24 i.e. v(E \JE ')+v(E C \E ') >  v ( E ) + v ( E ' )  
for events E  and E ' .
1.5 Non-Additive Beliefs
The assumption that beliefs are not necessarily additive seems counterintuitive at 
first, in particular because probability theory is now so deeply entrenched. The aim  
of this section is to clarify the role of probability theory in game theory, its lim its, 
and the interpretation of non-additive probability.
The modern probability concept was formulated by Kolmogorov (1933).25 One 
of his main achievements was the separation of probability as a mathem atical
24 In cooperative gam e theory, characteristic functions with this property are usually called 
‘convex’ (see, e.g., Shapley (1971). However, m athem atically this property is an instance o f ‘su­
perm odularity’ in lattice theory.
25For the history of modern probability see, e.g., van P lato (1994).
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concept from its empirical interpretation. Conceptually, ‘probability’ is taken as 
a basic, undefined term, and its empirical interpretation is left open. Mathe­
matically, probability is part of measure theory: A probability measure p  is de­
fined as a real-valued set function on a cr-algebra that is normalized (p(0) =  0, 
p(S)  =  1), monotonic ( E  C F  ==> p(E)  <  p{F) ,  additive (E C\ F  =  Hi = >  
p( E  U F ) =  p{E)  + p ( F ) )  and continuous with respect to lim its of sequences of sets 
(lim,_foo Ei =  E  = >  lim,_foo p(E{)  =  p(E)) .  The last two conditions are usually 
combined to ‘ (7-additivity ’ (‘denumerable additivity’).
However, this probability concept also has both mathematical and conceptual lim ­
itations. In fact, Kolmogorov him self writes in (1948) :26
“... from the poin t o f  view  o f  the concrete tasks o f  probab ility  theory, 
the system  in question also deserves a certain am ount o f  criticism . This 
criticism  ... poin ts out, correctly, the existence o f  arbitrary and artificial 
elements. (...)
1st, the notion o f an elem entary event is an artificial superstructure ... .
In reality, events are not com posed o f  elem entary events, but elem entary 
events originate in the dism em berm ent o f com posite events.
2nd, som ewhat m ore com plicated problem s require, i f  the theory is to  
be sim ple and tractable, that probability  be subject to the axiom o f  de­
numerable additivity . However, the justification o f  that axiom remains 
purely em p irica l...
3rd, we are forced to  g ive up the principle, form ulated in numerous 
classical works in probability  theory, according to  which an event o f  
probability  zero is absolutely im possible... .”
K olm ogorov (1948)
There are other mathematical limitations of the probability concept: First, if the 
state space is arbitrary, probability cannot be defined on the power set, so some 
events — although well defined —  simply do not have a probability. Secondly, 
the uniform distribution can be defined for some state spaces (finitely many states, 
compact intervals) but not for others (countably many states, function spaces), and 
this does not depend system atically on the cardinality of the state space. Of great 
significance, in particular for game theory, is the difficulty that probability 0 events 
are not impossible. So the question of updating after probability 0 events arises. 
Finally, de Finetti (e.g. 1931a, 1949, 1970) maintained that the assumption of 
countable additivity is a useful regularity condition but not intrinsic to probability.
26 However, in order not to m islead the reader, it has to be pointed out that in this article 
Kolmogorov goes on to define probability as a  set function on com plete m etric Boolean algebras 
and shows that in this case finite additivity implies denumerable additivity.
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Also, any application of probability theory relies on an empirical interpretation 
of the probability concept. Kolmogorov himself supported the frequency interpre­
tation of probability (Kolmogorov 1933, § 1.2, Kolmogorov 1968), that interprets 
probabilities as long-run relative frequencies. However, one of the tenets of this 
interpretation is that it is possible to repeatedly sample the domain of uncertainty: 
one-shot events do not possess probability according to the frequentist interpreta­
tion.
It is important to notice that this interpretation of probability is incompatible with 
its use in game theory. Game theory —  and in particular the Nash equilibrium  
concept —  rely on the interpretation that every relevant aspect of the strategic 
situation has been included in the description of the game. In particular, games 
have to be analysed as one-shot strategic interactions. For instance, Kohlberg & 
Mertens (1986) write
“We adhere to the classical poin t o f  view that the gam e under consid­
eration fu lly describes the real situation  —  that any (pre)com m itm ent 
possibilities, any repetitive aspect,27 . . .  have already been m odelled in 
the gam e tree. . . .  Also, no random event (not described in the extensive 
form ) can be observed by a player, except i f  i t  is com pletely independent 
.. .o f  the m oves o f  nature in the tree.”
Kohlberg  & M ertens (1986)
So instead, game theory relies on the subjective interpretation o f game theory, 
created by de Finetti (193 la ,b , 1937). According to this ‘Bayesian’ interpretation, a 
probability measure (the ‘prior distribution’) represents coherent beliefs. Coherence 
is defined as consistency in qualitative likelihood or in betting rates that do not allow  
system atic exploitation (‘Dutch Book’ arguments). This is also the interpretation 
of probability that arises from the expected utility theories of Savage (1954) and 
Anscombe & Aumann (1963).
On the other hand, also the subjective interpretation of probabilities has its lim ita­
tions (Savage 1954, Savage 1967). First, probability reflects the internal coherence 
of beliefs about an uncertain event, without relating the shape of these beliefs to  
the available evidence. There is no requirement regarding the external consistency 
between beliefs and evidence, and beliefs also need not take into account the amount
27Em phasis added.
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of available evidence.28 Secondly, in the application of Bayesianism to statistics the 
prior distribution has to be specified. This results in a concern about the robust­
ness of conclusions that are based on a single prior. This has lead to interval-valued 
and set-valued probabilities in statistics (e.g. Smith (1961)), and to the indepen­
dent use of Choquet capacities in ‘robust statistics’ (Huber & Strassen 1973, Huber 
1981, Walley 1981). Finally, probability emerges as a purely personalistic concept: 
any belief that is internally coherent is equally justified. In particular, there is no 
requirement that specifies when different individuals have to have identical beliefs. 
In turn, this approach does not explain why different individuals sometimes agree.
As a consequence, even the subjective interpretation of probabilities faces difficulties 
when it is applied to game theory. For example, Harsanyi (1967-68) introduced the 
‘common prior assum ption’ (CPA) to analyse games with incomplete information, 
and Aumann (1987) used it to give an epistemic foundation for correlated equilibria. 
Yet the common prior assumption demands complete agreement of probabilities 
that are purely personalistic. It is indeed logically “possible that Savage may have 
welcomed the CPA” (Aumann 1987, p. 13), but the assumption violates the spirit 
of personalistic probabilities.
Non-additive beliefs therefore emerge as a generalisation o f subjective probabili­
ties. Capacities are measures that represent coherent degrees of belief. The possi­
ble non-additivity merely reflects the fact that weaker coherence requirements are 
im posed .29 To conclude, non-additive beliefs do not constitute as big a deviation  
from probability theory as one might suppose.
It is interesting that non-additive beliefs have a long history. In fact, at first prob­
abilities were not necessarily additive; additivity emerged as a result of Bernoulli’s 
(1713) weak law of large numbers, which is also one of the main sources of the 
frequency interpretation of probability (Hacking 1975). Both Bernoulli (1713) and 
Lambert (1764) were using non-additive probabilities. In economics, Knight (1921) 
argued that the distinction between uncertainty and risk is important and that 
the former is not quantifiable through probabilities. Shackle’s (1949a,b) argued for
28 Under repeated sam pling, Bayesianism  would reflect the am ount of evidence through updating  
of a  prior probability. But the am ount of evidence may vary for other reasons than repeated  
sam pling.
29There are also attem pts to  give a frequency interpretation of non-additive probabilities, see 
W alley & Fine (1982) and Marinacci (1999). In this thesis we have no need for this interpretation.
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non-additive beliefs in his development of a post-Keynesian theory. Non-additive 
probabilities are also used in physics (e.g. Feynman (1963, 1985)). ‘Belief func­
tions’, i.e. capacities that satisfy additional requirements (Dempster 1966, Demp­
ster 1968, Shafer 1976) are widely used in Artificial Intelligence (see, e.g., Shapiro
(1992)).
The need for a modification of subjective expected utility theory has recently also 
been realized in Bayesian game theory (Battigalli 1996, Battigalli 1997). Its origin 
lies in the realization that a strategy combination induces a ‘conditional probability 
system ’ on the actions of an extensive form game. Conditional probability system s 
are due to Renyi (1955), and were introduced into game theory by Myerson (1986) 
(see also McLennan (1989), Vieille (1996)). A conditional probability system  spec­
ifies a probability conditional on each event of a tr-algebra, i.e. even those events 
with probability 0, and they are related by Bayes’ Rule. From a game-theoretic 
point of view, if a strategy combination o f the opponents is to be interpreted as a 
belief o f a player, these beliefs thus correspond to a conditional probability system . 
From a decision-theoretic point of view, such beliefs correspond to a strengthening 
of the Savage and Anscombe-Aumann axioms on preferences over acts (Myerson 
1991, Chapter 1).
We mention conditional probability system s in order to show that deviations from 
subjective expected utility theory have already been accepted in game theory. How­
ever, if a player’s belief about his opponents corresponds to a conditional probability 
system, deviations from rational play are not taken as evidence of non-rationality. 
The player’s updated belief corresponds to parts of the strategy combinations of 
the rational opponents.
1.6 Uncertainty Aversion
Schmeidler’s (1989) development of Choquet expected utility theory led to a large 
literature that further investigated the various aspects of decision theory under 
uncertainty aversion. The aim of this section is to address some of the issues that 
are relevant for its use in game theory.
First, Gilboa & Schmeidler (1989) have introduced another model of uncertainty 
aversion (‘m axim inexpected utility theory’, or ‘MEU’ for short). They also consider
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the Anscombe & Aumann (1963) model and impose the following axioms:
( A l )  y  is a complete pre-ordering, i.e. complete and transitive.
(A 2 ) The decision problem is non-trivial, i.e. there exist / , / '  with f  y  f .
(A 3 )  The preference relation is continuous, i.e. \i  f  y  g y  h then there exist
a ,  P  €  (0 , 1 ) such that a f  +  (1 — a)h  y  g y  /?/ +  (1  — fi)h.
(A 4 )  Preferences are monotonic, i.e. if f ( s )  y  f ( s )  for all s  G S  then /  y  f .
(A 5 ” ) Preferences satisfy the constant-independence axiom, i.e. if /  and f  are
arbitrary acts and p* is a constant act and if /  >- / '  then for all 
a  with 0  <  a  <  1 and all acts g also a f  +  (1  — a)p* y  a f  +  (1  — o;)p*.
(A 6 ) Preferences display uncertainty aversion, i.e. if /  ~  f  then for all
a  with 0  <  a  <  1 we have a f  +  (1  — a ) f  y  f .
Gilboa & Schmeidler (1989) prove that that preferences over acts satisfy the six
axioms if, and only if, there exist
(1) a utility function over consequences u : Z  — > M that is ‘cardinal’, i.e. unique 
up to affine transformations, and
(2 ) a closed30 and convex set Q  o f finitely additive probability q,
(3) such that one act is preferred to another if and only if its minimal expected  
utility is higher, i.e.
It is interesting to notice how the models of Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa & Schmei­
dler (1989) are related. First, the axioms (A l) -  (A4) are the same. Secondly, the 
constant-independence axiom is neither weaker nor stronger than the comonotonic 
independence axiom: While a constant act is comonotonic with any other act, {Ah") 
must also hold for acts /  and / '  that are not comonotonic. Finally, the Gilboa & 
Schmeidler (1989) model assumes uncertainty aversion; this assumption is not nec­
essary for Schmeidler’s first result. If, however, uncertainty aversion is also assumed 
in Schmeidler’s model, it becomes more specific than the model of Gilboa & Schmei­
dler (1989): Supermodular capacities have a non-empty core (Shapley 1971), but 
the lower envelope of a convex set o f probabilities need not be a supermodular ca­
30This refers to the weak* topology.
f  y  f  ■<=> u o  f  dq u o  f  dq.
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pacity. It is well-known from cooperative game theory, that the core of a capacity is 
non-empty if and only if the capacity is ‘balanced’ (Bondareva 1963, Shapley 1967).
As a consequence, the literature debates which property adequately represents un­
certainty aversion (Epstein 19976, Ghirardato & Marinacci 1997), and, so far, no 
consensus has arisen. However, this question is not a conceptual problem for the use 
we make of uncertainty aversion in this thesis. The definition of a Choquet-Nash 
equilibrium will be based on ‘basic capacities’, i.e. characteristic functions of sets. 
This class of capacities falls into both decision models, and we will have no need to 
distinguish them conceptually.
Secondly, Schmeidler’s (1989) model is based on the Anscombe & Aumann (1963) 
decision model, in which acts are mappings from states into probability distributions 
over consequences. Since the motivation for developing the Anscombe-Aumann 
model was a simplification of Savage’s decision theory, the axioms that describe 
decision-makers with non-additive beliefs should not depend on the mixture space 
structure of the Anscombe-Aumann model. This leads to attem pts to develop 
Choquet-expected utility theory for the Savage model. A very transparent approach 
is due to Sarin & Wakker (1992).31
Sarin & Wakker (1992) take a distinction between ambiguous and unambiguous 
events as given. As a consequence, an act is unambiguous if it is measurable with 
respect to unambiguous events, and ambiguous otherwise. This allows them to 
impose, and restrict, the Savage axioms to the unambiguous acts, while to impose 
a weaker set of axioms on ambiguous acts. Sarin & Wakker (1992) show that 
this results in the Choquet expected utility representation of these preferences over 
acts .32
That the distinction between the Anscombe-Aumann model and the Savage-model 
is important for Choquet expected utility theory has been emphasized by Eichberger 
&; Kelsey (1996c). In the Anscombe-Aumann model, an uncertainty-averse decision­
maker will display a ‘preference for randomization’; in fact, Schmeidler (1989) takes
31 Other studies were conducted by G ilboa (1987), Wakker (19896), Wakker (1989a), Nakamura 
(1990), Chateauneuf (1991), Chew & K am i (1994), Oginuma (1994), Nehring (1994), Sarin 
Wakker (1994), Grant, Kajii & Polak (1997) for CEU and by Casadesus-M asanell, Klibanoff &
Ozdenoren (1998) for MEU.
32 In addition, the resulting utility function is bounded, and the capacity is additive on unam­
biguous events.
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this preference as the defining property. Eichberger & Kelsey (1996c) show, however, 
that the decision-maker will have no such preference in the Savage model, even if the 
capacity is supermodular (convex) . 33 On the one hand, Eichberger & Kelsey (1996c) 
argue that assuming a preference for randomization is counter-intuitive. On the 
other hand, the Anscombe-Aumann setup can be reproduced in experiments, so that 
the ‘preference for randomization’ assumption does have empirical meaning. Finally, 
some open questions remain in the Sarin & Wakker (1992) model: There is no axiom  
that corresponds to uncertainty aversion, and nothing that guarantees convexity or 
balancedness of the belief-representing capacity. Also, taking a distinction between 
ambiguous events and unambiguous events as given has two unsatisfactory aspects: 
First, even the ambiguous events are sets in the sense of set theory, and well-defined 
by their extensions; they are not ambiguous formally but only in the interpretation. 
Secondly, it is not the preferences that make some events ambiguous. In particular, 
beliefs over unambiguous acts have to be additive, which is, however, an empirical 
question.
Here, we take the view that the important insight of Eichberger & Kelsey (1996c) 
is that CEU in the Anscombe-Aumann model and in the Savage model correspond 
to two different kind of preferences. Beyond this, however, we argue that there is 
no a priori ‘correct’ model of decision-making under non-additive beliefs: Since the 
deviation from subjective expected utility theory was motivated by the empirical 
evidence of the Ellsberg paradox, it is also an empirical question which model better 
describes decision-makers. Eichberger & Kelsey (1996c) note, however, that there is 
no strong empirical evidence for a preference for uncertainty in decision situations.
Finally, it is important to mention that other theories for decision-making under 
uncertainty have been developed, some of them also with the objective to explain 
the Ellsberg paradox. In particular, Bewley (1986, 1987a, 1987b, 1988, 1998) de­
veloped ‘Knightian Decision Theory’, in which preferences over acts may be in­
complete. This results in a representation of preferences in which beliefs may be 
sets of probabilities, and acts are only chosen when they are unambiguously better 
than a ‘status quo’ alternative. Quiggin (1982) has developed ‘anticipated utility  
theory’ (later called ‘rank-dependent utility theory’), which applies to risk rather 
than uncertainty, but which is formally closely related to Choquet expected utility
33Mathematically, this is due to the fact that Fubini’s theorem does not hold for general non­
additive measures, see, e.g ., Ghirardato (1997).
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theory: The exogenously given probabilities are distorted and the expectation of 
the distorted function is calculated as a Choquet integral.
1.7 Updating
The problem how to update non-additive beliefs arises naturally in extensive form 
games, in which the opponent’s strategies are at least partly observable. Several 
approaches have been developed how to update non-additive beliefs. In this section, 
we survey some of these and explain our choice of the ‘Dempster-Shafer rule’.
The natural starting point for the investigation of the problem how to update non­
additive beliefs is conditional probability, respectively Bayes’ rule, i.e. v{A \B)  :=  
V^v(b )^ • Formally, Bayes’ rule is still well-defined even if v is not additive. However, 
Bayes’ rule leads to conceptual difficulties.
Since the capacity v is derived from the preference relation over acts, it is ap­
propriate to consider the problem of updating this preference relation. Following 
Machina (1989), we can define that act /  is preferred to act f  conditional on event 
B  and ‘reference act’ g if the act34 (/s ,< 7) is preferred to the act (/b ,< 7). Gilboa  
& Schmeidler (1993) have shown that, in this framework, the application of Bayes’ 
rule to non-additive beliefs corresponds to ‘optimistic updating’, in the sense that 
the decision-maker updates his beliefs as if his reference act g assigns the worst con­
sequence to the event that B  does not occur. This is optimistic, because the event 
B  is then always regarded as good news. The assumption of optim istic updating 
is consistent with non-additive beliefs in general, but does not seem to agree with  
the assumption that players are uncertainty-averse, i.e. take a pessimistic attitude 
towards uncertainty.
A second problem associated with Bayes’ rule is the presence of belief 0 events. In 
particular, consider the ‘basic capacity’35 that associates belief 1 to the event S  
but probability 0 to any event B  C S. This capacity is supermodular, taking the
34Here, act ( / B i d )  is the act that gives the sam e consequence (or lottery over consequences) 
as /  if the state  is in B ,  and the sam e as g if not. The definition is independent of the question  
whether acts are Savage acts or Anscom be-Aum ann acts.
35 We call these capacities basic because they form a  basis for the linear space of all capacities over 
a finite state space (Shapley 1953). In cooperative game theory these capacities are called ‘sim ple 
gam es’, but in the literature on CEU ‘sim ple capacities’ are distorted probability distributions.
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Choquet integration of a random variable X  with respect to this capacity yields the 
minimal value m in ,Gs  X (s). Consider now the case that an event B  C S  occurs. 
Bayes’ rule is unable to update the capacity because the event B  has belief 0. Yet, 
intuitively, it is clear that the natural updated capacity associates belief 1 to the 
event B  and 0 to every event A  C B.
Both of these difficulties can be avoided through the ‘Dempster-Shafer rule’. This 
updating rule has been proposed in statistics (Dempster 1967, 1968) and was further 
developed to a theory of evidence based on ‘belief functions’ by Shafer (1976). It has 
found many applications in Artificial Intelligence (e.g. Guan & Bell (1991), Yager, 
Kacprzyk & Fedrizzi (1994), Smets (1994)).
In order to derive a belief function, consider a finite state space S  and a ‘ba­
sic probability assignment’ on its power set 2 5 , i.e. m (E )  >  0 , m (0 ) =  0  and 
J2e €2s m (^ ) =  1- Assume that m (E )  is interpreted as the weight of evidence that 
supports the belief that the true event is E, but the evidence does not allow a 
more restrictive interpretation. Then a belief function is a set function on S  that 
is defined as v(E )  := YIa c e 171^ ) '  *e. belief in the event E  is given by the 
sum of the weights of evidence on events that imply E. Shafer (1976) shows that 
the resulting set function v is a capacity that is ‘completely m onotonic’, i.e. for all 
n G N and for all E \ , ..., E n €  2s
« ( ( J B- ) >  E  ( - D ^ M O ) .
i= 1  / C { 1 .......n} <€/
/ # 0
In particular, belief functions are supermodular (n=2), i.e. express uncertainty aver­
sion.
The Dempster-Shafer rule for updating v conditional on event B  is given by the 
formula _ _
v(A \B)  :=  U * ) - » ( * ) .
1 -  v(B )
It is only defined for v(B )  <  1.
The Dempster-Shafer rule reduces to Bayes’ rule if v is additive. This updating rule 
allows the intuitive updating of basic capacities described above. Moreover, Gilboa 
& Schmeidler (1993) have shown that the Dempster-Shafer rule corresponds to
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pessimistic updating, i.e. the reference act assigns the best outcome to the event that 
B  does not occur, so that B  is regarded as bad news. The assumption of pessimistic 
updating naturally complements the assumption of uncertainty aversion. Also, the 
Dempster-Shafer rule preserves uncertainty aversion, i.e. an updated supermodular 
capacity is itself supermodular.
However, there are also conceptual difficulties associated with the Dempster-Shafer 
rule. First, before the work of Gilboa & Schmeidler (1993) it was criticised for 
lacking a behavioural foundation. Secondly, recall from above that that dynamically 
consistent updating of preferences over acts means that act /  is preferred to act f  
conditional on event B  and ‘reference act* g if  the act ( / b , < 7 )  is preferred to the 
act (/b > 0 )> because then the decision maker will not change his behaviour if he 
learns that B  occurred and he originally preferred ( / b , < 7 )  to ( / b , < 7 ) -  Epstein & 
Breton (1993) and Eichberger & Kelsey (19966) show that the Dempster-Shafer 
rule is not dynamically consistent in the following sense: If dynamic consistency 
holds for all acts g then beliefs must be additive, and there is no updating rule that 
is dynamically consistent if beliefs are not additive.
As a consequence, Eichberger & Kelsey (19966) conclude that there is no ‘correct’ 
updating rule for non-additive beliefs, and argue that the updating rule should 
depend on the application. As argued above, the pessimistic updating captured 
by the Dempster-Shafer rule agrees with the assumption of uncertainty aversion. 
In addition, given that the deviation from subjective expected utility to decision 
theory with non-additive beliefs was motivated empirically by uncertainty aversion 
in the Ellsberg paradox, the requirement of a theoretical consistency argument like 
dynamic consistency is not very compelling. We take the view that it is an empirical 
question which updating rule better describes decision-making in experiments.
Other updating rules have been suggested for non-additive beliefs (e.g. Walley 
(1981) and Fagin h  Halpern (1990)). However, the Walley-Fagin-Halpern rule is also 
not dynamically consistent, and in addition would not allow updating of basic capac­
ities. Further, Gilboa & Schmeidler (1993) have shown that the Dempster-Shafer 
rule coincides with ‘maximum likelihood updating’ of sets Q of additive beliefs, 
which selects those beliefs from Q  that maximise the probability of the condition 
B  and updates those by Bayes’ rule, i.e. v{A\B)  =  m in{g(A |B) =  | q(B) =
maXq/6Q g / (JB)}.
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1.8 Non-Additive Beliefs in Game Theory
After the development of Choquet expected utility theory the question arises nat­
urally what its implications for Bayesian game theory are. The aim of this section 
is to survey the solution concepts that have been suggested.
The analysis o f the consequences of non-expected utility theories for games began 
early (e.g. Fishburn (1972)). For instance, Blume, Brandenburger & Dekel (1991) 
extend non-Archimedean expected utility theory to games. In particular, Crawford
(1990) presented a game-theoretic analysis of the consequences of a general failure of 
the independence axiom for individual preferences. He proposed a general ‘Equilib­
rium in Beliefs’ for two-player normal form games. Since Choquet expected utility 
theory assumes a weak form of independence, and therefore beliefs are further re­
stricted, the following equilibrium concepts can be seen as special cases of equilibria 
in beliefs. However, due to the functional form of preferences, the presence of more 
than two players, or an extensive form structure many additional aspects arise.
Equilibrium and rationalizability concepts based on some form of CEU have been 
proposed by Dow & Werlang (1994), Eichberger & Kelsey (1993), Epstein (1997a), 
Haller (1995), Hendon, Jacobsen, Sloth & Tranaes (1996), Klibanoff (1993), Lo 
(19956), Lo (1996), Marinacci (1994), Mukerji (1994), and Hitzberger (1996) for 
normal form games, and by Eichberger &; Kelsey (1995), Lo (1995a) and Ryan 
(1997a) for extensive form gam es.36 The literature is surveyed in Eichberger & 
Kelsey (1993) and Haller (1997).
The common objective of these studies is the question, in which sense the assump­
tion of non-additive beliefs can be consistent with game-theoretic reasoning, and 
what the consequences of non-additive beliefs in strategic interaction are. Thus 
these studies do not explicitly focus on the conceptual problems in the foundations 
of game theory described above .37
In section 8.1, we present the equilibrium concepts for normal form games that 
incorperate non-additive beliefs. In section 8.2 we discuss solution concepts for 
extensive form games. The aim of these sections is to convey which approaches
36See also Hart, M odica & Schmeidler (1994), who use MEU for a joint derivation of utility  and  
value in two-player zero-sum games. However, this work is stronger linked with decision theory 
than with non-cooperative game theory.
37However, it can be argued that they do so implicitly.
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have been taken in the literature, and which aspects have been identified as critical, 
but we will not attem pt to give an exhaustive survey. Section 8.3 relates these 
approaches to that taken in this thesis.
1.8.1 Normal Form Concepts
In the following, consider a finite normal form game G  := (I , S , u ), where I  is the 
set of players, Si is the set of pure strategies of player i £  7, and S  =  XjG/S f is the 
set of pure strategy profiles. Let 25* be the power sets of 5,-. The sets of mixed 
strategies are given by and E =  x tG/E,- is the set of mixed strategy profiles. 
As usual, S - i  and E_,- are the sets of z-incomplete strategy profiles, that specify a 
pure, respectively mixed, strategy for every player other than i. Let u =  (tt,) be 
the /-tuple of von Neumann - Morgenstern utility functions for the players.
•  Dow & Werlang (1994) consider finite two-person games in normal form. They 
define a ‘Nash Equilibrium under Uncertainty’ as a pair of capacities r>i, V2  that 
correspond to the players’ beliefs, i.e. Vi : 2Sl — > [0 , 1] is player 2 ’s belief about 
the strategy choice of player 1, and analogously for player 2. In order to formulate 
how these beliefs have to be consistent, they study the question how the support of 
a capacity should be defined. They propose that the support of a capacity v is a 
minimal event for which the complement has capacity zero, i.e. S  =  supp1 v :<=> 
v(S )  =  0 and v(T)  >  0 for any event T  C S. A pair of capacities then forms a 
Nash equilibrium under uncertainty if there exist supports of and V2  such that 
each pure strategy in these supports maximises the Choquet expected utility o f that 
player given his belief, i.e.
VsJ £  supp ui : sj £  arg m ax I « i ( s i ,S 2 ) d V2 ,
»ieSi J S2
Vs  ^ £  supp V2  : S2 £  arg m ax I U2 (fii, $2 ) d v\.
*3G-Sa J s 1
First, notice that this equilibrium concept is formulated in terms of pure strategies, 
so it does not allow for a strict preference for mixed strategies. Secondly, notice 
that the support concept implicitly defines the knowledge of the players38. Since 
‘non-additive beliefs’ cannot be correct if the opponent chooses a mixed strategy, 
the players are only assumed to correctly anticipate the support. The non-additivity
38 See also Morris (1993).
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of beliefs then allows the expression of uncertainty aversion. Dow & Werlang (1994) 
show that non-rationalizable outcomes may be Nash equilibria under uncertainty, 
and that there are equilibria that differ from the backward induction equilibrium  
if  the once-repeated prisoners’ dilemma is analysed as a normal form game. They 
also show that their approach is different from the ‘crazy type’ approach of Kreps, 
Milgrom, Roberts & W ilson (1982), because uncertainty averse players would ignore 
the possibility of benevolent crazy types, so that only harmful types would enter 
the players’ calculations.
However, there are several difficulties with their approach: First, a natural starting 
point for defining the support of a capacity is to  define it as the smallest set that has 
belief 1, i.e. S  =  supp2 v v(S)  =  1 and v(T)  <  1 for any event T  C S.  The
problem with this definition is that under uncertainty aversion only the universal set 
would qualify as a support. On the other hand, Dow & Werlang (1994) show that 
a support in their sense need not be unique. In addition, consider again the basic 
capacities that give weight 1 to the universal set S  and weight 0 to any other set. 
Under the definition of support of Dow & Werlang (1994), each individual element 
is a support of this capacity. Secondly, in equilibrium players do maximise utility  
and choose their strategies accordingly. This is not anticipated by the players. For 
this reason, Dow & Werlang (1994) propose their equilibrium concept as a model 
in which players lack logical omniscience. Thirdly, their equilibrium concept does 
not address the perfection aspect of extensive games, and the backward induction 
equilibrium is also a Nash Equilibrium under Uncertainty.39,40
•  Klibanoff (1993) considers finite normal form games with finitely many players.
39Haller (1995) considers finite two-player gam es in normal form. He investigates the conse­
quences o f introducing non-additivity on the solvability of games. A game is solvable if for any 
two Nash equilibria (a* ,<7^) and (r*, t£)  the strategy com binations (ct*, Tj ) and (a*, Tj ) are also 
equilibria, and all Nash equilibria are payoff-equivalent for each player. It is well-known that all 
zero-sum games are solvable under Nash equilibrium. Haller (1995) adopts the solution concept 
of Dow & Werlang (1994) and shows that even zero-sum games need not be solvable under Nash 
Equilibrium under Uncertainty.
40Marinacci (1994) considers finite two-player gam es in normal form. He suggests a  variation of 
the solution concept of Dow ic Werlang (1994). As in Dow & Werlang (1994), players m axim ise 
Choquet expected utility given their possibly non-additive beliefs, and beliefs have to  be correct 
in the sense that all strategies in the support of the beliefs are best replies. The difference is 
that he adopts as support the set of all pure strategies that have strictly positive weight, i.e. 
supp3 Vi :=  {s; G 5 , | v ,(s .)  >  0 ) .
39
He defines an ‘Equilibrium with Uncertainty Aversion’ as a mixed strategy <r,- for 
each player, together with, for each player, a (closed and convex) set of additive 
beliefs Qi over the opponents’ pure strategy combinations. Each player chooses his 
mixed strategy in order to maximise the minimal expected utility in the sense of 
Gilboa & Schmeidler (1989) given his beliefs Qi, and the beliefs have to be consistent 
in the sense that player i considers the i-incomplete equilibrium profile as possible. 
Formally, for all i E / ,
a* E arg m ax min tt,(crj, qi), and
<7i € £ »  qi tQi
<rli G Q i .
First, notice that the equilibrium concept is formulated in mixed strategies. Here, 
players are allowed to have a strict preference for mixed strategies. Secondly, in 
games with more than two players, the players are allowed to believe that their 
opponents’ choices are correlated, even though in equilibrium the actual choices are 
independent.
•  Eichberger & Kelsey (1993) extend Dow’s and Werlang’s equilibrium concept to  
games with finitely many players. The players’ beliefs are given by capacities v,- 
defined on the power set o f the opponents’ pure strategy combinations 25 - *. The 
support concept is defined as in Dow & Werlang (1994). Let «S,*(u,) be the set of 
pure strategies that maximise Choquet expected utility of player i. Then a profile 
of non-additive beliefs v,- form an Equilibrium under Uncertainty iff, for all i E I,
supp1 Vi C Xi'ei,i'^ iSi(vi).
As in Dow & Werlang (1994), an ‘Equilibrium under Uncertainty’ is defined in terms 
of pure strategies, i.e. excludes a strict preference for mixtures. As in Klibanoff
(1993), players are allowed to believe that their opponents’ choices are correlated.
•  Mukerji (1994) also studies finite normal form games with finitely many players. 
He defines an ‘Equilibrium in e-ambiguous Beliefs’ els a profile of ‘simple capacities’, 
i.e. contracted probabilities (v (E ) =  a  •p (E ) for events E C S  and v(S)  =  1 for the 
universal set S, a  >  0). As noted by Dow & Werlang (1994), for such capacities the 
support coincides with that of the underlying probability and is therefore uniquely 
determined. Similarly, a simple capacity models independence if the underlying 
probability is a product of marginals. The beliefs modelled as contracted probabili­
ties correspond to a game in which rationality is not mutual knowledge and e is the
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probability that the opponent is not rational. The players are completely ignorant 
about non-rational play and are uncertainty-averse. An equilibrium in e-ambiguous 
beliefs is then defined as a the equilibrium of Dow & Werlang (1994). In particular, 
it excludes a strict preference for mixed strategies.
•  Lo (19956) studies finite two-player games in normal form on the basis of G ilboa’s 
and Schmeidler’s (1989) maxmin expected utility theory. He defines two support 
concepts for sets of additive beliefs over the opponent’s strategy choice. The support 
of Qi is the set of all opponent’s pure strategies that have strictly positive probability 
under any belief in Qi, i.e. supp Qi := {sj E Sj \ qi M  >  o. Vtfi E Qi }. The 
extended support of Qi is the set o f all opponent’s pure strategies that have strictly 
positive probability under some belief in Qi, i.e. xsupp Qi := {sj  E Sj | qi{sj) >  
0, E Qi }. Lo (19956) then defines a ‘Cautious Nash Equilibrium’ as a pair of 
sets of additive beliefs Q \ , Q\  such that for both players
Vs* E supp Q*i VSi E Si : min U i ( s * , q t ) >  min u »(si,9 i), and
k €Q; v.eQ;
Vsf* E xsupp Q j Vsi g  supp Qj  : min u ,(s - ,g t) >  min
The interpretation of this equilibrium concept is that every strategy in the support 
of Q j  is infinitely more likely than any strategy that is not, because for the first 
strategy 9j (s ,)  >  0 for all qj E Q j,  whereas for the second strategy qj{si)  =  0 for 
some qj E Q j . So the first condition requires that such strategies maximise maxmin  
expected utility of Gilboa & Schmeidler (1989). On the other hand, every strategy 
in the extended support of Qj  is still considered possible, although infinitely less 
likely than those strategies in the support. The second condition requires that these 
possible strategies are also rational for player i in the sense that only the infinitely 
more likely strategies are strictly better.
Since Lo’s (19956) equilibrium concept is formulated in terms of pure strategies, he 
does not allow a strict preference for mixtures. For this reason, his solution concept 
is a strengthening of ‘Nash Equilibrium under Uncertainty’ of Dow & Werlang 
(1994). Under the concept of Dow & Werlang (1994), no requirement is imposed 
on strategies that are not in the support of the players’ beliefs.
•  Lo (1996) studies finite normal form games with finitely many players. Again 
players’ beliefs are modelled as sets of additive beliefs in the sense of Gilboa & 
Schmeidler (1989). For the set Q j  of beliefs of player j  (additive probabilities over
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S - i )  he defines the set of marginal distributions as margs .Qj :=  {<r,- E S i | 3qj E 
Qj : <ri = rnargs .qj }. In a ‘Beliefs Equilibrium’ (Q i)ie / each such marginal must 
be a mixed strategy that maximises the minimal expected utility of that player, i.e.
margs .Q*- C arg max min u,(<7 ,-, <7,).
* J oi^iqi£Q*
The interpretation of this equilibrium condition is that player j ,  knowing that Qi 
are player »’s beliefs, can anticipate that player i  will choose a utility maximising 
strategy. In analogy with Nash equilibrium, the set of strategies which do not 
maximise utility should have measure 0 under the marginal margs . Q j . In a ‘Beliefs 
Equilibrium’, two players’ beliefs about a third need not coincide. For this reason 
Lo (1996) suggests a ‘Beliefs Equilibrium with Agreement’ as a set of beliefs Q \  
for each player for which there exist sets o f mixed strategies £ t* such that, for all 
players i and j ,  the beliefs Q^ are the closed convex hull o f all additive beliefs q 
on S - i  whose marginal margs .q is contained in T,j. That is, two different players 
agree on the play of a third player k in the sense that their sets of marginals are 
£*:• Also, a player believes that his opponents play independently in the sense that 
his set of beliefs contains all product measures (this independence concept is due 
to Gilboa & Schmeidler (1989)). Since the solution concepts are defined in terms 
of mixed strategies, strict preference for randomization is allowed.
Other solution concepts have been proposed by Epstein (1997a),41 Hendon, Jacob­
sen, Sloth & Tranaes (1995),42 and Ritzberger (1996).43
41 Epstein (1997a) considers finite normal form gam es with finitely m any players. He considers 
a class of general preferences that do not imply specific functional forms, but both CEU and MEU  
fall into this class. He then extends the rationalizability concept of Bernheim  (1984) and Pearce 
(1984) to this class of preferences. Epstein (1997a) excludes a strict preference for m ixtures, but
allows correlated beliefs about the play of the opponents.
42Hendon et al. (1995) study finite normal form gam es with finitely many players. They propose 
a ‘Nash Equilibrium with Lower Probabilities’ which is based on belief functions. In an earlier 
paper (Hendon, Jacobsen, Sloth & Tranaes 1994) they show that the m ixture space axiom s of 
Herstein & Milnor (1953), when applied to belief functions, yield a utility function on the power 
set o f consequences such that vy y  v2 <=>■ i z  m i ( E ) u {E)  >  X^Eg2Z where
m i and m 2  are the basic probability assignm ents of belief functions vy and v%.
On the basis of this result, they define the expected utility of a profile o f belief functions through 
the basic probability assignm ents as
Ey X  . . .  X  E n C S
In particular, the expected utility of a pure strategies Si £ Sy is defined by choosing for Vi the basic
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1.8.2 Extensive Form Concepts
Eichberger & Kelsey (1995) are the first to consider a class of extensive form games. 
Specifically, they consider finite two-player signalling games: Player 1 receives full 
information about the ‘state of nature’ 6 E 0  and takes an action s i E S i.  Player 2 is 
able to observe s 2  but is ignorant of 0. Player 2 takes an action S2  E Si-  The actions 
and the state of nature then determine the players’ utilities u ,(s i, «2 , 0 ) for i =  1 , 2 . 
Eichberger & Kelsey (1995) extend the equilibrium concept of Dow & Werlang
(1994) to this class of games. The extensive structure requires a specification of 
the updating rule, and they adopt the Dempster-Shafer rule. A ‘Dempster-Shafer 
Equilibrium’ consists of a pair of non-additive beliefs v\ and v%. The belief V2  
specifies player l ’s belief about player l ’s strategy choice. The belief v\ specifies 
player 2 ’s belief about player l ’s strategy choice and the state of nature. For a 
Dempster-Shafer equilibrium, there must exist a support (in the sense of Dow & 
Werlang (1994)) of V2  such that each pure strategy in the support is a Choquet 
expected utility maximising strategy for player 1. In addition, player 2 will update 
his belief vi after observing s i .  So, for a Dempster-Shafer equilibrium, for each 
strategy s i the updated capacity v[ must have a support of pure strategies that 
maximises Choquet expected utility of player 1. Again, Eichberger & Kelsey (1995) 
do not allow a preference for randomization .44
probability assignm ent that puts weight 1 on strategy set { s ;} . Hendon et al. (1995) then adopt 
the support concept suppj and define a Nash equilibrium with lower probabilities as a profile of 
belief functions such that each strategy in its support maximises expected utility. They show that 
even cooperation in the one-shot prisoners’ dilem m a can be an equilibrium outcom e under this 
solution concept.
43 R itzberger(1996) considers finite normal form games with finitely m any players. In Ritzberger 
(1996), the equilibrium concept is defined in terms of strategy choice rather than belief. As in a 
Nash equilibrium, each player can anticipate the m ixed strategies of the opponent, but evaluates 
lotteries over outcom es according to rank-dependent expected utility theory. That is, he distorts 
these probabilities when he calculates his expected utility. Ritzberger (1996) does not require 
that this distortion is equivalent to uncertainty aversion, in fact he treats the players’ decision  
problem as one under risk rather than uncertainty. A ‘Nash Equilibrium under E xpected Utility  
with Rank-Dependent Probabilities’ is then a Nash equilibrium in which it is com mon knowledge
how the different players distort the probabilities.
44Ryan (1997a) extends the work of Eichberger & Kelsey (1995). He notes that the support of 
Dow &: W erlang (1994) is not invariant after updating through the Dempster-Shafer rule (see also 
Ryan (19976)). He proposes a different support concept that gives a unique support if it exists: 
S  =  supp4 v <=» v(S) =  0 and v ( T )  >  0 for any non-em pty event T  C  S.  He defines a ‘Robust
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Finally, Lo (1995a) studies finite extensive games with perfect recall. His equi­
librium concept is too intricate to be given formally here. Lo (1995a) adopts the 
maxmin expected utility theory of Gilboa & Schmeidler (1989), so that each player’s 
beliefs (at the beginning of the game) are given by sets of additive probability mea­
sures over the opponents’ pure strategy sets. He requires that in equilibrium all 
such measures have the same support. Further, he postulates that the beliefs are 
updated by the maximum likelihood rule, and that the updated beliefs (at each 
information set) reflect independence and agreement as in Lo (1996). In a ‘Mul­
tiple Priors Nash Equilibrium’, every pure strategy in the support of the beliefs 
must then maximise the minimum expected utility, given the updated beliefs, on 
the paths of play that are compatible with the beliefs.
1.8.3 Summary
The equilibrium concepts described above have achieved two objectives: First, the 
introduction of non-additive beliefs can account for strategic phenomena that are 
unexplained by Nash equilibrium analysis, e.g. that players may have a strict pref­
erence for mixed strategies over the pure strategies in its support, or that non- 
rationalizable strategy profiles may be equilibria. Secondly, the solution concepts 
have identified the difficulties that the extension of the Nash equilibrium concept 
faces. In particular, the definition of support of a capacity, the inclusion of a prefer­
ence for mixtures, and the accommodation of correlated beliefs about the opponents’ 
play are choices of the modeller rather than determined by the structure of the in­
teraction. Also, some of these concepts only apply to specific classes of games, 
or are very difficult to apply. Finally, some requirements seem to be motivated  
by analogy with the Nash equilibrium concept rather than an intrinsic considera­
tion of rationality or strategic interaction, e.g. requirements about compatibility of 
marginals.
More fundamentally, all solution concepts with the exception of Mukerji (1994)
and Lo (19956) assume that rationality in the sense of Choquet expected utility
maximisation is mutual or common knowledge. There is no source of ambiguity or
uncertainty beyond the individual preferences. The players are assumed to under­
Dempster-Shafer Equilibrium ’ as a Dem pster-Shafer equilibrium of Eichberger & Kelsey (1995) in 
which such supports exist and are preserved on the equilibrium path.
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stand the structure of the strategic interaction less well than the modeller. Their 
failure to anticipate the consequences of rationality are due to a lack of logical om­
niscience. To be sure, these assumptions are indeed logically consistent. However, 
the solution concepts proposed in this thesis do not rely on these assumptions.
The solution concept of Mukerji (1994) is closely related to the (independently de­
veloped) concept o f ‘Choquet-Nash equilibrium’proposed in this thesis .45 As in this 
thesis, Mukerji (1994) considers non-additive beliefs as a concept to analyse games 
in which rationality is not mutual knowledge.46 He also adopts the framework of 
Kreps et al. (1982) and assumes that rational players face complete uncertainty 
about non-rational play and are uncertainty-averse. If the players’ beliefs then are 
simple capacities, his solution concept coincides, for two-player games, with the 
‘Choquet-Nash equilibrium’ defined in this thesis. This construction overcomes the 
conceptual problems described above and allows to extend the equilibrium con­
cept to non-additive beliefs: The possible non-rationality of the opponent forms 
the source of uncertainty, and the rational players can anticipate the play of their 
rational opponents.
The solution concepts in this thesis are also, but not only motivated by the ques­
tion how the equilibrium concept can be extended to non-additive beliefs. First, a 
‘Choquet-Nash equilibrium’ is derived as a special case of a ‘Weak Choquet-Nash 
equilibrium’. There the rational players have general non-additive beliefs about 
their non-rational opponents. Thus there is no role for ‘simple capacities’ in the 
solution concept. Also, the solution concepts differ for games with more than two 
players. In a Choquet-Nash equilibrium the events that more opponents are non- 
rational are independent. However, there are two main differences between the 
approach of Mukerji (1994) and the approach in this thesis:
First, we argue that the assumption of complete ignorance about the play of non- 
rational opponents does not only overcome the problem of specifying a prior in the 
Kreps et al. (1982) approach, but is a necessary consequence of the fact that the 
solution concept itself only specifies rational strategies. The consistency requirement
45Mukerji (1994) considers normal form games only. He does not extend his approach to a
robustness analysis for Nash equilibria.
46In Lo (19956), rationality is not m utual knowledge either, but it is m utual knowledge that it
is infinitely more likely that the opponent is rational than that he is not. In Mukerji (1994) and 
in this thesis, these likelihoods are of the same order.
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is that all deviations then must be considered non-rational. This forces beliefs to 
be non-additive, respectively set-valued.
Secondly, our solution concepts are mainly motivated by extensive form consider­
ations. There lack of mutual knowledge of rationality arises endogenously after a 
deviation from rational play. Thus we aim to suggest a solution concept in which 
this deviation is taken as evidence of non-rationality. As a consequence, the ‘Per­
fect Choquet equilibrium’ proposed in this thesis is an equilibrium concept in which 
equilibrium arguments only apply on the equilibrium path. Off the equilibrium  
path a different solution concept applies because equilibrium arguments only hold 
for rational players. Again on the basis that we propose a rational solution concept 
only, all deviations are possible, and under uncertainty aversion this corresponds to 
minimax reasoning off the equilibrium path.
In formulating our solution concept for extensive form games we emply the Dempster- 
Shafer rule. Here our solution concept (independently) adopts the choice o f Eich­
berger & Kelsey (1995). They note that normal form concepts “fail to exploit one of 
the strengths of non-additive probabilities, namely that unlike additive probabilities, 
they can be updated after events of probability zero.” Eichberger & Kelsey (1995) 
extend the Dow & Werlang (1994) equilibrium concept to signalling games. In this 
thesis we also use the Dempster-Shafer rule to update after belief-zero events, but 
the equilibrium concepts differ both formally and in motivation and interpretation.
Finally, it remains to mention that there are other equilibrium concepts that address 
the extensive form aspect of interpreting deviations as evidence of non-rationality. 
In particular, Battigalli (1987), Reny (1992), Fudenberg & Levine (1993) and Rubin­
stein &; Wolinsky (1994) considered equilibrium concepts that only require players 
to choose best replies to conjectures that are confirmed on the equilibrium path 
(and various other assumptions). Thus the players’ conjectures may be wrong off 
the equilibrium path, but they never observe this; beliefs off the equilibriur^j path 
are not constrained. Typically, this leads to a generalization of perfect equilibrium, 
and to a multiplicity of equilibria. In contrast, in this thesis we do make strong 
assumptions on behaviour off the equilibrium path. This behaviour results from 
the players’ attitude towards uncertainty, not his beliefs about the opponents. As 
a consequence, perfect Choquet equilibria do not just generalize perfect equilibria.
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1.9 Economic Applications
The development of decision theory with non-additive beliefs was inspired by de­
viations from subjective expected utility theory as in the Ellsberg paradox. The 
extension to game theory with non-additive beliefs was a natural next step. U lti­
mately, however, the success of these theories will depend on the question whether 
they have interesting applications. A recent review is Mukerji (1999). Here we only 
want to list some of them:
In finance, Choquet expected utility theory has been applied to portfolio choice 
(Dow &; Werlang 19926, Dekel 1989, Simonsen & Werlang 1990), initial public 
offerings (Yoo 1990) and asset pricing (Dow & Werlang 1992a, Kelsey & Milne 
1995, Epstein & Wang 1994).
In agency and contract theory some applications are Ghirardato (1994), Kelsey & 
Spanjers (1997), Mukerji (1996), Rigotti (1997), Rigotti (19986), R igotti (1998a), 
and Rigotti & Ryan (1998).
In information economics CEU is used in Dow, Madrigal & Werlang (1989), Eich­
berger & Kelsey (1995), Persico (1995), and Tallon (1995a, b).
Chateauneuf (1994) and Ben-Porath, Gilboa & Schmeidler (1997) analyse inequality 
measurement in an approach similar to CEU. Eichberger & Kelsey (1996a) study the 
effect of non-additive beliefs on the provision of public goods. Lo (1998) considers 
auctions with uncertainty-averse bidders. Wang, Young & Panjer (1997) apply 
anticipated utility theory to the study of insurance prices.
1.10 Experimental Evidence on Uncertainty Aversion
The aim of this thesis is to propose a rationality concept for extensive games for 
uncertainty averse players. It remains to survey the experimental evidence on un­
certainty aversion.47
First, although Ellsberg’s paradox has stimulated so much research, Ellsberg (1961) 
did not conduct scientific experiments. His reasoning was based on thought experi­
47Camerer (1995) offers a  general survey of experim ents about decision-m aking under risk and  
uncertainty, Camerer &: Weber (1992) concentrate on non-additive beliefs. This section is based  
on Sm ithson (1997).
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ments and casual observation .48 However, careful experiments later confirmed Ells- 
berg’s intuition. In the original urn examples, experimental subjects regularly show 
a strict aversion to ambiguity in the sense that they are willing to pay for avoiding 
it (Camerer & Weber 1992). Moreover, this aversion is robust: Even written argu­
ments cannot convince them to change their beliefs. (Slovic & Tversky 1974). In 
addition, there is a low correlation between the revealed attitudes towards risk and 
the attitudes towards uncertainty49 (Cohen, Jaffray & Said 1985).
Apart from confirming this basic intuition, the experimental studies further refined 
the understanding of uncertainty aversion. Some studies found that there is less 
uncertainty aversion when uncertain acts m ay avoid losses than when uncertain 
acts may provide gains (Cohen et al. 1985). Also, uncertainty aversion effects 
recedes when people believe that they have sufficient expertise in case the ambiguous 
outcome is realized (Heath & Tversky 1991).
It is important, however, that uncertainty aversion is by no means a universal 
empirical phenomenon. Experiments found that subjects prefer ambiguity when 
there are low probabilities of gains and high probabilities of losses (Curley & Yates 
1985). Subjects also prefer consensual but ambiguous information to conflicting 
but precise information, i.e. people prefer ambiguity to conflict. And when asked to 
evaluate the likelihood of causes for specific events, it is found that subjects give too 
little weight to (ambiguous) catch-all categories (‘catch-all underestimation bias’) 
(Fischhoff, Slovic & Lichtenstein 1978).
The only experimental study so far that has investigated how players update their 
beliefs (Cohen, Gilboa, Jaffray & Schmeidler 1999) has not led to a clear-cut con­
clusion.
Similarly, there are not many experimental studies relevant for an evaluation of 
uncertainty aversion in games, possibly due to the lack of theoretical frameworks 
until recently. One related study is Beard & Beil (1994), who report on experiments 
whether players rely on the rationality of others. They find strong evidence against 
relying on the self-interest of opponents in games, even though most players indeed
48 In the sam e vein, G ilboa & Schmeidler (1993) argue that the widespread use of classical 
statistics can be viewed as evidence against Bayesianism .
49 Note that in CEU the attitude towards risk (expressed as the curvature of the utility function)
is indeed independent of the attitude towards uncertainty (expressed as the shape of the belief 
capacity).
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act in their self-interest.
Finally, it is also important to mention that there is evidence against the assumption  
that beliefs are monotonic, which is a finding that even calls into question the 
modelling of beliefs as capacities. Tversky & Kahneman (1983) (see also Selten
(1991)) devised the famous ‘Linda problem’, in which they confronted subjects 
with the following information:
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored  
in philosophy. A s  a student, she was deeply concerned with issues o f  
discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear 
demonstrations.
Tversky &: Kahneman (1983)
When asked to rank the likelihood of different propositions about Linda, Tversky 
& Kahneman (1983) report that 90 % rank the statement that “Linda is a bank 
teller and is active in the feminist movement” before “Linda is a bank teller” , even 
though the former obviously implies the latter (‘conjunction fallacy’). Tversky & 
Kahneman (1983) argue that decision-making is not based on beliefs at all, but 
on heuristics that lead to biases, i.e. system atic deviations from rationality. In 
the ‘Linda problem’, the ‘representation heuristic’, i.e. the hypothesis that subjects 
rank statements on the basis of their representativeness of the given information, 
is proposed as an explanation of observed behaviour. However, the status of both 
the evidence and the explanation is a subject of debate (e.g. Gigerenzer (1996), 
Kahneman & Tversky (1996).
1.11 Conclusion
This chapter has shown how game theory approaches the question what constitutes 
rationality in games. Despite significant progress, however, open questions remain.
In contrast, subjective expected utility theory in decision theory has received con­
flicting empirical evidence. This has led to the development of decision theories 
based on non-additive beliefs that explain the empirical evidence as uncertainty 
aversion. Under the subjective interpretation of probability, the non-additivity has 
a natural interpretation as a weaker consistency requirement on likelihood judge­
ments. The extension of non-additive beliefs to game theory yields new strategic 
insights, but also faces conceptual difficulties.
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The objective of this thesis is to bring these two strands together: In the following 
chapters we will argue for a particular way to introduce non-additive beliefs into 
game theory, based on consistency requirements for a rationality concept. In turn, 
the resulting equilibrium concept addresses some of the conceptual difficulties of 
capturing rationality in games.
1.12 Limitations
Throughout this work we will focus on non-cooperative games rather than cooper­
ative games. In particular, both communication between players and their ability 
to write binding contracts are excluded unless formally modelled as part of the 
game. For the m ost part, we will focus on finite games, even though many games 
of economic interest are infinite.
We will concentrate on the extension of N ash’s (1950) equilibrium concept and 
not consider rationalizability as a basis for the extension. Since communication is 
excluded, we will also not consider extensions o f correlated equilibria.
We will present the motivation for the definition of these equilibrium concepts in­
formally, and not give a formal epistemic characterisation. We also have nothing to 
say about other justifications of equilibrium ideas based on learning or evolution.
Finally, we will only present theoretical concepts and will not confront them with 
experimental evidence.
1.13 Terminology
In agreement with the literature, we use the concept ‘non-additive’ in the sense 
of ‘not necessarily additive’: Non-additive set functions may be, but need not be 
additive.
We often speak of a ‘player’ even when he is the single decision-maker.
We distinguish between ‘normal form gam es’ and ‘strategic form gam es’ in the fol­
lowing way: In a normal form game each player has one action and the players 
choose their actions simultaneously or in ignorance of each other’s choice. A strate­
gic form game is associated with an extensive form game in which players may take
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more than one action and may move sequentially. The actions of the strategic form 
game are the pure strategies of the extensive form game. We make this convention 
in order to avoid any misunderstandings when we discuss normal form games, i.e. 
they are not the strategic form games of extensive form games with a sequential 
structure.
Following Myerson (1991) (and Halmos (1950)), we som etim es use ‘iff’ to abbreviate 
‘if  and only i f ’.
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Chapter 2
U ncertainty Aversion and Equilibrium  
in Norm al Form Games
A b stra c t
This chapter presents an analysis o f games in which rationality is not necessar­
ily mutual knowledge. We argue that a player who faces a non-rational opponent 
faces genuine uncertainty that is best captured by non-additive beliefs. Optimal 
strategies can then be derived from assumptions about the rational player’s atti­
tude towards uncertainty. This paper investigates the consequences of this view of 
strategic interaction. We present an equilibrium concept for normal form games, 
called Choquet-Nash Equilibrium, that formalizes this intuition, and study existence 




From a classical point of view, game theory is about the question what constitutes 
rationality in a situation of strategic interaction (von Neumann & Morgenstern 
1944, particularly sections 2.1 and 4.1). The players are assumed to be rational 
in a decision-theoretic sense, i.e. they act as if  they possess a utility function over 
outcomes and beliefs given by a probability distribution over states, and maximise 
(subjective) expected utility (von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944, Savage 1954). 
Beliefs, in turn, have to be compatible with what the players know. In partic­
ular, players are assumed to know that their opponents are themselves rational. 
Under additional assumptions, the equilibrium concept (Nash 1950) can then be 
interpreted as a rationality concept (see, e.g., Tan & Werlang (1988), Aumann & 
Brandenburger (1995)).
However, the assumptions that players are rational, and that they know that their 
opponents are rational, are restrictive, both from an introspective and an experi­
mental point of view. This paper addresses the question what constitutes rationality 
if  rationality is not mutual knowledge. As in Kreps et al. (1982), we distinguish be­
tween rational and non-rational players. However, we argue that the possibility that 
the opponent is not rational leads to uncertainty that cannot be adequately cap­
tured by beliefs that are necessarily representable by a probability measure. Thus, 
the analysis of games without mutual knowledge of rationality has to be based on a 
weaker definition of decision-theoretic rationality. In particular, Choquet-expected 
utility theory allows more general beliefs. Thus, we combine the analysis o f Kreps 
et al. (1982) with Choquet-expected utility theory.
Choquet-expected utility theory (henceforth CEU) is due to Schmeidler (1989). Un­
der Choquet-expected utility theory players are maximising expected utility sub­
ject to their beliefs, but their beliefs do not have to be additive. CEU is closely 
related to, but not quite identical with maxmin expected utility theory (Gilboa & 
Schmeidler 1989), which allows sets of additive beliefs. Whereas Savage’s subjective 
expected utility theory reduces uncertainty to risk, CEU and its variants gives rise 
to a qualitative difference between risk and uncertainty.
This difference is important in games if we distinguish between rational and non- 
rational players as in Kreps et al. (1982). A rational player is one who chooses
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his strategy as to maximise utility given his beliefs. A rational player who faces 
a rational opponent can anticipate her strategy if he knows her utility function 
and can anticipate her beliefs. Consequently, a rational player who faces a rational 
opponent faces risk, in the sense that his beliefs are given by objective probabilities 
determined by best-reply considerations. Thus his beliefs are necessarily additive.
On the other hand, a rational player who faces a non-rational opponent faces true 
uncertainty, if all he knows is that a non-rational player does not necessarily choose 
a utility-maximising strategy. Under CEU, a rational player’s beliefs reflect his 
attitude towards uncertainty. As a result, it becomes possible to base a theory 
of rational decisions in games not on a player’s theory about how non-rational 
opponents play, but on his attitude towards uncertainty. Since CEU was motivated  
by phenomena that can be explained as uncertainty aversion —  for instance the 
Ellsberg paradox —  we also make this assumption.
We present an equilibrium concept, called Choquet-Nash equilibrium, that formal­
izes this intuition and discuss existence and properties of these equilibria in normal 
form games. We show that
-  in normal form games Choquet-Nash equilibria always exist,
-  not every rationalizable strategy is a Choquet-Nash equilibrium, and, conversely, 
non-rationalizable strategies may be equilibria,
-  strictly dominated strategies are never rational, but elimination of such strategies 
cannot be iterated,
-  robustness with respect to doubts about the rationality of the opponents is not 
captured by payoff-dominance or risk-dominance,
-  mixed strategies may or may not be robust, depending on the game in question.
On this basis we formulate two equilibrium refinements: A Nash equilibrium is 
called strictly uncertainty aversion perfect if it continues to be an equilibrium as 
long as the belief in the opponents’ rationality is sufficiently strong. Such equilibria 
need not exist. A Nash equilibrium is called uncertainty aversion perfect if it can be 
approximated by equilibria that do not require mutual knowledge of rationality. We 
show that such equilibria always exist, and that these refinements differ from those 
that are based on ‘trembles’ of otherwise fully rational opponents, i.e. trembling- 
hand perfect, proper and strictly perfect equilibria.
This paper makes three contributions. First, we extend the analysis o f Kreps et
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al. (1982, henceforth KMRW). In contrast to KMRW, we do not need to specify 
a particular belief about the ‘type’ of an irrational opponent. Due to the absence 
of a theory of non-rational decision-making, such a specification is necessarily ad 
hoc. Moreover, the uniform distribution does not adequately model the ignorance 
about'an irrational opponent, because it is not invariant under irrelevant changes 
of the game, for instance when adding a superfluous strategy that is a mere copy 
of an existing one. In our approach, ignorance can naturally be expressed as a 
non-additive probability.
More fundamentally, two difficulties arise with interpreting equilibria as rational 
strategies in the KMRW framework. First, interpreting equilibrium strategies as 
rational im plicitly defines all non-equilibrium strategies as non-rational. Thus, a 
rational player’s beliefs about an non-rational opponent should be consistent with 
this definition of non-rationality. This means that his beliefs should be consistent 
with any non-equilibrium strategy of the opponent. Secondly, a ‘type’ in a game 
with incomplete information corresponds to a consistent infinite hierarchy of be­
liefs. Thus, in KMRW the rational player believes that the opponent possesses such 
beliefs, even if he is not rational. In contrast, in our analysis an irrational opponent 
is a source of genuine uncertainty, and the question what constitutes a rational 
strategy is determined by a rational player’s attitude towards uncertainty. Conse­
quently, our analysis applies independently of the question whether the opponent 
can be modelled as a type.
The second contribution of this paper consists in a robustness analysis of Nash equi­
libria. Applying our solution concept to normal form games allows us to formalize 
how robust a Nash equilibrium is with respect to doubts about the rationality of 
the opponent. This robustness concept differs from existing ones, and shows how 
robustness is not a property of an equilibrium concept in general, but rather a 
property of specific equilibria in specific games.
The third contribution of this paper is that it extends the equilibrium concept to 
games in which players have non-additive beliefs. Here we extend solution concepts 
proposed by Dow & Werlang (1994), Eichberger & Kelsey (1993), Epstein (1997a), 
Haller (1995), Hendon et al. (1995), Klibanoff (1993), Lo (19956), Lo (1996), Mari- 
nacci (1994), Mukerji (1994), Ritzberger (1996), and Ryan (1997a). This literature 
considers games in which players maximise CEU, or some variant of CEU. These
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papers show that it is possible to capture strategic phenomena that cannot be ex­
plained when players maximise subjective expected utility, and have also uncovered 
the difficulties that an extension of the equilibrium concept has to address. In our 
analysis we provide an explicit reason for the existence of uncertainty, and on this 
basis some of these difficulties can be avoided. In particular, it is not necessary to 
use simple capacities in the definition of an equilibrium, or to decide between the 
different support concepts that have been proposed for capacities, or to formulate 
an independence concept for capacities .50
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we define the equilibrium concept 
for two-player games and prove existence of Choquet-Nash equilibria. In section 3 
we derive properties of Choquet-Nash equilibria, formulate the two refinements of 
Nash equilibria, and compare them with standard solution concepts. In section 4 
we discuss the extension to infinitely many strategies and more than two players. 
Section 5 compares the equilibrium concept with other equilibrium concepts that 
are based on Choquet expected utility and uncertainty aversion. Section 6  presents 
an equilibrium concept that allows players to have a strict preference for mixed 
strategies. Section 7 concludes.
2.2 Choquet-Nash Equilibrium
A game in normal form is defined by specifying the set of players N , for each player 
a set of strategies Si and each player’s von Neumann - Morgenstern utility function 
it,-. In particular, players are assumed to be rational: when faced with uncertainty 
they maximise subjective expected utility. This concept of rationality has been 
axiomatized by Savage (1954).
In a game, rational beliefs must not only satisfy Savage’s axioms, but must in 
addition be consistent with what players know about the structure of the game 
and about each other’s rationality. In particular, if a player can anticipate which 
strategies are rational and if he knows that his opponent is rational, then he can
50 After a first version of this paper was com pleted, I learnt of the closely related approach of 
Sujoy Mukerji (1994). His main concern is the consistent introduction o f CEU into gam e theory, 
and he argues that this requires the KMRW framework. We fully agree with this, in addition we 
argue in this paper that the converse also holds, i.e. non-additive beliefs overcome the lim itations 
of the KMRW approach.
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anticipate his opponent’s play. Precise arguments along this line are developed, e.g., 
in Tan & Werlang (1988) and Aumann &; Brandenburger (1995).
If rationality is not mutual knowledge the question thus arises how a rational player 
should act if he knew that the opponent is not rational. In that case Savage’s axioms 
imply that the rational player should have a belief given by a unique probability 
measure over the opponent’s actions. If neither a theory of bounded rationality nor 
a stable empirical regularity of non-rational behaviour is available, there seems to  
be no foundation for this belief. The idea of this paper is that a weaker rationality 
concept allows further assumptions about the rational player from which rational 
actions can be derived.
2.2.1 Uncertainty Aversion
A key axiom in subjective expected utility theory is the independence axiom (Ans- 
combe & Aumann 1963, Sam uelsonl952). Intuitively, the independence axiom says 
that if a decision maker prefers one act over another then he should also prefer a 
probability mixture of the first and a third act over the same mixture of the second 
and the third act: Either this probability mixture will reduce to a choice between 
the first two acts, or not, in which case the decision-maker is left with the third act 
in either case .51 The descriptive validity of the independence axiom is questioned by 
the Allais paradox, the Ellsberg paradox and similar findings. Since its consequence 
is that a decision maker’s beliefs can be represented by a probability measure, it 
also places a high demand on a player’s rationality.
CEU weakens the independence axiom (Schmeidler 1989). Under CEU, the indepen­
dence axiom is not assumed to hold for all acts, but only for acts that are “comono­
tonic” . Two acts52 / , / '  are comonotonic if f ( u )  >  /(w ') implies f ' ( u ) >  / '(u /) ,  
i.e. both acts give rise to the same preference ordering over states. In the following 
figures, acts / ,  g and h are pairwise comonotonic, /  (or g or h) and h' are not.
51 However, this interpretation equates the probability mixture with a two-stage lottery, i.e. also
assum es a version of the ‘reduction of com pound lotteries axiom 1, see Kreps (1988, p .50 -  52) for
the expected utility case.
52Here, acts /  G J- map states tv £  ft into von Neumann - Morgenstern utilities. The acts are
measurable with respect to events £ £  E C 2n .
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U  i CJ2 ^1
/ 10 6 \ f + \ h 10 CO
9 16 0 13 0
h 10 0 5 5
0 4 \9 + \ h ' 8 2
F igure  1 F igure 2
Restricting the Sure-Thing Principle to comonotonic acts means that if the player 
is indifferent between /  a n d g then he must also be indifferent between \ f  and 
\ g +  because f , g  and h are comonotonic. However, he may, e.g., strictly prefer 
| / +  \h f  to | g +  \ h ' . The reason is that mixtures of non-comonotonic acts can be 
interpreted as “hedging” , i.e. distributing utility across states. Uncertainty aversion 
means that players may rationally act as if they hedged against uncertainty. Thus, 
in contrast to subjective expected utility theory, CEU allows the introduction of an 
additional assumption about rational preferences over acts that characterizes the 
player’s attitude towards uncertainty. 53
Schmeidler (1989) has shown that behaviour that is rational in this weaker sense can 
still be described by expected-utility maximisation. Players do still act as if they 
possess a von Neumann - Morgenstern utility function and beliefs, and take expected 
values. These beliefs, however, are no longer given by a probability measure over 
events, but a capacity, i.e. non-additive measure over events. Formally, a capacity v 
maps E into [0,1] such that (i) u(0) =  0, (ii) v(Q) =  1 and (iii) E  C E' = >  v(E) <  
v (E ’). Property (iii) weakens the finite-additivity requirement for finitely-additive 
measures: EC\E'  =  0 = >  v (E U E ')  =  v(E )  +  v{E').  Note that non-additive beliefs 
still may, but in general need not be additive.
The expectation of a real-valued random variable X  with respect to a non-additive 
measure v is defined in Choquet (1953). If X  takes finitely many values c*i >  . . .  >
53This preference for randomisation argument exploits the structure of the Anscom be-Aum ann  
m odel (Eichberger & Kelsey 1996c). Also, com onotonic independence may be too strong a re­
quirement for uncertainty aversion (Epstein 19976, Ghirardato & Marinacci 1997). In our game- 
theoretic context these are side issues, however.
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a n the Choquet integral is given by54
f  n
I X d v  :=  >  ati) • Aar,-,
 ^ 1=1
where Aar,- := a,- — ar,+i and a n+i := 0.
Formally, uncertainty aversion can be characterized in terms of the capacity v. The 
capacity v displays uncertainty aversion iff it is supermodular, i.e. v(E ) +  v(E ') <  
v (E  fl E') +  v (E  U E '). The ‘probability weights’ v(E )  of an uncertainty averse 
decision maker do not add up to 1. M aximisation of Choquet expected utility under 
uncertainty aversion corresponds to allocating probability residuals to outcomes 
that are worst for the player.
2.2.2 Equilibrium
Let (1 ,5, u) be a finite two-player game in normal form. If player i knew that his 
opponent was non-rational, CEU implies that his belief is given by a not necessarily 
additive capacity Vj over Sj.  Moreover, his expected utility from his pure strategy 
S{ is given by the Choquet expectation u ,( s , , Vj) := Js . U i(si,S j) d v j . We define his 
payoff from a mixed strategy o-,- £  A 5,- as vj)  := J23,es, a i( s i ) ' w»(s»> vj)-
In a game in which rationality is not mutual knowledge, player 1 will thus take both 
possibilities into account: that the opponent is rational and that he need not be. 
If he can anticipate the rational strategies, his overall expected utility will be the 
weighted sum of his expected utility from interacting with a rational opponent, and 
the Choquet expected utility from interacting with a non-rational opponent. The 
weight corresponds to his degree of belief in the opponent’s rationality. In a weak 
Choquet-Nash equilibrium, these rational strategies are determined endogenously.
D e fin it io n . Let ( / ,  5 , it) be a finite two-player gam e in normal form. Let 0 <  
f l , €2 <  1- Let vi be a capacity on S i and V2  be a capacity on S 2 . Then cr* is a 
w eak  C h o q u e t-N a sh  eq u ilib r iu m  iff ( if  and only if)
a l E arg max [ (1  -  €1 ) ■ ui(<7 i ,  <r*2) +  ei -u i(a i,V 2 ) ],
<7, GX/1
0-2 e  arg max [ (1  -  e2) • u2{cr{,cr2 ) +  e2 ■ u2 (ri,o-2) ].
3
54As usual, we write v ( X  >  t) for v({u> 6  >  t} ) . The integrals on the right hand side
are extended Riemann integrals. If v is additive this is the usual expectation.
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Note that if ei =  € 2  =  1 then each player believes that he faces a non-rational oppo­
nent, and thus the question what constitutes a rational strategy is purely decision- 
theoretic. On the other hand, if € 1  =  € 2  =  0 then rationality is mutual knowledge. 
Note also that this definition assumes that the rational players know each others 
beliefs. Finally, notice that this equilibrium concept makes no assumption about 
the players’ attitudes towards uncertainty, in particular, they may be uncertainty 
loving.
In general, when players are not expected utility maximisers, an equilibrium need 
not exist (Crawford 1990, Dekel, Safra & Segal 1991). However, the following 
proposition shows that this problem does not arise under CEU . 55
P r o p o s it io n  1. For all ei, 6 2 , and V2  a weak Choquet-Nash equilibrium exists.
P r o o f. The proof is the standard argument due to Nash (1950). The best reply 
correspondence a*(a j)  =  argm ax^ gs. [ (1  — c,-) • u,-(<r,-, ) +  e,- • u,- (c,-, Vj) ] maps the
(n — 1 ) dimensional unit simplex into itself. Since the objective function is linear in 
(Ti, it is continuous, therefore a maximum exists and the best reply correspondence 
is non-empty and convex-valued. Since it,- is continuous in <Tj, it also has a closed 
graph. By Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem, (<rj(0-2), (^ i)) a fixed point,
which is, by definition, a general Choquet-Nash equilibrium. q .e .d .
In this generality the equilibrium concept is difficult to apply, because the beliefs e,- 
and Vi have to be specified. We therefore make three simplifying assumptions: First, 
we assume that players share a common prior about the degree of mutual knowledge 
of rationality. This assumption is for simplicity only, but also has two useful side 
effects. It avoids any ad hoc asymmetry, and it makes the assumption that players 
know each others beliefs less demanding. Secondly, we assume that players are 
totally ignorant about the behaviour of a non-rational opponent. This ignorance 
has two reasons: Our solution concept specifies rational strategies only, so it does 
not restrict at all the range of non-rational strategies. Thus, complete ignorance 
is a consistency requirement. Also, there is no exogenous theory of non-rational 
decision making. As a consequence, every assumption about the shape of a rational 
player’s beliefs about his non-rational opponent are ad hoc. In addition, a useful
55 Note that this existence result also holds under uncertainty love. However, this is due to  the  
order of integration, see section 6.
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side effect is that the assumption that players know the rational opponent’s beliefs 
is less restrictive. Finally, we consider the case that the players are uncertainty 
averse. Uncertainty aversion is the natural explanation of behavior observed in the 
Ellsberg paradox.
Complete ignorance can naturally be captured by ‘simple capacities’:
vj(E j)  —
0 , if Ej C S j,
1 , if E j =  S j .
If player i holds this belief Vj about a non-rational opponent, he is only certain 
that the opponent will choose one of his available actions, but is unable to assign 
positive probability to any particular set o f actions.
The Choquet-expectation of a utility function with respect to a simple capacity re­
flects uncertainty aversion, since all probability is allocated to the worst realization, 
i.e.
A Choquet-Nash equilibrium is a weak Choquet-Nash equilibrium with these addi­
tional assumptions.
a Choquet-Nash equilibrium (henceforth CNE) exists. Moreover, every symmetric 
game also has a symmetric Choquet-Nash equilibrium.
D e fin it io n . Let ( / ,  5 , u) be a finite two-player gam e in norm al form. The gam e  
is sym m etric iff Si =  Sj and it,(s,-,sj) =  Uj(sj ,  s ,). A  stra tegy  com bination is 
sym m etric  iff Si =  S j.
56In the remaining sections, we also use the notation g s  ’ m ‘n*;€Sj u*(s *> sj )  =
I s  milN €S 'J ui(si> «>) da?.
dvj =  min it,(s,-, Sj)
sj£Sj
D e fin it io n . Let (I,  S, u) be a finite two-player gam e in norm al form. Let 0 <  c <  1.
Then a* is a C h o q u e t-N a sh  eq u ilib r iu m  ifl56
<x{ E arg m ax f (1 -  e) • iti(<ri,o-*) +  c • tr i(si) • min i t i ( s i , s 2) ]>
<7-2 G arg max f (1 — c) ■ u2(<rU a 2) +  e • cr2(s2) ■ min u2(« i,« 2) ].
It follows from proposition 1 that in every finite two-player game in normal form
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R em a rk  1. For all e, in a sym m etric gam e a sym m etric Choquet-Nash equilibrium  
exists.
P r o o f. Again, the proof is standard. The result is proved as in proposition 1, 
except that the fixed point argument is applied to the best reply correspondence
q .e .d .
2.3 Properties of Choquet-Nash Equilibria
The aim of this section is to present the properties of Choquet-Nash equilibria. 
Section 3.1 relates them to dominance and rationalizability. In section 3.2, we 
relate Choquet-Nash equilibria to the robustness of Nash equilibria This will lead 
to the definition of two equilibrium refinements (sections 3.3 and 3.4). Section 3.5 
compares them with minimax strategies in zero-sum games. Finally, section 3.6 
compares them with other equilibrium refinements (trembling-hand perfect, proper 
and strictly perfect equilibria).
2.3.1 Dominance and Rationalizability
The following result implies that, independently of the degree of mutual knowledge 
of rationality, no strictly dominated strategy is rational.
L em m a  1. Let ( / ,  S, u) be a finite two-player gam e in normal form. Let 0 <  c <  1. 
Let a* be a Choquet-Nash equilibrium. Then i f  crt* (s, ) >  0, then Si is a best response 
to  (Tj and e, i.e.
S{ E arg max [ (1  -  e) • it,(st-, <rj) +  c • min ut(s», sj)  ].
Sj£Sj
P r o o f . Again, the proof is standard. If Si is not a best response then some other 
strategy sj- gives higher expected utility than s,-. Thus the player can increase 
his overall utility from cr* by playing <x,(s() =  c*(si )  +  <r*(sj), 6-,-(s,-) =  0  and 
<ti{s") =  cr*(s") for all other strategies s", which contradicts the assumption that 
<Ti is a best reply. q .e .d .
It is important to notice, however, that strict dominance cannot be iterated, as the 
game in Figure 3 shows:
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L R  
T  1,1 -9 9 ,0
B  0,1 0,0
F igure  3
In this game playing L is a strictly dominant strategy for player 2. Consequently, 
iterated strict dominance yields T  as the unique rational strategy for player 1, if  
rationality is mutual knowledge. In particular, (T, L) is the unique equilibrium and 
the unique rationalizable strategy profile of the game.
However, (T, L) is not a plausible profile unless player 1 is convinced that player 
2 is rational. The CNE in this game depends on e. In every CNE, player 2 will 
play L because this is his strictly dominant strategy. However, unless e <  ^  only 
strategy B  is rational for player 1.
Note that this shows that non-rationalizable strategies may be CNE-strategies. The 
‘Matching Pennies’ game in figure 4 shows that, conversely, not every rationalizable 
strategy is a CNE.
T
B
Note that the best reply correspondence for a Choquet-Nash equilibrium in the 
‘Matching Pennies’ game is given by
*1 (<7j) =  arg max [ (1 -  e) • u,(<7i, aj) +  et- • ( -1 ) ],
<7i (EE,
which differs from the Nash best reply correspondence only by a factor and a con­
stant. Consequently, independently of e, only the mixed strategies cr1 (T) =  (Ti {B) =  
a 2 (L) =  <7 2 (R)  =  |  form a CNE. This is also the unique Nash equilibrium, but every 
strategy profile is rationalizable. We have thus established proposition 2:
L R
1 - 1 - 1,1
- 1,1 1 , - 1
F igure  4
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P r o p o s it io n  2. Non-rationalizable s tra tegy  profiles m ay be Choquet-Nash equi­
libria. Conversely, not every rationalizable stra tegy  profile is a Choquet-Nash equi­
librium.
2.3.2 The Robustness of Nash Equilibria
The definition of a Choquet-Nash equilibrium collapses to the definition of Nash 
equilibrium if c =  0. So any Nash equilibrium is a CNE for e =  0. We will show 
that a given Nash equilibrium may also be a CNE for e >  0, and that the highest 
such e can be regarded as a measure o f robustness of a given Nash equilibrium .57 
To establish this claim, we first need the following lemma:
L em m a  2. Let (I, S, u) be a finite two-player gam e in norm al form. Let 0 <  £ <  1. 
Let cr* be a Choquet-Nash equilibrium. I f  a* is a Nash equilibrium, then it  is also 
a Choquet-Nash equilibrium for all 0 <  e' <  e.
P r o o f. Let 0 <  c <  1 and 0 <  e' <  e. Since cr* is a Nash equilibrium, Ui(<r*,<Tj) >  
Ui((Ti,<Tj). Since cr* is a CNE for c,
(1 -  c) ■ Ui(<Tt,<Tj) +  £■ Js . m inxes,. Ui(si t Sj) dtr] ]
>  (1 -  e) • Uj(u"j, &j) +  c ■ f s . m inxes,. Ui(si t Sj) dcr,- ]
for all cr,- and all i. Consequently, for any a  E [0,1],
a  • +  (1  -  a ) • [(1  -  e) • +  £ ■ f s . m m Sj€Sj Ui(si t s j )  d<r\ ]
>  a  • Ui(<ri, o-j) +  (1  -  a ) • [(1  -  e) • Cj) +  £ • f s . min4ie5> u ,(s t-, sj )  d(Ti ]
for all cr,-. So for a  =  1 — y  we have a  E [0,1] and
(1  -  c') • U{(erf, (Tj) +  d  • f s _ m in x es, u ,(s»> sj)  do~i
>  (1  -  £') ■ U ifa , <Tj) +  c' • f s , m in,ie5> Ui(si ,Sj) d(Ti
for all CTi, and for all i E I, i.e. cr* is also a CNE for e!. q .e .d .
On the basis of lemma 2, we can now define a measure of robustness of a Nash 
equilibrium with respect to doubts about the rationality of the opponent:
57 See also Eichberger & Kelsey (1993).
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D e fin it io n . Let ( / ,  S, u) be a finite two-player game in normal form. Let 0 <  e <  1. 
Let <t* be a Nash equilibrium. Then the degree e(<r*) o f  uncertainty aversion ro­
bustness o f  cr* is given by the largest e for which cr* is a Choquet-Nash equilibrium.
Note that c exists because the expected utility functions are continuous in c.
As the following game shows, this measure of robustness formalizes a different in­
tuition about robustness than payoff-dominance and risk-dominance. The game in 
figure 5 has two strict Nash equilibria:
T
B
The equilibrium (T , L) dominates the equilibrium (B , R) both with respect to 
payoff-dominance and with respect to risk-dominance. However, ?(T, L) =  | ,  since 
if a rational opponent plays L (respectively T ) then it is only rational to play T  
(respectively L) as long as c <  | .  On the other hand, c(B,  R) =  1, since if a rational 
opponent plays R  (respectively B ) then it is never rational to deviate from B  to T  
(respectively from R  to L).
We next show that strict Nash equilibria are robust with respect to doubts of the 
rationality of the opponent:58
R em a rk  2. Let ( / ,  S, u) be a finite two-player gam e in norm al form. Let s * be a 
Choquet-Nash equilibrium. I f  s* is a s tric t Nash equilibrium , then there exists an 
e >  0 such that s* is a Choquet-Nash equilibrium for all 0 <  e <  e.
P ro o f. Define for each i E /
Si := max [m in u,(s,-,Sj) — min u,(s*,Sj)]
5 S% $ j £ S j  $ j £ S j
oti := min [u,- (s*, S j) -  ut- (s,-, S j)]S $ E*->i
Note that a,- >  0 and Si >  0. Define e,- :=  and ? := m in,g/ c,-. Note that




F igure  5
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e >  0. Then for any i and any s,- £  Si
(1 -  e) • [u i(s; , s j)  -  Ui(si, sj)]
>  (1 -? )•< *<
> (1 -  £,•) • a,
=  • Si
>  € - Si
>  e • [minxes,. Ui(si} sj) -  mmSj£Sj « .(< , sj)]
It follows from lemma 1 that only pure strategy deviations are relevant, so s* is a 
CNE for e, and by lem m a 2 for all c <  c. q .e .d .
The requirement that a Nash equilibrium is strict is sufficient for e >  0, but it is 
not necessary, as the ‘Matching Pennies’ game in figure 4 shows. The non-strictness 
of mixed strategy equilibria is sometimes regarded as a conceptual weakness, be­
cause the players, while having no incentive to deviate, still seem to lack a positive 
incentive to choose their equilibrium strategies. This has led to a justification of 
mixed strategy equilibria by purification arguments, i.e. in terms of an embedding 
of the original game into a game with (slight) incomplete information .59 However, 
both this criticism of mixed equilibria and their defense apply equally to all mixed 
strategy equilibria. Next, we show that the robustness measure e formalizes that in 
some games mixed strategy equilibria are more plausible than in other games.
T
B
The game in figure 6  has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium o~l(T) =  <r\(L) =  | ,  
a l ( B )  =  (r^iR) =  Given that the rational opponent plays <7j ,  a player’s expected 
payoff from a rational opponent is independent of his own strategy. Thus a rational 
player will only take into account the expected payoff from a non-rational opponent.
59N ote, however, that the justification o f Nash equilibria given in Aumann Sc Brandenburger 




F i g u r e  6
66
This payoff is 0 when he plays T  (respectively L ) and 7 when he plays B  (respectively 
R ). So a rational player will always deviate to B  (respectively R) if he expects a 
rational opponent to play according to <r* and there is doubt about the opponent’s 
rationality, however small it is, unless e =  0 .
The stability property of mixed strategy equilibria are given by remark 3:
R em a rk  3. Let ( / ,  S, it) be a finite two-player gam e in norm al form. Let cr* be 
a Nash equilibrium. Let i £  I , £ Si, a* (s,) > 0 and  cr*(s() > 0. Then if  
m inxes,. Ui(si , sj )  ±  m i n ,^ .  tt,(s-,Sj) then c(<r*) =  0 .
P ro o f. If a* is a CNE, both s,- and must be best replies to c. However, since 
a* is also a Nash equilibrium, both s,- and s(- are also best replies to ,• if e =  0. 
So if e >  0 we must have m in ^ .^ . it,(s,-, Sj) =  m in,i€ 5 i iti(s(-,Sj), a contradiction.
q .e .d .
The following example shows that even for a genuinely mixed Nash equilibrium60 




Consider the mixed equilibrium T  and q* =  Prob(L) =  | .  Then player 1 will prefer 
T  as long as (1 — c) 2 ■ |  >  1 , i.e. e <  | .  Player 2 is always indifferent between 
L and R, so c =  g. Note that for q* =  |  every p* =  Prob(T) £  [0,1] is also a 
Nash equilibrium, however, for any equilibrium with p* >  0 we have 7 = 0 ,  i.e. 
such equilibria are not robust. The reason is that if there is a positive probability, 
however small, that player 2 is not rational, player 1 will prefer to play B  if a 
rational opponent plays q* —
Note, however, that we cannot have 0 <  7 <  1 for Nash equilibria in 2 x 2 games
in which both players use genuinely mixed strategies. The following game shows










Consider the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium p \ =  Prob(T) =  =  Prob(M ) =
|,< 7j =  Prob(X) =  ^2 =  Prob(C') =  This is also a CNE as long as e <  c := 
because a rational player will receive 2 from a rational opponent whom he meets with 
probability (1 — e), but 0 from a non-rational opponent if he plays the equilibrium  
strategy. Deviating to his third pure strategy will give him 1 in either case.
So far, all robust equilibria were quasi-strict. Recall that a Nash equilibrium is 
quasi-strict if every pure best reply to the equilibrium strategies of the opponent is 
in the support of the equilibrium strategy (Harsanyi 1973). We next show that this 
is not true in general, i.e. that robustness in our sense neither implies nor is implied 
by quasi-strictness of a Nash equilibrium.
T
B
Consider the Nash equilibrium (T, L ) of the game in figure 9. It is not quasi-strict, 
because B  is also a best reply to L. Yet it is robust, i.e. c =  1, because for player 
2 L is strictly dominant. Player 1 knows that a rational opponent will play L, 
and in case the opponent is non-rational he will strictly prefer T  to B . This shows 
that robustness does not imply quasi-strictness. Conversely, the mixed strategy 
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thus established proposition 3, which shows that our robustness concept differs from 
quasi-strictness:
P r o p o s it io n  3. Robustness and quasi-strictness are unrelated, i.e. Nash equilibria  
m ay be robust and quasi-strict, non-robust and quasi-strict, robust and non-quasi- 
strict, or neither.
It remains to consider the most important special case of non-quasi-strict equilib­
ria, namely Nash equilibria in weakly dominated strategies. We show that such 
equilibria may or may not be robust.
T
B
The Nash equilibrium (T, L) is payoff-dominant, but involves weakly dominated 
strategies and is therefore not quasi-strict. For this equilibrium c =  0, so it is not 
robust. However, consider the game in figure 11:
T
B
Again (T, L) is a payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium in weakly dominated strategies. 
However, it is indeed robust. For both T  and B , a rational player 1 expects 2 from 
a rational opponent playing his equilibrium strategy L, and 0 from a non-rational 
opponent. Player 2, on the other hand, strictly prefers L  to R  as long as c <  so
To summarize, we have shown that c can be interpreted as a measure of robustness









of a Nash equilibrium with respect to doubts about the rationality of the opponent. 
This robustness concept differs from payoff dominance, risk dominance, strictness 
or quasi-strictness. This leads us to suggest two refinements of Nash equilibrium.
2.3.3 Strict Uncertainty Aversion Perfection
So far, we have shown how the concept of Choquet-Nash equilibrium sheds light on 
the robustness of Nash equilibria. This suggests to use this robustness analysis as a 
basis for equilibrium refinements. Intuitively, Nash equilibria are robust if they can 
be approximated by Choquet-Nash equilibria. Since this approximation can take 
different forms, we define two equilibrium refinements: strictly uncertainty aversion 
perfect equilibria (section 3.3) and uncertainty aversion perfect equilibria (section 
3.4).
D e fin it io n . Let ( / ,  S , u) be a finite two-player gam e in normal form. Let <r* be a 
stra tegy com bination. Then cr* is a s tr ic t ly  u n c e r ta in ty  a v ers io n  p e r fe c t  Nash 
equilibrium i f  and only i f  there exists a sequence (ck)keN> with  0 <  Ck <  1 and  
lim/c^oo Ck — 0, such that a* is a Choquet-Nash equilibrium for every  e*.
We first note that the strictly uncertainty aversion perfect equilibria are those with  
a strictly positive degree of uncertainty aversion robustness:
L em m a 3. Let ( / ,  S , u) be a finite two-player gam e in normal form. Let a*
be a Nash equilibrium. Then a* is a str ic tly  uncertainty aversion perfect Nash
equilibrium i f  and only i f  6 ( 0  >  0.
P ro o f. Necessity (‘only if ’) is immediate because c >  e* >  0. Sufficiency (‘i f ’) 
follows from lem m a 2 by considering the sequence (%). q .e .d .
Next, we show that a strictly uncertainty aversion perfect equilibrium is indeed 
a Nash equilibrium. This establishes that this concept is indeed an equilibrium  
refinement:
R em a rk  4 . Let  ( I , S , u )  be a finite two-player gam e in normal form. A  s tr ic tly  
uncertainty aversion perfect Nash equilibrium is indeed a Nash equilibrium.
P ro o f. Let Ck >  0. Since o'* is a CNE for Ck we have
(1 -  efe) • Uj(<r*, C j) +  ck ■ Js . min^.gs,. ut (st-, s j)  dcrj ]
>  (1  -  Ck) ■ Ui{(Ti ,<Tj) + C k ■ f 5 . m i n , ^ .  tt,-(s{ , s j )  dcri ]
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for all cr,- and all i €  / .  These expected utility functions are continuous in e*, so the 
inequalities also hold in the limit as e* —y 0 . q .e .d .
We next study the existence question:
P r o p o s it io n  4 . A  str ic tly  uncertainty aversion perfect Nash equilibrium need not 
exist.
P ro o f. Consider the game in figure 12:
T
B
Let p i =  P rob(T ),p 2 =  Prob(H ),gi =  Prob(L ),g2 =  P rob(C ),g3 =  Prob(i2). Any 
Nash equilibrium of this game takes the form p \ >  ,^<3^  =  1. Each such (p*, q*) 
is an equilibrium, and there can be no equilibrium with pi  =  0  (else =  1 and 
Pi  ^  0 ), so 93 =  0 , and if <72 >  0 then p\  =  1 and <72 =  0, a contradiction.
However, none of these equilibria is strictly uncertainty aversion perfect: Player 1 
knows that he can expect 2 from a rational opponent both if he plays T  and 5 ,  but 
from a non-rational opponent he will expect 0 from T  and 1 from B.  As long as 
€k >  0, he will play B.  q .e .d .
This result suggest to look for existence in a subclass of games. Surprisingly, not 
even 2 x 2-games always possess a strictly uncertainty aversion perfect Nash equi­
librium, as the game in figure 13 shows:
T  
B




L C  R
2,2 2,0 0 ,1
2,0 1,1 1 ,0
F i g u r e  12
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This game has a unique Nash equilibria in genuinely mixed strategies p * =  Prob(T) =  
^,q* =  Prob(L) =  | .  However, if player 1 expects a rational opponent to play q*, 
he will strictly prefer B  to T,  since he will achieve the same utility from a rational 
opponent, but a higher utility in case the opponent is non-rational. So e =  0, and 
the claim follows from lemma 3.
Finally, the following remark characterises strictly uncertainty aversion perfect equi­
libria. It will be useful when we study zero-sum games and standard equilibrium  
refinements in sections 3.5 and 3.6.
R e m a r k  5. Let (I,  S, u) be a finite two-player gam e in norm al form. Let cr* be a 
Nash equilibrium. Then cr* is s tr ic tly  uncertainty aversion perfect i f  and only i f
f li  e  I, flsi e Si, M  e  supp a* : 
Ui{Si , (T*j ) =  U i ( ( T - , a * )
and min it,(s,-, s ,)  >  min it,(s(-,sA .
& j  € S j  s j  G S j
P r o o f . Suppose for some player i (E I  there exist s,- and £  supp a? such that 
M s.,* 7?) =  Uifai ’Vj)  and rninSj€Sj Ui(si ,Sj)  >  m in^gs, t i i ( « 5 T h e n ,  as long 
as e >  0, for player i a deviation from <r* to s,- is profitable, because he will expect 
the same utility as <7,* from a rational opponent, but a higher utility from a non- 
rational opponent. So e(cr*) =  0, i.e. cr* is not strictly uncertainty aversion perfect. 
Conversely, if these conditions hold, player i does not have a profitable deviation.
q .e .d .
The following proposition summarizes the above results on the robustness of Nash 
equilibria, in case a strictly uncertainty aversion perfect equilibrium exists:
P r o p o s it io n  5. Let ( / ,  S,  it) be a finite two-player gam e in normal form. Let <r* 
be a s tr ic tly  uncertainty aversion perfect Nash equilibrium.
(1) Every stric t equilibrium is s tr ic tly  uncertainty aversion perfect. However, 
s tr ic tly  uncertainty aversion perfect equilibria need not be strict.
(2) Quasi-strict equilibria in general, and m ixed stra tegy equilibria and equilibria  
in weakly dom inated strategies in particular, m ay be, but need not be, s tr ic tly  
uncertainty aversion perfect.
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2.3.4 Uncertainty Aversion Perfection
Because strictly uncertainty aversion perfect equilibria need not exist, we suggest 
the following weaker refinement of Nash equilibria:
D e fin it io n . Let ( / ,  S , u) be a finite two-player gam e in norm al form. Let a* 
be a stra tegy  combination. Then cr* is an u n c e r ta in ty  a v ers io n  p e r fe c t  Nash 
equilibrium i f  and only i f  there exists a sequence (ck)keN> with 0 <  e* <  1 and 
limfc-KX) Ck =  0, and a sequence o f  stra tegy profiles (crk)k£N, such that each <rk is a 
Choquet-Nash equilibrium for e* and lim ^ o o  <rk =  cr*.
Since this definition allows constant sequences of strategy profiles, every strictly 
uncertainty aversion perfect equilibrium is indeed uncertainty aversion perfect.
R em a rk  6. Let ( / ,  S, u) be a finite two-player gam e in normal form. An uncertainty  
aversion perfect Nash equilibrium is indeed a Nash equilibrium.
P ro o f. Let ejt >  0. Since <rk is a CNE for Ck we have
(1 -  ck) • Ui(<rrk,a* k) +  ck • f s . m in x es , u<(s<, sj)  d<x*i k )
>  (1 -  Ck) • (T) k) +  Ck • Js . m in,>G5i ^ (s ,- , s j)  da{ ]
for all <Ti and all i G I. These expected utility functions are continuous in e*, <r,- 
and (Tj, so  the inequalities also hold in the lim it as Ck —> 0 and <rk —* a * . q .e .d .
P r o p o s it io n  6. Every finite two-player gam e in normal form has a t least one 
uncertainty aversion perfect Nash equilibrium.
P ro o f. Consider a sequence Ck —> 0. By proposition 1, there exists a CNE for every 
Ck■ Since the strategy sets are compact subsets of finite-dimensional euclidean 
spaces, by the Bolzano-Weierstrafi Theorem, every sequence of CNEs ak has a 
convergent subsequence a*. Since the associated sequence ci also converges to 0, 
the lim it of a* is an uncertainty aversion perfect Nash equilibrium. q .e .d .
We end this section with an example of an equilibrium in pure strategies that are 
not weakly dominated that is not uncertainty aversion perfect:
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L C  R
T  1,1 2,0 0,0
B  1,0 1,0 1,0
F igure  14
Consider the equilibrium (T ,L ). The strategy T  is undominated, and L  is weakly 
dominant. Yet (T, L ) is not uncertainty aversion perfect: As long as £ >  0, a 
rational player 2 will play L because it is weakly dominant. But given L , player 1 
will expect utility 1 from a rational opponent both if he plays T  or B , but since 
e >  0 he will strictly prefer B.
2.3.5 Zero-Sum Games
Under complete ignorance, an uncertainty averse player will allocate probability 
weight 1 to the outcome that is worst for himself. Intuitively, this suggests a close 
relationship of Choquet-Nash equilibria with minimax strategies in zero-sum games.
We next show, however, that this is not the case61. First, consider strictly uncer­
tainty aversion perfect equilibria:
T
B
In the game in figure 15, the Nash equilibrium is unique, and since the game is 
zero-sum the strategies are minimax strategies. However, remark 5 implies that this 
equilibrium is not strictly uncertainty aversion perfect. This example also shows 
that in even in zero-sum games a strictly uncertainty aversion perfect equilibrium
61 This result is due to a lack of preference for uncertainty, see section 4.
L R
0,0 2 , - 2




However, in the previous game the minimax strategies are uncertainty aversion 
perfect. The following example shows that not every Nash equilibrium in a zero- 
sum game is uncertainty aversion perfect:
T
B
The pair of minimax strategies (T, R) is not uncertainty aversion perfect: As long 
as e >  0, player 2 prefers to play L because L is weakly dominant.
2.3.6 Equilibrium Refinements
The fact that not all Nash equilibria are robust in the sense of (strict) uncertainty 
aversion perfection raises the question whether perfect Nash equilibria are more 
robust with respect to doubt about the rationality of the opponent. In this sec­
tion we present the relationship between uncertainty aversion perfection and other 
equilibrium refinements.
First, note that the equilibrium (T, L) in figure 14 is proper, because C  and R  are 
equally costly mistakes for player 2. So for c =  £ the strategy combinations o~k with 
Prob(T) =  1 -  £ ,P ro b (S ) =  ±, Prob(L) =  ^ . P r o ^ C )  =  Prob(i2) =  ^  is an 
e-proper equilibrium, and as k —>■ oo we have e —> 0 and ak —> (T }L ). However, 
as shown above, this equilibrium is not uncertainty aversion perfect. So properness 
does not imply uncertainty aversion perfection.
Note also, however, that this equilibrium is not strictly perfect. Our next example 
shows that strict perfection does not imply strict uncertainty aversion perfection:
L R
1 , - 1 1 , - 1
0,0 1 , - 1
F igure  16
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L R
T  2,0 0,2
B  1,2 2,1
F igure  17
The mixed strategy equilibrium p* =  Prob(T) =  =  Prob(L) =  |  is strictly
perfect, because it is completely mixed. But by remark 5, it is not strictly uncer­
tainty aversion perfect.





Consider the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium p \ =  Prob(T) =  =  Prob(L) =
This equilibrium is strictly perfect: Let P t , P m , PB,  PL,  P R  be any strictly pos­
itive trembles (minimum probabilities). Then the strategy combination with
Pi =  | ( 1  “ P b ),P 2 =  | ( 1  ~ P b ) , P3 =  P b , qi =  2 ( i l ~ ^ R) » g2 =  1 -  qi is a Nash 
equilibrium of the perturbed game, and as p i , 0 we have However,
the equilibrium is not uncertainty aversion perfect: For player 1, as long as € >  0, 
strategy T  gives 2(1 — e)q£ and strategy M  gives 2(1 — e )(l — g£), where qt is the 
strategy of a rational player 2. In order to find a sequence of mixed strategies for 
player 1 that converges to p — he must be willing to m ix between T  and M , 
which implies that in any Choquet-Nash equilibrium qe =  But then both T  and 
M  yield less than B , so for e >  0 no such equilibrium exists.
Conversely, we can ask whether (strictly) uncertainty averse equilibria also satisfy 







is strictly uncertainty aversion perfect, yet T  is weakly dominated for player 1, and 
therefore (T , L) is not trembling-hand perfect.
marized by the following proposition:
P r o p o s it io n  7. N either a proper equilibrium nor a str ic tly  perfect equilibrium need 
be uncertainty aversion perfect. Conversely, even a s tr ic tly  uncertainty aversion 
perfect equilibrium need not be trembling-hand perfect.
2.4 Extensions
So far, we have defined the solution concept only for 2-player games with finitely 
many strategies. Typically, in economic games the strategy spaces are infinite, for 
instance if firms choose prices, quantities, a location, a point in time, or a certain 
probability.
The Choquet-integral of a general random variable X  is defined as
/ rOO pO
X d v  :=  /  v (X  >  t )dt  +  /  [v{X > t ) ~  1 ]dt.
Jo J  — oo
As before, we define the expected utility from a non-rational opponent as u,- (s,-, V j )  : =  
f s  U{(si, sj )  dvj  and the payoff from a mixed strategy cr,- 6 AS,- as Ui((Ti,Vj) := 
JS . Ui(Si,Vj) d a .
As before, we can thus define a weak Choquet-Nash equilibrium for 2-player games 
with possibly infinite strategy spaces. Under the assumptions of a common prior 
about rationality, complete ignorance about non-rationality and uncertainty aver­
sion this reduces to:
D e fin it io n . Let  (I , S , u ) be a two-player gam e in normal form. Let 0 <  e <  1. 
Then a * is a C h o q u e t-N a sh  e q u ilib r iu m  iff
We have thus established a lack of relationships between robustness with respect 
to lack of mutual knowledge of rationality and equilibrium refinements that is sum-
trjG arg u l ( s1, s 2) dai  ],
v 1 C "1 *3c 2^
0-2 G arg u2{ s i , s 2) da2 ].
v 3 c *-*3 a IC i^
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As an example, consider a symmetric duopoly with linear cost and demand curve. 
Under Bertrand competition, setting price equal to marginal cost is a Choquet- 
Nash equilibrium independently of e. Under Cournot com petition, however, the 
firms have an incentive to offer less than the Cournot equilibrium output, and set 
higher prices, since for any given production there is a small chance that a non- 
rational opponent swamps the market and drives down profits.
The extension to n players is conceptually straightforward. However, it has to take 
into account that the events that different opponents are non-rational are indepen­
dent. For instance, if there are three players, then player 1 should maximise62
m ax [ (1  -  e)2 • <7-3 , 0 3 )
+  e ( l - e ) -  min « i ( s i , s 2,^3)—' «a€*Sa»i£S 1
+  (1 — e)e • <7-1 ( s i )  • min ui (s i ,<7*)S3)
s i£ S i
+  e2 • V  c n ( . i ) .  min u i ( s i , s 2, S3 ) ]•
(S3,S3)GS2XS3S lfcii
In general, we can formulate the solution concept in the following way: Let I  be the 
player set, and for J  C I  let s j  be a strategy profile that specifies a pure strategy 
for each player in J.  Let S j  be the set of such profiles, i.e. Sj  =  Xi^jSi .  Let s - j  
be a strategy profile that specifies a pure strategy for all players not in J.
D e fin it io n . Let (7, S , u) be a finite two-player gam e in norm al form. Let 0 <  c <  1. 
Then cr* is a C h o q u e t-N a sh  eq u ilib r iu m  iff for every player i E I
<t* G arg m ax [ (1  -  c) 171 ■ ti,-(cr,-,
<7i GSi
3i£Si
where | J\ denotes the number o f players in J  C I.
62 We continue to make the assum ptions for Choquet-Nash equilibria: com mon priors e, com plete  
ignorance and uncertainty aversion.
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2.5 Related Literature
The aim of this section is to argue that our equilibrium concept circumvents some
cept to non-additive beliefs: the definition of support of a non-additive measure,
independence of several non-additive beliefs.
Previous solution concepts —  with the exception of Mukerji (1994) —  have not dis-
player is allowed to have non-additive beliefs about the opponent’s play. An equi­
librium is then interpreted as an equilibrium in beliefs. However, since beliefs are 
non-additive, they cannot be correct, so the weaker consistency requirement that 
players are not wrong is imposed on equilibrium beliefs. Following Dow & Werlang 
(1994), this is formalised as the requirement that the players anticipate the support 
of the opponent’s beliefs. This raises the question, however, how the support of 
a non-additive capacity should be defined, and different support concepts give rise 
to different equilibrium concepts. These issues are surveyed, e.g., in Eichberger & 
Kelsey (1993) and Haller (1997).
Since defining the support as the smallest set of strategies that has belief 1 under 
uncertainty aversion does not impose any restriction on the support, Dow & Werlang 
(1994) define the support as the smallest set of strategies whose complement has 
belief 0. The support, so defined, need not be unique. The approach of Dow 
Werlang (1994) models a situation in which rational players lack logical omniscience, 
in that they do not draw the logical conclusions of their knowledge.
The question how to define the support of a non-additive capacity does not arise 
in our model. Here, players have additive beliefs about the rational opponents. 
So their expectations can be correct in the usual, literal, sense. Also, the rational 
players are assumed to be logically omniscient.
In the Dow & Werlang (1994) model, the support question has a natural answer 
in the special case, in which the non-additive beliefs are ‘simple capacities’, i.e. 
capacities that uniformly distort probabilities
of the controversial aspects of previous attem pts to generalize the equilibrium con-
the requirement that players’ beliefs are simple capacities, and the definition of
tinguished between rational and non-rational players. In those models, the rational
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where uncertainty aversion corresponds to the assumption that a  <  1. For such 
simple capacities, the Choquet-integral o f a random variable X  takes the form
f  X  dv =  a  • [  X  dp  +  (1 — a) • minX(a>).
J J wen
Thus, our concept of Choquet-Nash equilibrium corresponds formally to the case 
where a  =  (1 — c). However, this analogy is purely formal: A weak Choquet- 
Nash equilibrium cannot be re-interpreted as a simple capacity, and for non-simple 
capacities the above decomposition does not hold. We are not requiring that rational 
players’ beliefs about the opponents’ play are simple, but that beliefs about rational 
opponents are additive, whereas those about non-rational opponents may be non­
additive, but otherwise arbitrary (i.e. non-simple).
Finally, Dow & Werlang (1994) define their equilibrium concept for 2-player games. 
Eichberger & Kelsey (1993) extend their solution concept to n-player games and 
allow for the possibility that a rational player beliefs that his opponents do not 
act independently. In their approach, imposing such a restriction requires an in­
dependence concept for capacities (see, e.g., Ghirardato (1997) and Hendon et al. 
(1996)).
In our approach, this issue also does not arise. Since rational players have additive 
beliefs about their rational opponents, the usual independence concept applies and 
the equilibrium concept for n-player games assumes that rational players believe 
that their rational players act independently. This is in line with the underlying 
assumption that the game form models a non-cooperative situation and is common  
knowledge among the rational players.
2.6 Preference for Uncertainty
Recall that in section 2 we have defined the expected utility from pure strat­
egy Si against a non-rational opponent by the Choquet expectation ut-(s,-,Vj) :=  
f s  U{(si ,Sj) dvj .  Then we defined his payoff from a mixed strategy cr,- £  A  Si as 
Ui(<Ti, vj)  := Ylsi tSi  vj)- As a consequence, the overall expected utility
is linear in the probabilities cr,-(s;). Since vj  is non-additive, the order of integration 
in Ui(ai, vj)  is important. In this section we present and analyse an alternative 
equilibrium concept in which this order is reversed.
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We continue to make the assumptions of a common prior about rationality, complete 
ignorance about non-rational play and uncertainty aversion. Note that then
Ui{a i i vj ) =  min Ui(<Ti, sj )  =  min E  o'i(«i)u*(«f, sj) .Sj£oj $j£oj $i£Si
First note the following lemma: 
L em m a  4 .
•  i € S i
The inequality m a y  be strict. 
P r o o f. For all s,- and sj
E  <ri{si) min Ui(si ,Sj) <  min E$j£2>j Sj£&j $i£Si
Therefore for all Sj
E  V i M  m in <  E  **'(*»)“ •(*»'•*»)•
. r  c * j € Sj  _ c
So this holds in particular for the smallest value of the right-hand side. To see that 




\ T + \ B 1 1
F i g u r e  19
Here
E  o»(s») min u,-(s,-, s j ) =  0  <  min E  o'i(*«)«*(®»f ) =  1c j^G j^i^G^ i
q .e .d .
Thus, reversing the order of integration allows players to have a stric t preference 
for mixed strategies in a game. The first equilibrium concept that captures this 
phenomenon in strategic interaction is given by Klibanoff (1993), who based it on 
maxmin expected utility theory of Gilboa & Schmeidler (1989), in which players
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have set-valued beliefs. Allowing stric t preference for m ixed strategies gives rise to 
the  following definition:
D e f in i t io n .  Let ( / ,  S , it) be a finite two-player gam e in norm al form. Let 0 <  <
1. Then  <r* is a s t r o n g  C h o q u e t- N a s h  e q u i l ib r iu m  iff
<r\ £  arg m ax [ (1 -  ei) • t i i ^ i . c r j )  +  fi • m in u i(<7i,s2) ],
<7i€Si s i E S ?
<72 £  arg m ax [ (1 -  e2) • +  ^2 • m in u 2(si,<72) ].
U nder uncerta in ty  aversion, a  strong C hoquet-N ash equilibrium  always exists. T his 
is essentially the sam e argum ent as in proposition 1, except th a t  objective function is 
now quasi-concave in the probabilities <7*. However, the analogous solution concept 
for uncertain ty  love is now no longer guaranteed to  exist, since the objective function 
need no t be quasi-concave. As a consequence, the best-reply correspondence need 
n o t be convex-valued (see, e.g., Crawford (1990) and Dekel e t al. (1991)).
T he m ain  characteristic  o f a  strong C hoquet-N ash equilibrium  is th a t  in zero-sum  
gam es, the  solution concept coincides w ith Nash equilibrium : Since it  is already 
ra tional to  play m axm in strategies against ra tional opponents, and  since th is is also 
ra tional against non-rational opponents, it is overall ra tional. More generally:
R e m a r k  7. Let ( / ,  S’, u) be a finite two-player gam e in norm al form. Let 0 <
e <  1. Then every equilibrium in m axm in-strategies is also a strong Choquet-Nash
equilibrium independently o f  €.
P r o o f .  If <7* is an equilibrium  then for all i £  I  and all <7,- 6  S,-
Ui ((T* , cr] ) >  Uf (<7j , CTj ) .
Since <7? are m axm in strategies, for all <7,- £  £,•
m in it,(<7.*, s 7) =  m in u,(<7.*, <7. )  >  m in u,(cr,-, cr7) =  m in Uj(<7,-, s 7).
3 j £ S j  a  j E  £ 7 G s j  € Sj
Com bining bo th  inequalities gives the result. q .e .d .
2.7 Conclusion
T he paper presented equilibrium  concepts th a t formalize the idea th a t lack of m utual 
knowledge of rationality  together with a lack of a theory of non-rationality  create
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genuine uncertainty. However, on the basis of decision theory with non-additive, 
or set-valued, beliefs, rational behaviour is still well-defined, if the attitude towards 
uncertainty is specified.
The m otivation for developing our solution concepts were deviations from subjective 
expected utility in experiments, as in the Ellsberg paradox. This behaviour can be 
parsimoniously explained as uncertainty aversion. Thus we also formulated the 
solution concepts under this assumption. To what extent these solution concepts 
can model behaviour is an empirical question; this also holds for the question which 
solution concept is relevant in a particular situation. For instance, we see the 
question whether players have a strict preference for mixed strategies as an empirical 
one.
The assumption of extreme uncertainty aversion is rather crude; however, in the 
absence of a theory of bounded rationality that imposes restrictions on deviations 
from rational play, it seems the only assumption consistent with the fact that only 
rational strategies are derived.
Our results suggest robustness concepts for Nash equilibria. In so doing, we consider 
mutual knowledge of rationality as a limiting case of lack thereof. This is entirely 
analogous to Selten’s (1975, p. 35) view of “complete rationality as a lim iting case 
of incomplete rationality” . However, we would argue that robustness with respect 
to ignorance about non-rational play is more plausible than robustness with respect 
to ‘trembles’ of otherwise fully rational players.
The following are suggestions for future research: First, the question arises whether 
there are epistemic foundations for Choquet-Nash equilibria in a model similar 
to that of Aumann &; Brandenburger (1995). Secondly, it will be interesting to 
study the effects of communication and correlation on a Choquet-Nash equilibrium  
in the spirit o f Aumann’s (1974) correlated equilibrium. On the other hand, the 
equilibrium concepts could also be weakened to rationalizability concepts along the 
lines of Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984). Finally, combining our robustness 
concepts with equilibrium refinements for rational players will further narrow down 
the set o f equilibria.
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Chapter 3
Uncertainty Aversion and Equilibrium  
in Extensive Form Gam es
A b str a c t
This chapter formulates a rationality concept for extensive games in which devi­
ations from rational play are interpreted as evidence of irrationality. Instead of 
confirming some prior belief about the nature of non-rational play, we assume that 
such a deviation leads to genuine uncertainty. Assuming complete ignorance about 
the nature of non-rational play and extreme uncertainty aversion of the rational 
players, we formulate an equilibrium concept on the basis o f Choquet expected util­
ity theory. We apply the equilibrium concept to'the-the centipede game and the 
finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma.
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3.1 Introduction
According to the principle of sequential rationality, a rational player of an extensive 
form game regards his opponents as rational even after a deviation from rational 
play. The internal consistency of this principle is subject of much debate (see, e.g., 
Aumann (1995, 1996, 1998), Binmore (1996), Reny (1993)).
Attributing non-rational deviations to ‘trembles’ of otherwise perfectly rational 
players (Selten 1975) is logically consistent, but raises the second concern with 
the principle of sequential rationality, that is its empirical plausibility. Quite inde­
pendently of the question whether there exists a rationality concept that implies, 
or is at least consistent with sequential rationality, the question arises if there is 
room for an alternative rationality concept, in which deviations from the solution  
concept are interpreted as evidence of non-rationality. In this paper, we attem pt 
to formulate such a rationality concept on the basis o f Choquet expected utility  
theory.
In a seminal series of papers, Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson (1982) (hence­
forth KMRW) developed the methodology for analysing games with possibly non- 
rational opponents. In their models, there is some a priori uncertainty about the 
rationality of the opponent. Under subjective expected utility, players act as if they 
possess a probability distribution over the ‘type’ of the opponents’ non-rationality. 
They maximise utility given their beliefs, and in sequential equilibrium their beliefs 
are consistent with the play of rational opponents. KMRW have shown how even 
small degrees of uncertainty about rationality can have large equilibrium effects. 
They showed that this can explain both intuitive strategic phenomena, particularly 
in industrial organization, and, at least to some degree, experimental evidence.
One problem in this approach, however, is for an outside observer to specify the 
probability distribution over the types of the non-rational opponents before experi­
mental or field data are available. A second problem is that analysing the strategic 
interaction as a game with incomplete information implies that the other players, 
whether rational or not, can be modelled as ‘types’, who possess a consistent infi­
nite hierarchy of beliefs about the strategic interaction. Thus, the players in this 
methodology are not really non-rational; rather, they are rational but have prefer­
ences that differ from those that the game attributes to ‘rational’ players.
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In this paper, we argue that a consistency argument addresses both of these prob­
lems. A game-theoretic solution concept that singles out rational strategies implic­
itly defines all other strategies as non-rational. Thus, consistency requires that 
beliefs about non-rational players should..not exclude . any of these non-rational 
strategies. In other words, if the rationality concept is point-valued, the beliefs 
about non-rational play should include all deviations, and thus must be set-valued. 
So in this sense, the rationality concept itself pins down beliefs about non-rational 
play, but excludes subjective expected utility theory (henceforth SEU) as the ade­
quate model of these beliefs. Thus, SEU is not an appropriate framework for beliefs 
about non-rationality when rationality is endogenous.
Thus, this paper argues that, after an opponent deviates from rational play, a ra­
tional player faces genuine uncertainty. W hat matters, then, is the rational player’s 
attitude towards uncertainty. This paper formulates the equilibrium concept for the 
case in which rational players are completely uncertainty averse. It is this case that 
has led to the development of decision theories with set-valued and non-additive 
beliefs as an explanation of the Ellsberg (1961) paradox. Consequently, we base the 
equilibrium concept on Choquet expected utility theory (henceforth CEU) devel­
oped by Schmeidler (1989).
This paper joins a growing literature that applies CEU to games. The first of these 
were Dow & Werlang (1994) and Klibanoff (1993). Dow & Werlang (1994) consider 
normal form games in which players are CEU maximisers. Klibanoff (1993) sim i­
larly considers normal form games in which players follow maxmin-expected utility  
theory (Gilboa & Schmeidler 1989), which is closely related to CEU. In Hendon, 
Jacobsen, Sloth & Tranaes (1995) players have belief functions, which amounts to a 
special case of CEU. Extensions and refinements have been proposed by Eichberger 
& Kelsey (1993), Lo (19956), Lo (1996), Marinacci (1994) and Ryan (1997). Epstein 
(1997a) analysed rationalizability in normal form games. These authors consider 
normal form games and do not distinguish between rational and non-rational play­
ers. The paper closest to ours is Mukerji (1994), who considers normal form games 
only but argues that the distinction between rational and non-rational players is 
necessary to reconcile CEU with the equilibrium concept. For normal form games 
our concepts differ only in motivation and technical detail. The present paper 
mainly concerns extensive form games. Extensive games have been studied by Lo
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(1995a) and Eichberger &; Kelsey (1995). Lo (1995a) extends Klibanoff’s approach 
to extensive games, Eichberger h  Kelsey (1995) are the first to use the Dempster- 
Shafer updating rule (see section 3) in extensive games. They do not distinguish 
between rational and non-rational players.
This paper is organized as follows: The next section discusses an example. Section 
3 presents Choquet expected utility theory and discusses the problem of updating 
non-additive beliefs. In section 4 we formulate the equilibrium concept for two player 
games with perfect information. In section 5 we discuss the centipede game and 
the finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma in order to relate the equilibrium concept 
to the foundations of game theory. Section 6  elaborates on the extension of the 
solution concept to general extensive games. Section 7 concludes. There is one 
appendix on details o f updating non-additive beliefs.
3.2 An Example
Consider the following extensive form game, in which payoffs are given in von Neu­





1 ,1 -9 9 ,0
0,3 0 ,0
R
First, consider the case that x =  4. Then D  cannot be rational for P 2 , because it is 
strictly dominated. Therefore, Pi knows at the beginning of the subgame that P i is 
not rational and, consequently, has no reason to assume that P i will play his strictly
1 After D ,  both players P i  and P2  know that P 2  chose D  and they play the normal form 
subgam e, i.e. choose sim ultaneously between T  and B , respectively L  and R .
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dominant strategy L in the subgame. P i’s best reply to L  is T , but, intuitively, it 
is very risky.
In the absence of a theory of rationality, Pi faces true uncertainty about P 2 ’s play in 
the subgame. Therefore, if P i is sufficiently uncertainty averse, it becomes rational 
for him to play B . Thus, under these assumptions the rational strategies are U, L 
(because it is strictly dominant in the subgame) and B . This strategy combination 
is not a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, yet no player has an incentive to deviate 
unilaterally from these rational strategies. Moreover, if there is some initial doubt 
€ >  0 about P2 ’s rationality,2 then D  is also not a probability zero event, because 
nothing is known about a non-rational player, who might therefore well play D .3
All that it takes to reach these conclusion formally is a calculus that allows non­
additive, or set-valued, beliefs, and that captures P i ’s uncertainty as well as his 
uncertainty aversion. In addition, in order to conclude that that P 2 must be non- 
rational after D  we need an updating rule for non-additive beliefs.
Secondly, consider the case that x =  2. The above criticism of subgame perfection 
still applies: The equilibrium (T, L) in the subgame makes U rational, but once U  is 
designated as rational, Pi faces true uncertainty after D  and, if uncertainty averse, 
will rationally deviate to B. So (U, L , T) is not a rational solution. However, neither 
is (D , L, B ), because if D  is rational then Pi is justified in anticipating strategy L, 
and should play his best reply T . Now P2 has an incentive to deviate.
So suppose it is rational for P2 to play D  with probability p. Suppose further that 
there is a probability e >  0 that P2 is not rational at the beginning of the game. 
Then P i ’s optimal strategy in the subgame will depend on his belief about the 
rationality of P2 , given p  and c. The same updating rule that for x  =  4 allows the 
natural conclusion that P2 is rational after D  gives the result4 that
v(P 2 rational | D) =  t ^ ^  _  p) ■
2 For sim plicity, assum e in this exam ple that there is no doubt about the rationality of P \ .
3 If rationality is com mon knowledge at the beginning of the game, then D  is indeed a probability
zero event. In general, we take the view that there is a difference between probability zero events 
in decision theory and probability zero events in gam es, where an event for one player is an act 
for another. Here, D  is an act that might destroy this common knowledge. It is still intuitive that 
Pi should consider P2 as non-rational. This conclusion could be formally reached by taking lim its 
as t  0. However, in this paper we concentrate on the case c >  0.
4 See the next section and the appendix.
Note that v(P 2  rational | D)  =  (1 — c)p-+e^ _ p  ^ <  1 — e. Thus, in line with his 
uncertainty aversion P i considers the worst case when he updates his belief e. This 
worst case is that a non-rational player will play D  with probability 1, because this 
makes it most likely that his behavior in the subgame is unpredictable, and, again 
due to uncertainty aversion, should be evaluated with the worst outcome.
Since a rational P 2  will play L, Pi  knows that T  will give utility 1 with probability 
• W ith the complementary probability, P 2  is non-rational and the theory 
is silent about what this means. Again, Pi faces true uncertainty, and if  he is 
extremely uncertainty averse, he will allocate the complementary probability to the 
worst outcome —99. So P i ’s expected utility from T  is
 O-QP , i _ 9 9 _______i______
1 — (1  — £) ( i  — p) i - ( i - 0 ( i - p ) '
In a mixed strategy equilibrium Pi must be willing to randomize, so we must have
(1 ~  £)P ~  99e 
1 -  (1 _ e ) ( l - p )  U>
i.e. p  =  9 9 yz7 - Note, first, that P i is willing to m ix only if e <  e =  i.e. if 
the initial doubt about rationality is small enough, otherwise T  will be too risky. 
Secondly, as c goes to zero, p  goes to zero, i.e. it is less and less rational for P2 to 
play D.  Both aspects are quite intuitive.
Further, P2 must be willing to randomize as well, so that we must have 2 =  q • 
1 +  (1 — q) • 3, i.e. q =  where q is the probability that Pi plays T.  Overall, the 
rational strategies for given e >  0 are given by (p* =  993-3 ,^ L, q* =  | )  if  c <  c and 
(D , L, B)  if  e >  e. Again, no player has an incentive to deviate .5
3.3 Choquet Expected U tility and Updating
Under SEU, a player has preferences over acts that map a set of states of nature S  
into a set of consequences Z.  Under consistency assumptions about this preference 
ordering, the player acts as if he possesses a utility function u over consequences 
(cardinal, i.e. unique up to affine transformations), and a probability distribution p
5 For com pleteness, we can finally consider the case t  —  ^ 0 . This gives the strategy profile 
([/, L, q* =  ~).  N ote, however, that if e =  0  (as opposed to e \  0 ), then, intuitively, P \  has an 
incentive to deviate from q* =  j .
over states that represents subjective beliefs, and maximises expected utility. This 
axiomatisation of SEU is due to Savage (1954). Anscombe & Aumann (1963) have 
simplified this approach by assuming that acts map states into lotteries (probability 
distributions) over states.
Ellsberg’s paradox (1961) provides evidence, however, that players do not neces­
sarily act as if  their beliefs are probability distributions. On the contrary, these 
experiments provide evidence for the hypothesis that beliefs are non-additive, and 
that players are uncertainty averse.
CEU also considers a preference relation over acts. Under weaker consistency as­
sumptions, a player still acts as if he possesses a cardinal utility function it and 
subjective beliefs v, and maximises ‘expected utility’. The difference to SEU is 
that beliefs no longer have to be additive. Non-additive beliefs are given by a set 
function v that maps events (sets o f states) into M such that
(i) i>(0) =  0,
(ii) v(ft) =  1,
(iii) E C  F  = >  v(E) <  v{F).
CEU was first axiomatised by Schmeidler (1989).6
The expectation of a utility function with respect to non-additive beliefs v is defined 
by Choquet (1953). For u >  0 the Choquet integral is given by the extended 
Riemann integral
J  u dv := J  v(u >  t)dt,
where v(u >  t)  is short for v ({s £  5 |u (s) >  <}). For arbitrary u =  u+ — u ~ , where 
u+ := m a x {u ,0 } and u~ := m ax{—it ,0 } denote the positive and the negative part, 
the Choquet integral is defined as f  u dv := f  u+ dv — J  u~ dv, where v is the dual 
of v, i.e. v(E )  :=  1 — v(E )  and E  is the complement of E.
Non-additive beliefs express uncertainty aversion7 if v is supermodular, i.e. v (E  U 
E') +  v (E  fl E') >  v(E)  -f v(E').  If v is supermodular, then its core Core(v) := 
{p\p(E) >  i>(i?)} of additive set functions p  that eventwise dominate v is non­
6See also G ilboa (1987), Wakker (1989) and Sarin & Wakker (1992).
7 Note that we only claim that supermodularity is sufficient for uncertainty aversion, not that 
it is also necessary. Necessity is a controversial question (see Epstein (19976) and Ghirardato &: 
Marinacci (1997)). The reason why we associate uncertainty aversion with superm odularity is that 
we can then think interchangeably of non-additive and set-valued beliefs.
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empty (Shapley 1971). In that case, we can equivalently think of the players as 
possessing the set of additive beliefs Core(v). The Choquet integral of u is then 
given by f u  dv =  *ninp£Core(v) f  u ^P (Schmeidler 1986, Schmeidler 1989, Gilboa 
& Schmeidler 1989).
Finally, we have to specify how players update beliefs. There is no universally 
agreed upon updating rule for non-additive beliefs. Instead, the consensus is that 
different updating rules are appropriate for different circumstances. In line with the 
assumption that players are uncertainty averse, we use the Dempster-Shafer rule 
(Dempster 1967, Shafer 1976), which is given by
v (A  U B)  — v(B)
v(A \B)  :=
1 - v { B )
The Dempster-Shafer rule reduces to Bayes’ Rule if the capacity v is additive. 
Gilboa & Schmeidler (1993) show that the Dempster-Shafer rule corresponds to 
pessimistic updating. The Dempster-Shafer rule is not dynamically consistent, but 
there is no dynamically consistent updating rule for non-additive beliefs (see, e.g., 
Epstein & Breton (1993) and Eichberger & Kelsey (1996)). Thus the Ellsberg 
paradox implies that updating must be dynamically inconsistent. The Dempster- 
Shafer rule preserves supermodularity (Fagin & Halpern 1990), and is commutative 
(Gilboa &; Schmeidler 1993). Finally, we note that our approach does not rely on 
the details of the Dempster-Shafer rule. Any updating rule that takes into account 
that there are no probability zero events when non-rational play is unrestricted is 
admissible. Which updating rule will eventually prove to be the correct one is an 
issue that will have to be settled experimentally, for a first step in this direction see 
Cohen, Gilboa, Jaffray & Schmeidler (1999).
3.4 Perfect Choquet Equilibria
We use the following notation for extensive form games as defined in Selten (1975) 
and Kreps & W ilson (19826): Let T be an extensive game, finite and with perfect 
recall. Let V  be the set o f vertices, with decision nodes X  and endnodes Z.  Let 0 
be the origin (empty history). Let ■< be the precedence relation, i.e. v -<v'  means 
that there is a path from v to v ' . The relation ■< is an arborescence, i.e. a partial 
ordering in which different nodes have disjoint successor sets. Let I  be the player
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set. Let Xi  be the decision nodes of player i £  I. Let Hi be the set of player z’s 
information sets hi £  H{. Let A(h{) be the set of actions that are available to player 
i at his information set hi, similarly let A (x i ) be the set of actions that are available 
to  player i at his decision node x,-. Let Ai be the set o f actions available to player i 
at some information set. Let Xo  be the set o f all nodes at which there is a random  
move, and for x q  6  X q let 7r(xo) be the probability distribution over A ( x q ) .
Let Si be the set o f pure strategies s,- : Hi — > Ai of player *, £  A(hi).  Let Et-
be the set o f behavior strategies of player z, i.e. <r,(/z,) is a probability distribution 
over A(hi).  The sets S  and E are the sets of pure and behavior strategy profiles 
s £  S  =  x l€ /5 i ,  cr £  E =  x ,€/E,-. As usual, s_,- and a denote z-incomplete 
strategy combinations. Similarly, and denote h.-incom plete strategies
o f player i, i.e. strategies that do not specify an action at information set h,-.
Let Ui : Z  — > M be the von Neumann - Morgenstern utility function of player z. For 
s £  S, let it,-(s) be the expected utility of player i if the pure strategy combination 
s  is played and random moves are drawn according to the distributions 7r(xo). 
For <r £  E, let u,(<7) be the expected utility of player i  if  the behavior strategy 
combination a  is played. For a decision node x £  X ,  let U{(a\x) be the conditional 
expected utility of player z, if the game starts at decision node x and the behavior 
strategy combination a  is played.
The definition of a perfect Choquet equilibrium will become quite involved for gen­
eral extensive games. For this reason, we first restrict attention to two-player games 
with perfect information.
Since in extensive games lack of mutual knowledge of rationality arises endogenously 
whenever a player deviates from his rational strategy, we consider a situation in 
which rationality is in general not mutual knowledge. We aim to define what rational 
strategies are. We assume that rational players maximise Choquet - expected utility, 
i.e. possess a utility function u and maximise utility given their beliefs. Since the 
opponent may be rational or not, their beliefs can be expressed as two capacities 
vr and v-g, where vr is the belief about the play of rational opponents and the 
belief about the play of non-rational opponents. Let €ij{xi) be player z’s belief that 
player j  is not rational at decision node x,-.
So for given beliefs the rational player chooses his action at decision node x,- by
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m aximising
max [1 -  c y (*,•)] f  Ui(a, ^  | xf) d v r
a£A(xi)
+ 6l j (xl) fu i (a ,< r ;_ x .,Sj  | Xi) d v ^  
where Xi is player i ’s plan how to continue playing.
The strategy of a rational opponent has to be determined endogenously. So, in 
equilibrium beliefs v r  gave to coincide with the opponent’s rational strategy o^. In 
particular, vR is an additive belief and the Choquet integral reduces to the usual 
integral, i.e.
J  ui{a> sj  I *») d v R -  J  u,(a, <rf _x .,Sj | *,-) d a) =  u ,(a , <r\-Xi, o j | *,-)•
It remains to specify the beliefs v-g about play of non-rational opponents. Since 
the solution concept specifies rational strategies only, every deviation has to be 
considered non-rational. Thus v^  should not impose any restriction on the play 
of a non-rational player, so that the rational player faces non-additive uncertainty. 
W hat matters then is the rational players attitude towards uncertainty. We define 
the solution concept for the case in which rational players are uncertainty-averse.8 
Consequently, we assume that v  ^ is the basic capacity that assigns belief
1, S'j = S j
0 , else
to the event that a non-rational player’s strategy is in the set S j .
Modelling complete uncertainty as a basic capacity as opposed to a uniform prob­
ability distribution also has the practical advantage that the expected value of the 
utility function does not depend on the description of the state space. For instance, 
if a superfluous move, i.e. a copy one of the opponent’s strategies, is added to the 
opponent’s strategy set, Choquet expected utility under a basic capacity is the 
same, whereas the expected utility under a uniform probability distribution would, 
in general, change.
8The Ellsberg paradox seems to point towards uncertainty aversion, and this has been the main  
m otivation for developing CEU. Sm ithson (1997) reports that uncertainty aversion is a  robust 
phenom enon in the Ellsberg experiment. However, Sm ithson (1997) also draws attention to  the 
fact that uncertainty aversion is not a universal empirical fact.
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For this capacity, the Choquet integral reduces to9
u i{a >*i,-xi>8j  I *») d v R =  I *<)•
Overall, a rational player thus maximises his expected utility, given his beliefs e,j, 
vr and v-fi. The perfection requirement now means that a player maximises his 
utility at each decision node in the game, conditional on that node being reached. 
Moreover, as the game progresses he updates his beliefs, and since his beliefs about 
non-rational opponents are non-additive he does so on the basis of the Dempster- 
Shafer rule. In a perfect Choquet equilibrium, a rational player correctly anticipates 
the play of a rational opponent and has no incentive to deviate. Formally:
D e f in it io n . Let T be a finite extensive two-player gam e with perfect information. 
Then a* is a perfect Choquet equilibrium iff (if  and only if) for each players i, each 
o f  his decision nodes z,-, and each pure action a*(z,-) in the support o f  a* (z ,)
a*(xi) e  arg max [1 -  fy  (*,•)] «,-(<*, ,_Xi, | *i)aeA{xi)
+€ij(x i)  [m in  | z,-)],
_____________gp-fri)_____________
i  -  [ i  -  « • ) ] [ !  -  n  ^  ( * j )]  *
where x\ is player i ’s decision node that precedes z,-, the product is taken over all 
decision nodes o f  player j  that lie between x\ and  z,-, and cr) (x j)  is the probability  
that player j  takes the action that leads from x\ to  z ,-.10
Thus, a perfect Choquet equilibrium resolves the infinite regress that arises in a 
situation in which rationality is not mutual knowledge: Rationality means to max­
imise utility given beliefs; these beliefs take into account that a rational opponent 
will do the same, and that the rationality concept does not restrict the play of a 
non-rational opponent.
9  Note that in contrast to som e of the literature on CEU in gam es we do not restrict rational
players’ beliefs to ’sim ple capacities’, i.e. distorted probability distributions. In principle, the
players m ay have arbitrary beliefs about non-rational play. Here, we assum e instead that a rational
player distinguishes between rational and non-rational opponents.
10The updating rule takes into account that the opponent may move more than once between
and x i .  See remark (6 ) in the appendix.
€ij (x*)
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Note that in a perfect Choquet-equilibrium the equilibrium path is supported by 
a different solution concept, i.e. minimax play, off the equilibrium path. Conse­
quently, the solution concept does not suffer from the logical deficiency of subgame 
perfection, where the equilibrium path is supported by equilibrium reasoning off 
the equilibrium path.
Note also the important difference between subjective expected utility theory and 
Choquet expected utility in justifying the minimax-strategy against non-rational 
opponents. Under subjective expected utility the maximin-strategy is rational only 
if the rational player believes that the non-rational opponent minimaxes him. This 
belief seems difficult to justify. Under CEU the maximin-strategy is rational because 
the rational player cannot exclude the possibility that the non-rational opponent 
plays, perhaps by chance, a minimax-strategy and because he reacts aversely to­
wards the uncertainty created by the lack of possibility to forecast a non-rational 
opponent’s play.
This solution concept generalizes immediately to repeated normal form games, i.e. 
m ulti-stage games with observed actions (Fudenberg & Tirole 1991), in which the 
players move simultaneously in each stage, and learn the (pure) actions after each 
stage.
In section 6  we discuss the extension of this equilibrium concept to general extensive 
games and to more than two players. In the next section we relate the solution 
concept to the foundations of game theory.
3.5 Subgame Perfection
The aim of this section is to relate our solution concept to the discussion on the 
foundations of game theory. The example in section 2 already shows how a perfect 
Choquet equilibrium differs from subgame perfection. The following discussion of 
the centipede game shows that backward induction need not be based on common 
knowledge of rationality. Thus, we argue that our solution concept provides a 
robustness criterion for subgame-perfect equilibria.
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3.5.1 The Centipede Game
The logical consistency of subgame perfection has been controversial for a long 
tim e (Binmore 1987-88, Reny 1993). Selten’s (1975) concept of trembling-hand 
perfection circumvents these difficulties by explaining deviations from rationality 
as unsystematic trembles of otherwise rational players, so that deviations are not 
evidence of non-rationality. Rationality is then defined as a lim iting case of non- 
rationality where the probability of mistakes approaches zero. Though this approach 
is empirically implausible, it is logically consistent.
The logical status of subgame perfection was further clarified by Aumann (1995, 
1998) (see also Binmore (1996), Aumann (1996)). Aumann (1995) shows that com­
mon knowledge of ‘ex ante substantive rationality’ implies the backward induction 
outcome in perfect information games. Here, a player is ‘rational’ if there is no 
other strategy that the player knows to give him higher expected utility than the 
one he chooses.
The distinction between ‘ex ante’ and ‘ex post’ rationality refers to the point in 
the game when his knowledge matters. ‘Ex ante rationality’ at some decision node 
v means that at the beginning of the game he knows of no better action at v, 
‘ex post’ rationality means that when v is reached he knows of no better strategy. 
Consequently, ‘ex ante’ rationality is weaker than ‘ex post’ rationality.
The distinction between ‘substantive’ and ‘material’ rationality refers to the decision 
nodes where the player is assumed to be rational. Thus ‘substantive’ rationality 
means that a player is rational at all decision nodes, whether they are reached by 
rational play or not. ‘Material’ rationality, on the other hand, means that players 
are only assumed to be rational at reached decision nodes. ‘Material’ rationality is 
weaker than substantive rationality, and Aumann shows that ‘m aterial’ rationality 
does not imply the backward induction outcome.
Aumann (1998) notices that his result can be sharpened for the centipede game. The 
centipede game (Rosenthal 1981) has become a cornerstone for the discussion of the 
foundations of game theory. Aumann shows that, due to its specific payoff structure, 
common knowledge o f ‘ex post material rationality’ implies the backward induction 
outcome in the centipede game. The rationality concept cannot be weakened to ‘ex 
ante material rationality’. Note that common knowledge of rationality implies the
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backward induction outcome, not the backward induction strategy profile.
Ann Bob Ann Ann Bob 2  n -J- 2  
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The Centipede Game
It is im m ediate that the perfect Choquet equilibrium in the centipede game is to play 
down everywhere: At the last node ‘down’ is strictly dominant, at the penultimate 
node the player knows that a rational opponent will go down at the last node, or 
will consider the non-rational opponent unpredictable and assume the worst. In 
either case the continuation payoff is less than that from going ‘down’, so again 
‘down’ is optim al. The same reasoning applies at every earlier node.
This conclusion is interesting for the following reasons: First, not only do we get 
the backward induction outcome, but also the backward induction strategy pro­
file. Moreover, this profile is achieved using the same logic as subgame perfection. 
Secondly, the backward induction solution arises without mutual knowledge of ra­
tionality. Finally, the original objection to backward induction no longer applies: 
players are not assumed to be rational off the equilibrium path.
3.5.2 The Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma
One of the first papers to apply CEU to normal form games was Dow h  Werlang 
(1994). In particular, Dow and Werlang develop an equilibrium concept for players 
who have non-additive beliefs and analyse the once-repeated prisoners’ dilem m a . 11 
They show that players with non-additive beliefs may not backward induct, and 
contrast their result with that of Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts h  W ilson (1982).
1 1  We have so far only considered extensive form gam es with perfect information; this is extended  
in the next section . However, as the following remarks make clear, we do not need the the general 
equilibrium concept to deal with the once-repeated prisoners’ dilemma.
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One of the differences between a perfect Choquet equilibrium and the Nash equilib­
rium under uncertainty of Dow & Werlang (1994) is the way in which uncertainty 
arises in the game. Dow & Werlang (1994) do not distinguish between rational 
and non-rational players, in their equilibrium concept players are CEU maximisers 
who lack, to some degree, logical omniscience. They anticipate that their oppo­
nents maximise CEU, but do not draw the conclusion about the strategy choice. 
In other words, theirs is an equilibrium in beliefs. In our model, it is the lack of 
mutual knowledge of rationality that gives rise to uncertainty. The rational players 
can anticipate how rational opponents will act, but not how non-rational opponents 
will
The main difference, however, that Nash equilibrium under uncertainty is a normal 
form concept. Thus when players may have non-additive beliefs, cooperation in 
the first period and defection in the second can be an equilibrium: If the players 
believe that the opponent cooperates in the second period if, and only if they do so 
at the first stage, they have an incentive to cooperate early, and for lack of logical 
omniscience both players’ beliefs may be non-additive . 12,13
Under complete uncertainty aversion, in a perfect Choquet equilibrium both play­
ers defect at all stages: In the second stage defection is strictly dominant, in the 
first stage a player can anticipate that a rational opponent will defect in the next 
stage, and a non-rational opponent causes uncertainty that is evaluated by its worst 
outcome, i.e. defection. So the second stage action is independent of the first stage 
action, and again defection is strictly dominant in the first stage.
Note that Aum ann’s (1995) justification of the backward induction outcome does
1 2  In fact this phenom enon is also related to another aspect of the Nash equilibrium under 
uncertainty in Dow & Werlang (1994), i.e. their definition of support of a  non-additive measure. 
T he support im plicitly defines the knowledge of the players. W hat the correct support notion is 
for non-additive beliefs is controversial. This issue does not arise in a perfect Choquet equilibrium, 
in which players know the rational strategies in the usual sense.
1 3  It is also easy to construct such an equilibrium in the KMRW framework: Again, assume
that the rational players believe that the non-rational opponent cooperates in the first period and 
cooperates in the second period if and only if both players cooperated in the first period. If the 
probability o f having such a ‘crazy’ opponent is sufficiently high, it is indeed rational to cooperate  
in the first period. This result is interesting because it shows that backward induction may break 
down even if the strategies of the rational opponent can be correctly anticipated and subgame 
perfection is required. Yet, a basic shortcom ing of this result is that it rests on this specific belief 
about non-rational play.
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not apply to the repeated prisoners’ dilemma, since it is not a perfect informa­
tion game. Thus, the perfect Choquet equilibrium concept sheds some light on the 
robustness of subgame-perfect equilibria. It is perhaps surprising that backward in­
duction is robust in games like the centipede game or the finitely repeated prisoners’ 
dilemma, in which it is most counterintuitive.
3.6 Extension
The aim of this section is to discuss the extension of the solution concept to general 
extensive games. This extension is not straightforward, as the following example 
shows:
0
Note, first, that in a general extensive game a player should hold different beliefs 
about the degree of his opponent’s rationality at different decision nodes in the 
same information sets. In the above example, at note a player P2 should have belief 
e(0), i.e. the prior with which he started the game. However, if T  strictly dominates 
B , then at decision node 6 P 2  should hold the updated belief that the opponent is 
non-rational, i.e. e(6) =  1 .
The second problem, also illustrated in the above example, is that not all decision
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nodes of an information set matter equally for the player who moves there. Above, 
Pv s belief c(b) does not matter at all, because P i does not move after 6. Only at 
decision node a is p 2’s belief about P i ’s rationality relevant for his decision.
Overall, in the example the intuitively correct belief for P 2 to have at his information 
set is therefore his prior e(0). We suggest to generalize this observation in the 
following way:
Let hi be an information set of player i. Call a decision node x,- (E /i, relevant for 
player i if his opponent has a decision node in the subtree that starts at x,-. For each 
relevant decision node x,- in hi, calculate the (in general non-additive) belief p'(xi)  
that the node is reached given the optimal strategies and beliefs e(hj) at preceding 
information sets /*(•. Form an updated belief e(x,) for each relevant decision node, 
where e(x,) is the Dempster-Shafer update from the preceding information sets and 
the equilibrium strategies. Finally, define e(hi) as the expected value of e{xi) given
K x i) :=  Formally :
D e fin it io n . Let T be a finite two-player game in extensive form.
Then a* is a perfect Choquet equilibrium iff (if and only if) for each players i, each 
o f  his information sets hi, and each pure action a*(h,) in the support o f  cr* (h,-)
a*(hi) e  arg max [1 -  e,j(h,)] u , ( a , , <r] \ h{)
a E A ( h i )  ’
+€ij(hi)  [ min u,(a, (r*i_Xi, s ,  | hi)],
S j E S j
/* '(* .):=  n  n  ( +  )
x ' - < , X i  x ' . - < X iI J
~  E x ^ h i  v ' M
:= SHbt}
I hi) =  // (x ‘)w*(a . <-/*;> I x *)>
X i E h i
____________ C |j « ) _____________
1 -  [1  -  d j ( x ' . ) ] [ i  -  n  a j  ’
x ' ^ X j - K x i
€ij{hi) := ^  p(xi)€ij(Xi)
X i E h i
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where x | (x'j) are player i ’s  ( j ’s) decision nodes that precedes x,-, c*(x() (o’j(x'j))  
is the probability that player i ( j)  takes the action that leads from x\ (xj ’)  toward  
x,-.
Consider the following example:
0
Consider P 2  at his information set h: Let e =  e(0), then we have e(a) =  e. Again, 
assume that T  is strictly dominant, so that e(b) =  1. Also, p'(a)  =  |  and //(&) =  
Note that the calculation of p'(b) again reflects uncertainty aversion, because the 
worst case is that non-rational players would play B , since this would give most 
weight to the worst outcome as P2 weighs his decision at his information set. Finally,
V(a ) =  J + I 7  =  T+7 and f*(b) =  T+7- So €(h) =  +  f*(bM b) =  T k -
The extension of the equilibrium concept to more than two players is conceptually 
straightforward, but computationally demanding. For two opponents P j  and Pk of 
player 2, and beliefs cj and €k about their lack of rationality, the rational player has 
to take all four cases into account: that either of the players is non-rational, that
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both are rational and that neither is. So at decision node z,- he should maximise 
max [(1 -  €j){ 1 -  ck)] Ui{a, _x . ,a) , <r*k)
a£A(xi)
+[(1 - € j ) e k] min Ui{a,a*-Xi,<Tj,sk)
* k € S k
+ [£i ( l - f*)] mm Ui{a,<Tl_Xi,Sj,<T*k)
, min ^ - (a ,^
\&ji3k)£Sj
In particular, taking into account that both players may be non-rational means that 
in the worst case their actions may be correlated. Beliefs ej and e* are then updated 
separately on the basis of the Dempster-Shafer rule.
3.7 Conclusion
The paper has suggested a solution concept that combines equilibrium logic with 
maxmin play off the equilibrium path. The solution concept is natural if rationality 
is not mutual knowledge, no restriction is imposed on deviations from rationality, 
and if players are uncertainty-averse.
Nevertheless, the solution concept also has some lim itations. First, the computa­
tional effort of calculating equilibria may be quite high. Secondly, experiments show 
that players sometimes systematically deviate from rational play, so that it may be 
possible to formulate more restrictive assumptions on non-rational play after all. 
Note that this would give rise to a difference between a descriptive solution concept 
with such restrictions, and a normative concept like ours where we based the lack 
of restrictions on the consistency argument that a rationality concept alone does 
not restrict non-rational play.
Thirdly, the assumption that players are completely uncertainty-averse is extreme. 
Yet, at the current stage of the development of Choquet expected utility theory 
there is no ideal alternative.14
Finally, it seems a drastic consequence that strategic interaction comes to a complete
halt after a deviation from rational play. Note, however, that the solution concept
1 4  It would be possible to assume that players take a weighted average of the best and the worst 
outcom e if they are certain to face a non-rational opponent. This is Hurwicz’s optim ism -pessim ism  
index (see Arrow & Hurwicz (1972). However, by introducing another free parameter the model 
would lose predictive power.
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applies to one-shot games, and therefore leaves no room for real-world strategies to 
deal with doubts about rationality, e.g. experimentation and communication. Note 
also that trembling-hand perfection makes an equally extreme assumption to ensure 
logical consistency by postulating that otherwise fully rational players ‘tremble’, and 
that deviations therefore provide no evidence against rationality.
Needless to say, our solution concept provides nothing but a first step that may be 
a basis for a more refined analysis.
Appendix
Let v be a capacity and consider the events E , F  €  E. The Dempster-Shafer rule 
specifies that the posterior capacity of event E  is given by (if v (F ) <  1)
v (E  U F)  — v(F)
v(E \F )  :=
1 -  v(F)
Let € be the prior probability that a player is not rational with 0 <  e <  1. Assume 
that a rational player chooses an action A  with probability p. Then the posterior 
belief about the opponent’s rationality after action A  is given by
This is derived as follows:
Let R  be the event that the player is rational, let R  be the event that he is non- 
rational.
We want to calculate______________________ _ _
(3-D *(R\A)  :=
1 -  v(A)
Since a player is either rational or not, we have 
(3.2) v{R\A)  +  v(R\A)  =  1.
Consequently,
(3) „(R|j4) =  ri g ? ) - ® ,
(4) v(R \A ) =' ' 1—v ( A )
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imply
v(A)  =  v(R  U A) +  v (R  U A'j — 1.
Further,
(5) and
(6) =  S l ^ p .
We know that
(7) v(R)  =  1 - 6 ,
(8) v(R )  =  e,
(9) u(A|i?) =  1 — p, and
(10) =  0 .
so that
(11) v(A  U i l )  =  ( l -  e )(l — p) +  e, and
(12) v(]4U i?) =  1 - 6 .
Thus
(3.13) v(A)  =  (1 -  e) +  (1 -  e )(l -  p) +  6 -  1 =  (1 -  e )( l -  p).
Consequently,
( 1 } ' i -  ( i - o ( i - p )
(1 -  e)p
v{R\A)  =
1 — (1 — e) ( l  — p ) 1 
€
1 -  (1 - e ) ( l  - p )
Remarks:
(1) The derivation is only valid under lack of mutual knowledge of rationality, i.e. 
for 6 >  0 and 6 <  1, otherwise v(A|i?) or u(A|H) are not well-defined.
(2) W ith 0 <  c <  1 there are no probability zero events, since
v(A)  =  (1 -  c)(l  -  p) <  1.
This holds for any p £  [0,1], including the boundaries.
(3) In particular, if e >  0 then e1 >  0, independently of p. However, if p =  0, then 
d  =  1. Thus we also need to be able to update the belief 6 = 1 .  Intuitively, if 
the prior belief about the opponent is that he is non-rational and beliefs about
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his behavior are uncertainty averse, then there are no probability zero events, 
and the posterior belief should also be that the opponent is non-rational.This 
can be justified directly from the Dempster-Shafer rule (1): From monotonicity, 
v(R )  <  v(R U olA ), therefore u(i2U^4) =  1. Also, (6) implies v(A | /i) =  v(A\JR), 
so again by monotonicity, v(A)  <  v (A  U R) =  0. Since this result also follows 
if we substitute e =  1 into (13), we do not have to explicitly track this special 
case.
(4) The reason why e =  0 has to be excluded is that there is no parallel argument 
that e =  0 and p  =  0 should give e' =  1. (3) implies v ( A U  R)  =  v(A|i2) =  1 
and (1) gives e' =  , but v(A)  ^  1.
(5) Note that action A  is always interpreted as evidence of non-rationality: v(/2|.A) =  
€ >  €- Thus updating is in line with uncertainty aversion, which
gives rise to non-additive beliefs in the first place. For the player, the worst 
case is that the non-rational opponent chose action A  with probability 1, be­
cause this makes it more likely, under uncertainty aversion, to receive the worst 
outcome in the next stage.
(6) Note that if c' =  and e" =  then e" =
(7) Finally, note that the argument rests heavily on (2), i.e. the the requirement 
about beliefs that an opponent is either rational or non-rational, so that these 
beliefs have to be additive.
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Chapter 4
U ncertainty Aversion and Backward Induction  
in the Centipede Game
Abs t rac t
In the context of the centipede game, this chapter discusses a solution concept 
for extensive games that is based on subgame perfection and uncertainty aversion. 
Players who deviate from the equilibrium path are considered non-rational. Rational 
players who face non-rational opponents face genuine uncertainty and may have non­
additive beliefs about their future play. Rational players are boundedly uncertainty 
averse and maximise Choquet expected utility. It is shown that if the centipede 
game is sufficiently long, then the equilibrium strategy is to play ‘Across’ early in 
the game and to play ‘Down’ late in the game.
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4.1 Introduction
The centipede game has become a benchmark both for the empirical adequacy and 
the theoretical consistency of game theoretic concepts. In any Nash equilibrium  
—  and thus in every equilibrium refinement — the first player chooses ‘Down’ 
immediately; in the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium the players choose ‘Down’ 
everywhere.
Empirically, experimental evidence suggests that players do not act in this way 
(see, e.g. , McKelvey & Palfrey (1992)). Theoretically, subgame perfection applies 
equilibrium arguments, that hold for rational players, off the equilibrium path. 
This is consistent only under the assumption that deviations from rational play are 
not evidence of non-rationality, e.g. because rational players might tremble (Selten 
1975). This aspect has led to a controversial debate about backward induction (see, 
e.g. , Basu (1988), Reny (1993), Aumann (1995), Binmore (1996), Aumann (1996)).
McKelvey &: Palfrey (1992) are able to interpret experimental evidence in the sense 
of Kreps et al. (1982, henceforth KMRW). In their model, the structure of the game 
is not mutual knowledge. Instead there is a small probability of being matched with 
an ‘altruistic’ opponent who always plays ‘Across’. McKelvey & Palfrey (1992) show 
that, as a consequence, it is indeed rational to play ‘Across’ early in the game.
There are two arguments against this way of interpreting the experimental evidence. 
First, if taken as an explanation of evidence rather than an equilibrium effect, it 
relies on the actual existence of such altruists in the subject pool. The second, 
formulated by Selten (1991) in the context of the KMRW approach to the finitely 
repeated prisoner’s dilemma, is that the analysis proceeds by changing the game, 
and not by analysing the same game in which the paradox arises. However, both 
criticisms do not apply if the players are assumed to know the game, but lack mutual 
knowledge of rationality, as suggested by Milgrom & Roberts (19826, p .303). If 
the rational players believe that non-rational opponents always play ‘Across’, the 
analysis of McKelvey & Palfrey (1992) is an explanation of the actual evidence in 
the original game.
Still, this approach to modelling lack of mutual knowledge of rationality leads to 
conceptual difficulties:
First, there is no reason why rational players should hold this specific belief about
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opponents that they do not consider to be rational. Therefore, not only is the spec­
ification of the belief that non-rational players always play ‘Across’ ad hoc, in the 
absence of a theory of non-rationality there is no basis for specifying any particular 
belief.
Secondly, this also holds in particular for the uniform distribution as a model of 
complete ignorance. There is no reason why a non-rational player should be as­
sumed to choose all his strategies with equal probability. In addition, there is the 
well-known problem that a uniform probability depends on the description of the 
space of uncertainty: For instance, if a state is split into two sub-states, the com­
bined probability of the two sub-states under the uniform distribution is higher than 
the probability of the original state.
Thirdly, and more fundamentally, if the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is identified with 
rational play, then any deviation must be considered non-rational. This problem  
is related to, but different from the first: Not only need the players not have a 
particular belief about non-rational opponents, according to the rationality concept 
they must not have any particular belief. This consistency requirement follows from 
an identification of Bayesian-Nash equilibrium with rational play, because this im­
plicitly defines all other strategies as non-rational.
Finally, the analysis of games under incomplete information on the basis o f the 
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium assumes that the types of a player correspond to a con­
sistent hierarchy of beliefs about the underlying uncertainty (Harsanyi 1967-68). 
This leads to the usual infinite regress. Thus in this analysis the rational player not 
only believes that a ‘non-rational’ opponent always plays ‘Across’, but also believes 
that the non-rational opponent believes a rational player to believe this, ... ad in­
finitum. But this means that a rational player must believe that his non-rational 
opponent has an infinite and consistent hierarchy of beliefs. This, o f course, is at 
odds with the interpretation of this opponent as non-rational. It is for this rea­
son that McKelvey & Palfrey (1992) refer to structural uncertainty and ‘altruistic’ 
types.
Nevertheless, the KMRW approach has been extremely useful in helping to under­
stand strategic interaction, particularly in industrial organization (Kreps & Wilson 
1982a, Milgrom & Roberts 19826) and, as in McKelvey & Palfrey (1992), in exper­
imental game theory.
Our model is in the same spirit as KMRW (1982) and McKelvey &; Palfrey (1992).
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We postulate that rationality is not mutual knowledge, i.e. an opponent may or may 
not be rational. We replace the assumption that players have a specific belief about 
non-rational play with the assumption that players are genuinely uncertain about 
the way non-rational opponents play. When facing uncertainty, players maximise 
Choquet expected utility (Schmeidler 1989, henceforth CEU). According to CEU, 
players act in face of uncertainty as if they maximise subjective expected utility. 
However, in contrast to a situation in which players face risk, players’ beliefs do not 
have to be additive, i.e. the ‘probabilities’ that the players use to weigh consequences 
do not have to add to 1.
Our contribution in this paper is to define an equilibrium concept that extends sub­
game perfection to a game with genuine uncertainty due to lack of mutual knowledge 
of rationality. Thus we do not need to make any assumption about the behavior 
of non-rational players, and we can avoid modelling them as types. Instead, we 
can make an assumption about the rational players’ attitude towards uncertainty. 
We assume that they are uncertainty averse, but only boundedly so. We show 
that this results in an equilibrium in the centipede game in which rational play­
ers play ‘Across’ early in the game and ‘Down’ late in the game. Moreover, it is 
subgame-perfect in the sense that decisions are optimal at every node in the game.
Our result is due to an interaction between the game-theoretic definition of strategy 
as a contingent plan and the players’ attitude towards uncertainty. In calculating 
expected utilities, a player who is uncertainty averse will use ‘probability weights’ 
that do not add up to I, and a ‘probability residual’ (the difference between the 
sum of the weights and 1) that he will allocate to the worst outcome. As long as 
the degree of uncertainty aversion is bounded, however, every strategy of the non- 
rational opponent will enter the calculation with some positive weight, however 
small. Since a strategy is a contingent plan, it specifies an action — ‘Across’ or 
‘Down’ —  after every history of the game, even those that are excluded by the 
strategy itself (because it specifies ‘Down’ very early). Consequently, the number of 
strategies increases exponentially in the length of the centipede game. This means 
that early in the game the ‘probability residual’ that is allocated to the worst 
outcome is small. Thus even uncertainty-averse players will find it profitable to go 
‘Across’. Late in the game, however, the number of remaining strategies is small, 
and uncertainty averse players will prefer ‘Down’. We show that this phenomenon
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is an equilibrium, i.e. it is stable even if other rational players act in a similar way.
CEU has been introduced into game theory by Dow & Werlang (1994) and KlibanofF 
(1993). Dow & Werlang (1994) show that in the presence of uncertainty the back­
ward induction outcome may break down if the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma 
is analysed as a normal form game. Our model extends this result in two directions: 
First, we give an explicit reason for non-additive uncertainty, the lack of mutual 
knowledge of rationality. Secondly, we formulate a solution concept in the spirit of 
subgame perfection and show that the backward induction outcome breaks down 
in the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the centipede game, analysed in its extensive 
form. This allows the conclusion that these two concepts —  backward induction 
and subgame perfection —  differ fundamentally in the presence of uncertainty.
Other papers that combine the analysis o f extensive form games with CEU are 
Eichberger & Kelsey (1995) and Lo (1995a). In these papers there is no explicit 
distinction between rational and non-rational players. Eichberger & Kelsey (1995) 
use the Dempster-Shafer rule to update non-additive beliefs. Closest to the spirit 
of our analysis is Mukerji (1994), however he considers normal form games only.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains the model, section 3 an ex­
ample, section 4 the result, and section 5 concludes. There is one appendix.
4.2 The Model
4.2.1 The Centipede Game
Consider the following version of the centipede game:
Ai 2 a 2 3 A3 n  “  1  A n - !  n An






The decision nodes are numbered from 1 to n. For definiteness we assume that n 
is odd. Player Pi moves at odd nodes, player P 2  at even nodes. At node i, a player 
chooses between ‘Across’ A,- and ‘Down’ D{. The leader payoff is a,-, i.e. a,- is the 
payoff to the player who plays D ,. The follower payoff is
The payoffs are such that the game is a centipede game, i.e.
(1) a,- and &,• are strictly increasing in i,
(2) Oi >  &»+1 ,
(3) rji := - is weakly increasing in i,
(4) rji <  |  for all i 6  N .
Thus the game corresponds to a situation in which two players can share a certain 
profit, but only in unequal terms. Overall profit a,- -f &,■ is increasing, but every 
player prefers to be the leader now than to be the follower in the next stage. If the 
opponent could be relied upon to play ‘Across’, however, each player would play 
‘Across’ earlier15. The centipede game is due to Rosenthal (1981), its name is due 
to Binmore (1987-88).
A pure strategy of player j  is a mapping that associates with each of his decision 
nodes i an action A,- or D{. Thus, if a player has m decision nodes he has 2m many 
pure strategies, i.e. the number of strategies grows exponentially in the length of 
the game.
The players are assumed to have a prior probability that specifies the probability 
that the opponent is non-rational. For simplicity we assume that this prior is 
common to both players16. We denote this prior probability by e, and assume 
0 <  e <  1.
Our equilibrium concept aims to capture the optimal strategies of rational players. 
Thus a rational player must not have an incentive to deviate from his equilibrium  
strategy, as long as a rational opponent does not deviate either. However, a ra­
1 5  Conditions (3) and (4) are conditions on the payoff increases. It means that the sure gains from 
playing ‘Down’ in relation to the possible gains from playing ‘Across’ increase, i.e. that playing 
‘Dow n’ does not becom e less attractive in relative terms (3). Condition (4) says that these gains 
must not be too high; this is sufficient, but not necessary, to ensure that playing across does not 
result from uncertainty love alone. In their experim ents, McKelvey & Palfrey (1992) assum e that 
•qi is constant with iji =  j  and n =  4, resp. n =  6 . (See also footnote 9.)
1 6  Allowing different priors only introduces one more degree of freedom. This would not make 
the analysis conceptually deeper, and would make it easier to generate different equilibria.
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tional player does not know what a non-rational opponent will do, and so faces 
genuine uncertainty. We assume that, when facing this uncertainty, rational players 
maximise Choquet expected utility in the sense of Schmeidler (1989).
4.2.2 Choquet Expected U tility  Theory
According to CEU, players act in the face of uncertainty as if they possess a utility 
function over consequences and subjective beliefs over the domain of uncertainty, 
and maximise subjective expected utility. However, in contrast to a situation in 
which players face risk, players’ beliefs do not have to be additive, i.e. representable 
by a probability measure. Instead, players’ beliefs are represented by a capacity, 
i.e. a not necessarily additive ‘probability’ measure.
This model thus corresponds to a situation in which uncertainty cannot be reduced 
to probability. This model allows a parsimonious explanation of the Ellsberg para­
dox that people do not act as if their beliefs can be represented by probability 
measures. CEU retains the useful notion of belief and explains lack of probabilistic 
sophistication as a result of the players’ attitude towards uncertainty.
Formally, let S  be a set of states of nature. Let s  £  S  and let £  C 25 be a 
or-algebra of events E  6  E. A capacity associates with each event a real number 
such that17
(1) t>(0) =  O,
(2) v(S) =  1, and
(3) E  C E' = >  v(E) <  v{E').
The expected utility with respect to a capacity is defined as the Choquet (1953) 
integral: Let A  be a simple positive random variable, i.e. X  takes the positive 
values x i , X 2 > on the events E i , E 2 , ■■■,En. The sets are measurable, pairwise 
disjoint, and their union is S. W ithout loss of generality, assume xi >  X2  >  ... >  Xk 
and set x^+1 := 0. As usual, let v ( X  >  t) := v({w £  f2|X(w) >  <}).
Then the Choquet integral is defined as18
J  X d v  := J  v ( X  >  t)dt
17The m onotonicity property (tit) weakens the finite-additivity axiom  E  fl E'  =  0 = >  v(E  U 
E')  =  v(E)  +  v(E')  for finitely-additive measures.




If v is additive this is the usual expectation. Thus the Choquet integral generalizes 
the usual formula for the expectation in terms of the decumulative distribution 
function E X  =  / 0°° F ( X  >  t)dt.  It is a natural definition for an integral because 
it assigns to a characteristic function 1 e  of an event E  the capacity v(E )  of this 
event, and preserves monotonicity, i.e. if  X (s )  <  X '(s )  for all s  G S  then Js  X d v  <
I s  X ' d v .
4.2.3 Uncertainty Aversion
The non-additivity of v allows the formalisation of the player’s attitude towards 
uncertainty. According to the definition of the integral, if probability weights are not 
additive then the probability residual is allocated to the worse outcome: Consider 
two events E  and E ' Let E  H E' =  0 and E  U E' =  S. Assume that the random 
variable X  takes value xi  on E  and X2  on E ' , and that x \  >  x 2 . Let v(E ) +  v(E')  <  
1. Then by the definition of the integral f s X d v  =  x i  • v(E)  +  x^ • (1 — *>(.£?)). 
This means that the probability residual 1 — v(E )  — v(E')  is allocated to the worse 
outcome. Thus subadditivity of a players’ beliefs corresponds to his uncertainty 
aversion when facing genuine uncertainty. A decision-theoretic axiom atisation of 
uncertainty aversion in terms of preferences over acts is due to Schmeidler (1989)19.
When a player faces a non-rational opponent his relevant space of uncertainty is the 
opponent’s pure strategy set.Therefore, we assume that a rational player assigns to 
each of his opponent’s pure strategies Sj G Sj  some ’’probability weight” 6 3j >  0. 
Since any deviation from rationality is as non-rational as another, the player has 
no reason to regard any of a non-rational opponent’s strategies more likely than 
another. For this reason we assume 0Sj =  9, for all sj G Sj.  This also simplifies the 
analysis. For simplicity we also assume that the players are identical, i.e. that the 
6  is the same for both of them 20.
19For related axiom atisations see, e.g. G ilboa & Schmeidler (1989) and Sarin & Wakker (1994)
20 As before, introducing a different degree o f uncertainty aversion for the second player corre­
sponds to an additional degree of freedom. We think it is desirable not to introduce any ad hoc 
asymmetry.
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If a rational player is completely uncertainty averse, we have 0 =  0, and in evaluating 
one of his pure strategies the player will assign probability 1 to the opponent’s 
strategy that minimizes his utility. As long as 6  >  0, the player is only boundedly 
uncertainty averse, in that he gives some weight, however small, to other strategies 
of his opponent. Formally, this means that a rational player’s beliefs about the
strategy choice of a non-rational opponent is given by the capacity21
, , f 1 » E = Sjv{E) =  { 3
\  e\E\ , E c S j .
The assumption that the rational player is uncertainty averse thus translates into 
9 <  j^ j. The main point of this paper is that there is an interaction between 
uncertainty aversion and the game-theoretic definition of strategy, as long as the 
uncertainty aversion is bounded.
4.2.4 Expected Payoffs
The specification of this capacity now allows us to define the payoff, that a rational 
opponent expects if he plays his pure strategy s,- E S» and believes that his opponent 
is non-rational, as the CEU of his utility:
u(si , v)  := I u(si ,Sj )dv.
Jsj
Since a player does not know, however, if his opponent is rational or not, but has a 
prior belief e that the opponent is non-rational, his expected payoff from his strategy 
Si given that a rational opponent uses strategy Sj is given by
(1 -  e)u(s,-,s}) +  eu(si ,v) .
A rational player will choose a strategy that maximises his payoff not only at the 
beginning of the game, but also in each subgame. It thus remains to specify how a 
rational player’s beliefs change during the course of the game.
4.2.5 Updating and the Dempster-Shafer Rule
An updating rule has to generalize Bayes’ Rule to non-additive probability measures. 
We assume that non-additive beliefs are updated through the Dempster-Shafer rule.
21 Here |£7| denotes the cardinality of the set E.
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Formally, let v be a capacity and consider the events E , F  E S . The Dempster- 
Shafer rule specifies that the posterior capacity of event E  is given by
v { E U F ) - v ( F )
v(E \F )  :=
1 -  v(F)
The Dempster-Shafer rule (Dempster 1968, Shafer 1976) corresponds to Bayes’ Rule 
if  the capacity is additive. When it is not, it reflects the uncertainty aversion, or 
pessimism, of the player (Gilboa & Schmeidler 1993).
The main use we make of the Dempster-Shafer rule is that it allows the formalization 
of the updating process after an action that is only taken by a non-rational player: 
Let e be the prior probability that the opponent is not rational. Assume that the 
opponent has two actions A  and D , and that a rational opponent chooses action A  
with probability p. Then the posterior belief e' about the opponents’ rationality is 
given by
e - ( l - | 5 , | 0 )
l - e | 5 , | f l - ( l - e ) ( l - p ) ’
where (5^-1 is the number of the opponents’ strategies, in the subgame starting at 
the given node, that specify D. This is formally derived in the appendix.
Note that, first, if p  =  0 and only a non-rational player chooses A  the Dempster- 
Shafer rule gives the result that e' =  1. Secondly, if p  =  1 then e' <  e, i.e. a rational 
action is interpreted as evidence of rationality. Finally, as long as there is some 
doubt about the rationality of the opponent at the beginning of the game, there are 
no probability zero events.
We can now define the solution concept.
4.2.6 The Equilibrium Concept
An equilibrium is a strategy combination from which no rational player has an 
incentive to deviate unilaterally. We are considering an extensive game in which 
rationality is not mutual knowledge, so we have to extend this definition in two 
ways: First, we incorporate the assumption that rational players face genuine un­
certainty, maximise Choquet expected utility, are boundedly uncertainty averse and 
update their beliefs according to the Dempster-Shafer rule. Secondly, in the spirit 
of subgame perfection we require optimality at each decision node.
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A 6 -perfect Choquet-Nash equilibrium is a pair of behavior strategies (0^ , 0 2 ) such 
that
( 1 ) at each node, each pure strategy of a rational player in their support max­
imises his expected utility given his beliefs about the opponent’s rationality, 
the rational opponent’s strategy, and the degree of uncertainty aversion,
(2 ) the beliefs about rational opponents are correct, and
(3) the beliefs about the opponent’s rationality are updated according to the 
Dempster-Shafer rule.
We now have the following results:
Result 1:
Every centipede game has at least on 0-perfect Choquet-Nash equilibrium, for every 
common degree of uncertainty aversion 0  and every degree e o f mutual knowledge 
of rationality.
Result 2:
However small the degree c of lack of mutual knowledge of rationality, and however 
small the degree of uncertainty aversion, as long as they are positive, in the 0 -perfect 
Choquet-Nash equilibrium the first player will not play ‘Down’ with probability 1.
The results are formally stated and in section 4. In the next section we illustrate 
them by an example.
4.3 An Example
Consider the following centipede game:
1 A l 5 a 2 1 A 3 ‘ A a ' A 5  6  a 6 A-j 1600






500 400 2 0 0 0
10 60 50 250 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 800
Figure 2
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We assume that players have a common prior e =  |  that the opponent is non- 
rational. We assume that players are boundedly uncertainty averse with degree of 
uncertainty aversion 0 =  ^  for both players.
By backward induction, we analyse this game starting from node 7.
At n o d e  7, player P\  will achieve 2000 if he plays D 7  as opposed to 1600 if he plays 
A7 . He is no longer in a situation of strategic interaction but in a pure decision 
situation. Therefore D 7  is his optimal choice.
At n o d e  6, player P 2  faces both risk and uncertainty. He faces the risk that the 
opponent is non-rational, which is given by player TVs belief e& at node 6. Moreover, 
he faces the uncertainty what a non-rational opponent might play. The opponent 
has two strategies at node 7. Since P 2  is uncertainty averse, each of these strategies 
receives probability weight 0. The residual 1 — 20 is allocated to the strategy that 
is worst for P 2 . Thus his Choquet expected utility from a non-rational opponent is 
given by
u 2 (v6, A b) =  (1 -  20)800 +  0800 +  04000 
=  800 +  0 (4 0 0 0 -8 0 0 )
=  960.
In calculating his overall payoff from Aq , P 2  knows, by backward induction, that a 
rational player Pi will play D 7 , which results for P 2  in a payoff of 800. Thus his 
overall payoff is given by
( l - e 6)800 +  e6960.
P2  can ensure 1000 by playing Dq, so D$ is optimal.
At n o d e  5, it follows by the same reasoning that D$ is optimal.
At n o d e  4, player P 2  knows that a non-rational opponent has four strategies in the 
continuation game, and that it is optimal to play Dq at node 6. Thus TVs Choquet 
expected utility from a non-rational opponent is given by
u 2 {v a , A a ) =  (1 -4 0 )2 0 0  +  20200 +  201000 
= 200 + 20(1000- 200)
=  280.
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Thus his overall payoff is given by
(4.14) (1 -  e4)200 +  e4280.
P 2  can only ensure 250 by playing D 4 , so the optim al strategy depends on his beliefs
€4 .
By the Dempster-Shafer rule, € 4  and € 2  are related as follows:
(4.15) € 4  := < 2 - ( 1 - 4 )
l - 4 f2 - U - « 2 ) ( l - p 5 )
At n o d e  3, player Pi  knows that a non-rational opponent has four strategies in the 
continuation game, and that it is optimal to play D 5  at node 5. Thus P i ’s Choquet 
expected utility from a non-rational opponent is given by
u i { A 3 , v3) =  ( 1 - 4 0 ) 1 0 0  +  20100 +  20500 
=  100 +  20(500 -  100)
=  140.
Thus his overall payoff is given by
(4.16) (1 -  <r3)[p;500 +  (1 -  pj)100] +  <t3140,
where p \  is the probability with which a rational player P 2  plays A 4 . Pi  can only 
ensure 125 by playing D 3, so the optimal strategy depends on his beliefs e3 and on 
P2 ’s optim al strategy p\.
By the Dempster-Shafer rule, e3 and c are related as follows:
(4.17) e3 :=
1 _  + “ (! - < ) ( ! -  P5)
At n o d e  2, player P 2  knows that a non-rational opponent has eight strategies in 
the continuation game, and that it is optimal to play A 4  with probability p\  at node 
4. However, he also knows that at node 4 he can ensure 250, so that p \ ,  due to its 
optimality, ensures at least as much. Thus P2 ’s Choquet expected utility from a 
non-rational opponent is bounded below:
u 2 (v 2 , A 2) >  (1 -  80)50 +  4050 +  40250 
=  50 +  40(250 -  50)
=  90.
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Thus his overall payoff is bounded below by
(4.18) (1 -  e2)[p£250 +  (1 -  pj)50] +  e290,
where p$ is the probability with which a rational player P i plays A 3 . This payoff is 
bounded below by 50 +  40c2 for p£ =  0.
By the Dempster-Shafer rule, e2 and e are related as follows:
(4.19) €2 :=
At n o d e  1, player P i knows that a non-rational opponent has eight strategies in
the continuation game, and that it is optimal to play A 3  with probability p£ at node
3, which gives at least 125. Thus P i ’s Choquet expected utility from a non-rational 
opponent is bounded below:
(4.20) u i(A i,v i)  >  ( 1 - 8 0 ) 2 5  +  4025 +  40125
(4.21) =  25 +  40(125 -  25)
(4.22) =  45.
Thus his overall payoff is bounded below by
(l-d )[j> S 1 2 5  +  ( l - p S ) 2 5 ] + e i4 5 ,
where p£ is fhe probability with which a rational player P2 plays A 2.
Since ci := e =  it follows that
9ftf)
(1 -  6i ) K 125 +  (1 -  P2)25] +  ci45 =  y  +
Since D i gives 30, P i will prefer A \.
From the Dempster-Shafer rule, this implies
(a ogi f    € ' ^  ~  20)______( 4 ^ 3 )  2 •—______^6  (1   w i  _  *\
1 2 0  ( K Pi)
(4-24) =  1
This, in turn, implies that at node 2 the continuation payoff is bounded below by 
50 +  40e2 =  Yi <  60. This shows that despite the boundedness of uncertainty 
aversion the increasing payoffs alone do not lead player P2 to choose ‘Across’ at
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node 2. If he does so, then because he expects a rational opponent also to be 
willing to go ‘Across’. In equilibrium, these beliefs are self-fulfilling.
We now show that an equilibrium is given by
P2 = 1,
* _  36 
P s  ~  1 000 ’
and
* _  4 1  
Pa 800'
First, p , =  1 is optim al because, from (5) with e2 =  jp and p | =
( l - e 2 )[p5250 +  ( l - p 3 ) 5 0 ]  +  e290 
=  — +  2 0 0 10 36




From (4) with =  1 we have
6e
f3 = 1 0 - 4 c  
_3_
13'
Secondly, given p \  and e3 , player Pi is indifferent between A 3  and D 3  
and so is willing to mix. From (3) his continuation payoff is given by
(1  -  c3)K 5 0 0  +  (1  -  p*)100] +  c3140
=  -^-[(1000 +  205 +  420] 
lo
=  125.
From (2), with and e2 =  j j  we have
6e2
€4 =





6 + I o
at node 3,
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Finally, given e4 =  | ,  player P i is indifferent between A \  and Z}4, because his 
continuation payoff is, from (1),




To summarize, the equilibrium is given by: 
1 1 2 1 3 361000 4 -11** 800
1 1 1 1 964 759 11 11 i 1000 800
i * T
30 25 125 1 0 0 500 400




We end this section with some remarks:
(1) In this example, no pure strategy equilibrium exists. This can be seen from 
equations (1) and (2): If =  0 then e4 =  1, thus A* is optim al, which leads to
=  1, a contradiction. Conversely, ifp^ =  1 then (5) implies =  1. But then 
€ 3  =  and the continuation payoff (3) at node 3 is (1 — £3 ) 1 0 0  +  £3140 <  125, 
which leads to p3 =  0, another contradiction. In general, however, a pure 
strategy equilibrium may exist.
(2) In our example, e =   ^ is larger than in Kreps et al. (1982) and McKelvey & 
Palfrey (1992). It can be shown, however, that for no e >  0 will D 1 be chosen 
with probability one. More generally, here £ refers to a player’s belief that the 
opponent is rational, and reasons in the same way as the player himself. This 
makes a high £ a plausible parameter value.
(3) Players adjust the belief e about the opponent’s rationality both upward and 
downward, and not just in one direction. An action that is taken by a rational 
player with high probability is taken as evidence of rationality and £ is adjusted 
downward. Conversely, an action that a rational player only chooses with 





(4) It is interesting to note that the taking probability does not increase monoton- 
ically. Also, in contrast to the sequential equilibrium in McKelvey & Palfrey 
(1992) the taking probability may be 1 not only at the last two nodes of the 
game.
(5) The analysis does not give a bell-shaped distribution over the terminal nodes. 
In McKelvey & Palfrey (1992), the sequential equilibrium alone does not either, 
however, they are able to show that the incorporation of learning can explain 
the empirical data.
4.4 Results
We now state and prove the results formally.
Definition.
A centipede game T =  (n, ({.Di, A.i})i=i,...,n , (a*, ^*)*=i,---,«-l-i) Is given by a set N  ° f
n nodes i  E N,  for each node two actions D{ and A,-, and for each action Di and
for A n two payoffs a,- and 6,- such that
( 1 ) a,- and &,• are strictly increasing in i,
(2) <Zi >  6,-+i,
(3) rji :=  is weakly increasing in i,
(4) rji <  g for all i E iV.
For pure strategies Si and «2 let U j(si,S 2 ) be ak or 6&, where k :=  min^'Is^A:') =  
Dk> for some player j  }, depending on whether k 6  Nj  or not. Let <tj be a behavior 
strategy of player j ,  where c j( i)  specifies the probability of ‘Across’ at node i under 
<Tj. Let uj (0 1 , 0 -2 ) be the expected utility22 of player j  under the behavior strategies 
cti, cr2.
Let 6  be the common degree of uncertainty aversion of the two players, where23
0 <  6  <  9 := - i j - .  For given n, 9 is the upper bound on 6  to ensure uncertainty 
2~f~
aversion.
22 Behavior strategies define additive probabilities over the pure strategy sets, so th is is the usual 
expectation.
23The upper bound on 0 preserves uncertainty aversion. If it is violated, both propositions still 
hold, but proposition 2 is due to uncertainty love alone.
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Note that 6  <  A t is equivalent24 to n <  n := [—(2 (Id 9) +  1)], where Id denotes
2~3
the logarithm to the base 2. For given 6 , n is the upper bound on n that ensures 
that players are uncertainty averse even at the beginning of the game.
Definition.
Let T be a centipede game. Let N i and N 2  be the set o f player l ’s and 2 ’s decision 
nodes i. Let 9 be the degree of the players’ attitude towards uncertainty aversion, 
and let e be the common prior about rationality, let €0 =  a  :=  e Then a 6 -perfect 
Choquet-Nash equilibrium is a pair of behavior strategies such that if sj
and are in the support of <xj and
(1) sj G argm ax4l( l  -  € ,)u i(si,< 72)+  c ,« i( s i ,u 1), V iG iV i,
s i  G argm ax,2( l  -  e ,)u2( (^ ,s 2)-l-e.-u^t;,-,^), V* G N 2,
(o\ -  _  e r ( l - | 5 , . i + i | g )
(2) et+2 -  ! _ e .|s . i+1 Is_ (1_«7) ( 1  - ( 7; (»•+1 )) >
(3) «!(«!, Vi) : = / 5a .+1 W i(si,s2)dv,-,
U2 (v,-,s2) :=  f Si i+ iu2 (s 1 , s 2 )dvi ,
f  1 , E  =  Si i
(4) Vi(E ) =  {  J>
\  <?|£| , E  C S jti ,
where S jti is the strategy set of the opponent in the subgame beginning at node i. 
Proposition I.
For all e and all 6 , there exists a 6 -perfect Choquet-Nash equilibrium.
Proof . 2 5
Let u i(s i,V i) and u2(v,-,s2) be defined as in (3) and (4), and let ui(cr1,v ,) and 
« 2 (vi,cr2) be the (additive) expectations of u i(si,v ,-) and it2(v,-,s2) under the be­
havior strategies oq and <r2. Consider the correspondence26 <p : [0, l]n x [0, l]n_1 — y 
[0,1]" x [0 ,1]" -1, (o-!(*),(72(0 , €i) ^  (o-i(*),o-2(0 .< ) :
(4.5) a'^i) := argm ax(l -  c)ui(p, c 2) +  e,-iti(p, v,-) Vi G N i,
p
24 Following Kolmogorov & Fomin (1954), we denote for a 6  1  the integral part by [a] (the
largest integer sm aller than a) ,  and the fractional part by <  a >  (<  a > =  a — [a]).
25The only difference to the standard existence proof is that we apply fixed point argum ents
directly to the extensive form. The reason for this is that there is no agent normal form, since
non-rational players cannot be modelled as  players, who would choose additive behavior strategies.
On the other hand, applying non-additive equilibrium concepts to the normal form game between
rational agents only would require a model of independent choices by more than two players with
heterogeneous priors about the rationality of the opponents.
26Note that equation (7) is well-defined for e; =  0. Given our assum ption that e > 0, e; will not
assume this value, yet it must be included in order to have a com pact domain.
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(4.6) 0-2 (1) :=  argm ax(l -  t)u 2 {<ru p) +  tiU 2 (v i,p )  V *  G N 2,
p
We first show that a fixed point of this correspondence is a 0-perfect Choquet-Nash 
equilibrium:
L e t  (o - i( i) ,£ 2 ( 0 1**') G  ¥>(o-i(»),£ 2 (*),£»)• T h is m e a n s
(4.8) o-i(i) G argm ax(l -  i)u i(p , &2) +  f*wi(p, t;,-) Vi G N i,
p
(4.9) 0-2(0 G argm ax(l -  c)u2(<7i,p) -(- e,u2(v,-,p)
p
(4.10)
fi+2 : 1 -  -  (1 -  i i )(l  -  «■>(*’ + 1)) '
By their definitions, u i ( p ,  o-2), u 2 (<Ti,p), u i(p , v^) and u 2 ( v i , p )  are linear in p ,  so
in their support.27 Consequently (<xi(i),d-2(0>fi) satisfy (1) —  (4) for any given
€ = € 0 =  € i .
It remains to be shown that such a fixed point exists. Since <p maps a closed, 
bounded and convex subset of a finite-dimensional Euclidean space into itself, Kaku- 
tani’s Theorem (1941) implies that a fixed point exists if (p is non-empty, convex­
valued and has a closed graph. Since the maximands are linear in p, they are 
continuous over a compact domain and, by Weierstrafi’ Theorem, the m axim a in
(5) and (6) exist. Moreover, (7) uniquely determines e(+2. So <p is non-empty. Also, 
from the linearity of (5) and (6) and the uniqueness of (7), <p is convex-valued. 
Finally, by Berge’s Maximum Theorem (1959), <p is closed-valued and upper hemi- 
continuous. This implies that <p has a closed graph (Border 1985, p .56, Theorem  
11.9 (a)). This completes the proof.
Note that the equilibrium is not unique. Intuitively, a rational player will go across if 
his expected utility from a non-rational opponent —  determined by his uncertainty 
aversion —  and the expected utility from a rational opponent —  weighted by his 
belief about the likelihood of non-rationality — is higher or equal than his payoff 
from going down. His belief at this node is his update given his initial beliefs and 
the rational strategies. It may be that the initial belief is exactly such to make him 
indifferent. Generically, however, this will not be the case.
27Note that for u \ ( p ,  V i )  and U 2 ( v i , p )  this is due to the order of integration.
if  <Ti(i) and a 2(») are maximisers then so are the pure strategies s i( i)  and s 2 (i)
1*24
We refer to player P,- as the player who moves at node i, and denote by 5,- the set of 
pure strategies of player P,- in the subgame starting at node i. We denote by <r*(i) 
the equilibrium probability with which player Pt- plays Ai at node i.
Proposition 2.
V6  >  0 Ve >  0 3N  Vn : If  N  < n  < n  then o’* (1) ^  0.
Proof. Indirect. Suppose 0-*(l) =  0. Then € 2  =  1 and P 2 will choose A 2  if  
a 2  <  (1 -  e2) [^*(3 ) 0 4  +  (1 -  o-*(3))63]
which is equivalent to
+£2 [(1 -  «|S3|)63 + 0 ^ 6 3 + J y U ] ,
m  <  <>— ■
Now define N  as the smallest integer bigger than 4 +  2 (Id 7/2) — 2 (Id 6 ). Note that
4 +  2 (Id 772) -  2 (Id 0) <  —2(Id 0) -  2
<=>  Id 772 <  —3
<=> *
so that N  < n .  Finally consider n with N  <  n <  n: Note that
4 +  2(ld 772) — 2(ld 0) <  n
* = *  (Id V )
. 2 t 2
V2 < 0— T— .
But |53| >  2* 3 3 , and thus <r*(2) =  1. But since
1 >  Vu
IS. I >  Iftl,
» — > m
and
m  >  771,
we have independently of e
i , , < ( l - e )  +  e 9 ^ 1 .




A 0-perfect Choquet-Nash equilibrium is a solution concept for the centipede game 
that combines subgame-perfection with uncertainty aversion. We suggest as a rea­
son why players choose ‘Across’ early in the game the boundedness of uncertainty 
aversion. Even though players are uncertainty averse, if there is enough uncertainty 
from which players can profit and if they expect their rational opponents also to 
play ‘Across’ then it is indeed rational to play ‘Across’.
On a conceptual level, the equilibrium concept allows the analysis o f the centipede 
game without the assumption that rationality is mutual knowledge. It avoids sev­
eral difficulties that arise in the Kreps et al. (1982) approach: First, non-rational 
players are not necessarily ‘altruistic’ and always play ‘Across’. Secondly, we do not 
need to specify any particular belief about non-rational opponents, which in the 
absence of a theory of non-rational play would necessarily be ad hoc. In particular, 
we can avoid the difficulties associated with the uniform distribution as a model 
of ignorance. Thirdly, we do not need to refer to non-rational players as types, 
which would ascribe to them a consistent hierarchy of beliefs. Finally, the solution 
concept is consistent with the interpretation of equilibrium strategies as rational 
strategies, which implicitly defines all other strategies as non-rational. As a result, 
the structure of the game may be assumed to be mutual knowledge.
At the same time, our solution concept builds on existing game-theoretic concepts. 
First, the analysis is in the same spirit as Kreps et al. (1982), which has proved to 
be so useful in industrial organization. Secondly, the solution concept is an equi­
librium concept, and avoids the indeterminateness associated with weaker solution 
concepts. Similarly, the solution concept is static, and does not rest on the specifi­
cation of a dynamic learning or evolutionary process. Finally, we preserve the spirit 
of subgame perfection in requiring optim ality at all decision nodes. Thus we extend 
the approach of Dow & Werlang (1994) to extensive games.
The lim itations of our approach are the following: First, the actual computation of 
an equilibrium may be complicated, it corresponds to the computation of a fixed 
point, as does the sequential equilibrium in McKelvey & Palfrey (1992). Secondly, 
the degree of uncertainty aversion is not directly observable. How to elicit this 
degree from a purely decision-theoretic environment is an issue for future research.
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That the degree of uncertainty aversion is bounded, however, seems a plausible 
hypothesis whose usefulness can only be established empirically. Finally, while our 
solution concept gives an ‘inner’ equilibrium for the centipede game, it does not 
replicate the distribution of actual choices. While the sequential equilibrium with  
‘altruistic’ types in McKelvey & Palfrey (1992) alone does not give this distribution 
either, McKelvey & Palfrey (1992) show that additional hypotheses, both about 
how players make mistakes and how they learn during the game, do. To introduce 
such hypotheses in a consistent way is another topic for future research.
Appendix
Let v  be a capacity and consider the events E , F  E E. The Dempster-Shafer rule 
specifies that the posterior capacity of event E  is given by
v( E u T ) - v(F )
V 1 ' l - v ( F )
Let e be the prior probability that the opponent is not rational. Assume that the 
opponent has two actions A  and D  at the given node n. Assume that a rational 
opponent chooses action A  with probability p. Finally, assume S  is the set o f the 
opponent’s pure strategies that specify the action D  at the given node.
Then the posterior belief e' about the opponent’s rationality after action A  is given 
by
c ( l - | S | * )
I -  {I -  c )(l -  p) -  \S\0c' 
where |5 | is the number of the opponents’ strategies S, and c the prior belief about 
the opponent’s rationality, with 0 <  e <  1.
This is derived as follows:
Let R  be the event that the opponent is rational, let R  be the event that he is 
non-rational.
We want to calculate
v ( R U D ) - v ( D )
(4.11) e' =  v(R \A ) :=
1 -  v{D )
First,
(4.12) v(R \A ) +  v(fl|A ) =  1,
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and
(3) v(R \A ) =  ^ T J f D^ DK
(4) t , ^ )  =  v<fi1% ) <P)
imply
v(D ) =  v (R  U D ) +  v (R  U D ) — 1.
Secondly,
(5) v{D \R ) =  v(P1U. ^ (g ) , and
(6) n (D |fi)  =
We know that
(7) v(R )  =  1 -  e,
(8) v(R) = f,
(9) v(D \R )  =  1 — p, and
(10) v (D \R ) =  \s\e,
so that
(11) v (D  U R) =  (1 — e)(l — p) +  e, and
(12) u (D U f l)  =  |S|0e +  ( l - 6 ) .
Thus
v(D ) =  (1 - £ ) ( 1  - p )  +  |5|dc.
£ - ( l - | S | t f )
Consequently,
(4.13) £' :=
l - ( l - £ ) ( l - p ) - | S | d f ’
Note:
• The derivation is only valid under lack of mutual knowledge of rationality, i.e. 
for e >  0 and e <  1, otherwise v(D \R ) or v(D |/2) are not well-defined.
• W ith 0 <  € <  1 there are no probability zero events. Since |5 | strategies specify 
action D and there are two actions at this node, the number of strategies is 2 |5 |. 
So uncertainty aversion means 6  <  It follows that
v(D )  =  (1 -  e )(l -  p) +  \S\0c <  (1 -  e )( l -  p) +  i f  <  1.
This holds for any p £  [0,1], including the boundaries.
• In particular, if e >  0 then e' >  0, independently of p. However, if p =  0, then 
(! — 1. Thus we also need to be able to update the belief e =  1. Intuitively, if
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the prior belief about the opponent is that he is non-rational and beliefs about 
his behavior are boundedly uncertainty averse, then there are no probability 
zero events, and the posterior belief should also be that the opponent is non- 
rational.This can be justified directly from the Dempster-Shafer rule (1): From 
monotonicity, v(R ) <  v (R  U D ), therefore v (R  U D ) =  1. Also, (6) implies 
v(D \R ) =  v(D  U R ), so again by monotonicity, v(D ) <  v (D  U R) =  I*?!# <  1. 
Since this result also follows if we substitute e =  1 into (13), we do not have to  
explicitly track this special case.
• The reason why e =  0 has to be excluded is that there is no parallel argument 
that e =  0 and p — 0 should give e' =  1. (3) implies v (D  U R) =  =  1 and
(1) gives e' =  but v{D ) <£ 1.
• Whether action A  is interpreted as evidence of rationality or evidence of non- 
rationality depends on p, |S | and 6 :
e' <  e
*= *  i - ( i -£(kT-p) - |5 |^  -  e
<£=> ( l - e ) ( l - p )  < ( l - c ) | S | 0
<==> p > 1 — |5|0.
Other things equal, the higher the probability of A, the more likely it is that A  
is evidence of rationality, because A  is taken with high probability by rational 
players. The lower 6  and |5 |, the less likely it is that A  is interpreted as evidence 
of rationality, because the greater is the uncertainty that A  is taken by a non- 
rational player.
• Finally, note that the argument rests heavily on (2), i.e. the the requirement 
about beliefs that an opponent is either rational or non-rational, so that these 




The thesis has attempted to contribute to a clarification of the concept of strategic 
rationality.
We assumed that the rationality concept is an equilibrium concept. On the basis 
that a rationality concept does not restrict non-rational play, and that deviations 
from rational play should be taken as evidence of non-rationality, we argued for non­
additive beliefs about non-rational play. For the case of uncertainty-averse players 
we developed equilibrium concepts that capture this intuition. Their main feature 
in extensive games is that equilibrium reasoning is only applied to the equilibrium  
path; due to complete ignorance and uncertainty aversion players apply maximin 
reasoning off the equilibrium path. The solution concept than endogenously deter­
mines the equilibrium path.
There are, of course, several limitations of the analysis. We only consider uncer­
tainty aversion, not uncertainty love, even though uncertainty aversion is not a 
universal empirical phenomenon. An extreme consequence of our equilibrium con­
cept is that the strategic interaction comes to an end after a move that reveals the 
non-rationality of the opponent. On the other hand, the view that such deviations 
say nothing at all about the rationality of the opponent, and that is underlying stan­
dard solution concepts, is equally extreme. Still, we view the equilibrium concept 
proposed here at best as a basis for further refinements.
On a theoretical level, we feel that further developments will largely depend on 
progress in the decision-theoretic aspects of Choquet expected utility theory and 
its variants. In particular, a joint axiomatisation of preferences and their updating 
seems an important area of research. W ithin game theory proper, we feel that there 
is a need to give formal epistemic characterisations for equilibrium concepts with 
non-additive beliefs, without assuming that players already start with non-additive 
beliefs.
Ultimately, however, we think that the success of any theoretical construct not only
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depends on its intrinsic plausibility, but also on its usefulness in applications. In 
this respect, the following may be areas where approaches like ours may be useful:
First, game theory with non-additive beliefs may offer new insights into institutions. 
That one reason for the existence of institutions may be the objective to overcome 
non-rational individual decision making is a widespread intuition. In addition, they 
may exist in order to overcome non-additive beliefs in situations in which relative 
frequencies decide on the long-run success of the institution. Or alternatively, they 
may reflect non-additive beliefs by institutionalising the implementation of mixed  
strategies if there is a strict preference for mixtures. Also, these considerations 
are then not only relevant for the existence, but also the internal organisation of 
institutions.
Secondly, allowing for non-additive beliefs may help to explain evidence in experi­
mental game theory. Since uncertainty aversion effects are well-documented in de­
cision situations, a theoretical framework may help to identify them in games and 
to distinguish them from other dimensions of boundedly rational decision-making. 
Also, experimental games may further refine our understanding of uncertainty aver­
sion just as experiments in decision theory do.
Finally, an important area of economics for applications of game-theoretic concepts 
that use weaker rationality requirements is mechanism design. Optimal mechanism  
should be robust with respect to doubts about the rationality of the players, and 
should still lead to satisfying outcomes if non-rational players deviate. M inimax 
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